


THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE NAVAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE RECEIVING THEIR SALUTE AT MARINE BARRACKS, QUANTICO, VA.

Left to right: Colonel C. F. B. Price, U.S.M.C., (Comd'g. Officer 5th Marines, F.M.F.); Captain Wm. L. Mann (M.C.), U.S.N. (Post Surgeon); Colonel E. A. Osterman, U.S.M.C., (Liaison Officer); Lt.-Col. Archie F. Howard, U.S.M.C.; Lt.-Comdr. P. J. Halloran, (C.E.C.), U.S.N.; Colonel H. N. Manney, U.S.M.C., (Chief of Staff); Representatives Darrow (Pa.); McFarlane (Tex.); Higgins (Conn.); Vinson (Ga.), Chairman; Sutphin (N. J.); Kniffin (Ohio); Maas (Minn.); O'Connell (R. I.); Church (Ill.); Young (Ohio).

MAY, 1935

LEGISLATION NUMBER



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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. 19

MAY, 1935

No. 2

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Cover

House Naval Affairs Committee—Quantico

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DUES OVERDUE

■ The fact that our "fogies," or increase in pay for every three years' service, has been restored, beginning July 1, by virtue of S. 2287, which was signed by the President on June 13, 1935, should be another reason why the members of the Association who are in arrears in dues should send in their checks.—Ed.

The Marine Corps Association

ORGANIZED APRIL 25, 1913, AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

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OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP—Active membership open to officers of the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve and to former officers of honorable service with annual dues of \$3.00. Associate membership, with annual dues of \$3.00 open to officers of the Army, Navy and Organized Militia and to those in civil life who are interested in the aims of the Association. Honorary members shall be elected by unanimous vote of the Board of Officers.

Associate membership, with annual dues of \$2.00, including yearly subscription to THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, open to enlisted men of the Marine Corps of the first pay grade.

CONTRIBUTIONS—The GAZETTE desires articles on any subject of interest to the Marine Corps. Articles accepted will be paid for at the GAZETTE'S authorized rates. Non-members of the Association as well as members may submit articles. In accepting articles for publication, the GAZETTE reserves the right to revise or rearrange articles where necessary.

All communications for the Marine Corps Association and THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington. Checks for payment of dues should be made payable to the Secretary-Treasurer.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C., *Editor*

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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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No. 2



LEGISLATION

HOW IT WORKS

■ The draft of a proposed law submitted to Congress for enactment is called a bill. The usual form of introduction of a bill is by a member of either the Senate or House of Representatives laying it on the clerk's table. Such bills are either drafted by the Congressman himself, or he adopts a draft furnished him by someone. Sometimes bills are drafted by a committee, as when communications addressed to either house by an executive department or other source are referred to committees to originate the necessary bill.

Bills introduced are referred to an appropriate committee. The most important are the Appropriations Committee and the Ways and Means Committee. All bills that relate to appropriation of money must be considered by and reported out by the Appropriations Committee of the House. The Ways and Means Committee has to consider and report out all bills that have in any way to do with raising revenue, tariff, or any form of taxes. There is a Foreign Affairs Committee, which considers bills which concern the relations of the United States with foreign nations; a Committee on Naval Affairs, which has to do with all legislation relating to the Navy and Marine Corps; a Committee on Military Affairs, which has to do with legislation relating to the Army, National Guard, etc.; a Committee on Claims, and many others.

When a bill is referred to a committee, it is numbered and printed. The committee, if it sees fit, conducts hearings, at which persons interested in the proposed legislation are questioned as to the need for it. The committee may then report the bill to its house, with recommendation. The recommendation will usually be that the bill be passed without amendment, or with certain amendments suggested by the committee.

Occasionally a privileged bill is considered in the

House or Senate when reported, but usually it is placed with the unprivileged bills on the calendar where it belongs. There are several calendars in the House of Representatives. There is (1) the Union Calendar, to which are referred bills raising revenue, appropriation bills and bills of a public character directly or indirectly appropriating money or property; (2) the House Calendar, to which are referred bills of a public character not raising revenue or directly or indirectly appropriating money or property; (3) the Private Calendar, to which are referred bills of a private character; and (4) the Consent Calendar, to which upon request of a member may be transferred bills from the House Calendar and Union Calendar.

When a bill is reached for consideration it may be either passed or defeated. If the bill is passed it is then sent to the other house of Congress, where it goes through the same procedure of reference to a committee, hearings if desired by the committee, report made by the committee, placement on its appropriate calendar, and later consideration on the floor.

If the second house amends the bill it must go back to the house in which it originated for consideration of the amendment, which may be accepted or rejected. In the case of important bills, such for example as the naval appropriation bill, upon its return to the House with Senate amendments, when the amendments are rejected both houses appoint conferees to meet and to endeavor to settle the differences. When the conferees agree they report back to their respective houses, which then accept their report or reject it and require further conference.

When both houses of Congress have passed a bill it is then sent to the President for his action. If the President approves the bill he does so with his signature. The bill, then called an act, is now a law. If the President disapproves the bill he returns it with a state-

ment giving his reasons—veto message. It is then voted on again as to whether the bill shall pass over the President's veto. If two-thirds of the members present and voting in both House and Senate vote to pass the bill over the veto, the bill then becomes a law.

Ed.

LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR

■ The following is the standing as of June 25, of the Marine Corps legislative calendar with the 74th Congress. Later issues will carry any changes:

H. R. 35, "To establish boards in the Navy and Marine Corps for hearing and passing upon petitions for correction of records of persons discharged under other than honorable conditions."

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. McCormack and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

H. R. 133, "To authorize the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to furnish a firing squad to fire the customary salute for any ex-service man."

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. Celler and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

H. R. 3027, "Authorizing the pay of warrant officers on the retired list for transferred members of the Fleet Naval Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve who served as commissioned officers during the World War."

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. Hoeppel and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

H. R. 3029, "To amend Section 2 of the Act of May 23, 1930 (46 Stat. 375)."

Introduced by Mr. Hoeppel January 3, 1935, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Would allow credit on retirement to Reserve members for Army service and double time authorized by law to be counted on retirement.

H. R. 5231, "To amend Section 2 of the Act of May 25, 1930."

Introduced by Mr. Hoeppel February 1, 1935, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

This is the same as the preceding bill, *H. R. 3029*, with an added proviso giving the Secretary of the Navy authority to correct errors in computation of service for retirement, etc.

H. R. 3032, "To amend the Act of April 27, 1916, establishing the Army and Navy medal of honor roll."

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. Hoeppel and referred to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

This would add to the medal of honor roll and make eligible for the special pension of \$10 a month for life persons who have served in the military or naval service in any war, who have attained or shall attain the age of sixty-five years, were awarded medals of honor, etc., and who were retired from active service.

H. R. 3216, "For the relief of the present leaders of the United States Navy Band and the band of the United States Marine Corps."

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. Vinson and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Reported April 4, 1935. Laid on table June 3, 1935.

Would allow rank, pay and allowances of a lieutenant in the Navy and a captain in the Marine Corps, respectively, all service to be counted as commissioned service; and retirement as a lieutenant in the Navy and a captain in the Marine Corps, respectively.

H. R. 3618, "To amend an Act providing for promotion by selection and retirement of officers in the line of the Navy, by extending its provisions to officers of the Marine Corps and for other purposes."

Introduced by Mr. Sanders January 10, 1935, and

referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported favorably June 23, 1935.

Provides that officers specially commended for performance of duty in actual combat with the enemy during the World War shall be placed on the retired list with the rank of the next higher grade and three-fourths of the pay they were receiving at the time of retirement. Same provisions apply if retired for physical disability or on their own application.

H. R. 7957, "For the relief of certain officers on the retired list of the Navy and Marine Corps, who have been commended for their performance of duty in actual combat with the enemy during the World War."

Introduced May 8, 1935, by Mr. Drewry, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. *Passed House Naval Affairs Committee June 17, 1935.*

Provides that all officers who have been or may hereafter be retired for physical disability and who have been commended for their performance of duty in actual combat with the enemy during the World War shall be placed on the retired list with the rank of the next higher grade. No increase of pay, *85 Marine Officers concerned.*

H. R. 4016, "To repeal Section 16 of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes,' approved May 29, 1934."

Introduced January 18, 1935, by Mr. Drewry and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported February 5, 1935. Passed the House of Representatives March 27, 1935. Hearings held by Senate Naval Affairs Committee May 21, 1935. *No report to date.* No action expected this session.

H. R. 5257, "To amend Section 7 of the Act approved May 29, 1934 (48 Stat. 811)."

Introduced February 4, 1935, by Mr. Drewry and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Would provide boards for selection of brigadier generals for advancement to major general to be composed of major generals as far as possible.

H. R. 5270, "To authorize certain officers of the United States Navy, and officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps, to accept such medals, orders, diplomas, decorations, and photographs as have been tendered them by foreign governments in appreciation of services rendered."

Introduced February 4, 1935, by Mr. O'Connell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 1975, Same title as *H. R. 5270.*

Introduced February 15, 1935, by Mr. Trammell, and referred to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported May 24, 1935.

H. R. 5303, "For the relief of Charles W. Eaton."

Introduced February 4, 1935, by Mr. Gambrill. Referred to Committee on Naval Affairs.

Would permit him to count, for retirement purposes only, time served as a member of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippine Islands.

H. R. 5374, "Authorizing members of the naval service to whom a commemorative or special medal has been awarded to wear in lieu thereof a miniature facsimile of such medal and a ribbon symbolic of the award."

Introduced February 5, 1935, by Mr. Kniffin and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

H. R. 5576, "Navy Public Works Bill. Reported from

(Continued on page 41)

THE OLD BEAR OF THE NORTH

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER F. J. BIRKETT
United States Coast Guard

■ Achievement, success and accomplishment have invariably accompanied the famous old U.S.S. *Bear*. Her career under Uncle Sam, dating from the Greeley Expedition in 1884, covers nearly half a century.

Following failure of the relief expedition of 1882 and 1883 to reach Lieutenant Greeley and his party of observers at Camp Conger, near Cape Sabine, Elsmere Land, Commander Schley, later Rear Admiral of the U. S. Navy, brought about on January 28, 1884, the purchase of the former whaling steamer *Bear* from her owners, Grieve & Co., of St. John's, Newfoundland, for \$100,000. Urgency of the relief prompted the purchase of the ship, jointly by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, in advance of authorization by Congress. When the Secretary of War was asked what would happen if the resolution authorizing the purchase failed to pass Congress, he replied that he supposed he would own one-half of a good vessel. As it turned out, the funds for the purchase were available only two days before the *Bear's* arrival at Brooklyn Navy Yard, February 15, 1884.

The *Bear* was built at Greenock, Scotland, in 1874, and as a whaler during the intervening years made a reputation for being an Arctic ice vessel of the finest type. Her frames were of oak, twelve inches square, close together, with solid wood for the forward eight feet of her bow. For the Greeley relief work, heavy "A" frames were added amidships and the hull rounded off near the keel; a sheathing two and a half inches thick, of Australian ironwood, was applied over the underbody. The vessel possessed sufficient elastic strength to allow her beams to be compressed as much as a foot by ice pressure and then again to spring back in place. The sturdy reciprocating engine of about 350 indicated horsepower still is her propelling unit. A three-furnace Scotch boiler provides the steam. Barkentine rig was wisely provided for duty so remote from repair.

Under command of Lieutenant W. H. Emory, U.S.N., and with a volunteer crew of thirty-four officers and men, the *Bear* departed from the Brooklyn Navy Yard April 24, 1884. St. John's, Newfoundland, was reached ten days later, and shortly thereafter she sailed for the far North. In addition to the *Bear* on this mission were also under Commander Schley, the *Thetis* and *Alert*. The Commander, cheerfully and with the belief that his vessel would be the first to reach the Greeley survivors, extended the offer of \$25,000 reward to any of the whaling fleet who might be first to make the rescue. His faith in the *Bear* was well founded, for accounts of the cruise credit the *Bear* with usually being in the lead, and with being able to work through the ice and the first to reach the survivors of the ill-fated expedition.

TO THE REVENUE SERVICE

Upon return to New York from the successful expedition, in August, 1884, the Navy Department transferred



the *Bear* to the U. S. Revenue-Cutter Service, now the U. S. Coast Guard. Captain A. B. Davis of the Revenue-Cutter Service took command of the *Bear*, fitted her out for humanitarian work, and she sailed in November, 1885, for the long voyage through the Straits of Magellan, bound for San Francisco. Arriving there in February, 1886, the *Bear* was provisioned for an eight months' trip to the Arctic and, early that spring, under command of Captain Michael A. Healy, U. S. Revenue-Cutter Service, left for her first voyage to the North Alaskan coast.

For forty-two years the *Bear* made annual voyages, averaging 16,000 miles each year, into the Arctic; unlike most of the vessels engaged in those waters, she never failed to come back. Is it a wonder that the Eskimo looked upon the *Bear* as impregnable, possessed of a charmed life, an institution, even a living personality? To the inhabitants of the Far North the *Bear* appeared as the whole of the United States Government. With a strong steam engine, electric lights and, later, radio, the *Bear* was the greatest evidence of the marvellous magic of the white man. The first arm of the Federal Government to penetrate these remote corners of our continent,

the Captain of the *Bear*, who served in his official capacity as a United States Commissioner, was looked upon by the Eskimos more or less as we look up to a Chief Justice or the President. Another officer of the ship acted in the capacity of United States Marshal. Such a means of direct handling of minor infractions of the law was necessary. Above the Arctic Circle the polar pack limits materially the open season for navigation. In some instances major crimes were tried by a floating court carried aboard the *Bear*; on other occasions it was necessary to transport everyone concerned, accused, plaintiff, and witnesses, to the Federal Court at Nome, Alaska.

Besides her judicial duties, the *Bear* was kept busy with dozens of other prescribed duties, the major ones being assisting vessels in distress, prevention of seal and sea otter poaching, meteorological observations, transportation of numerous Federal Officials and scientists, carrying of mail, census taking, medical and surgical aid, rounding up of destitute and undesirable citizens, transporting supplies for Government Departments, making surveys, providing passage for school teachers and missionaries, and maintaining a general surveillance of thousands of miles of Alaskan shoreline.

One of the first rescues by the *Bear* was of the crew of whaling Bark *Napoleon*, which went ashore near Cape Navarin, Siberia. The distress call was conveyed to Captain Healy of the *Bear* by words carved on a driftwood board, passed along from native to native, through the coast villages. When it was finally delivered and deciphered, the *Bear* went to the rescue and picked up the almost despairing crew of the *Napoleon*.

SCORES RESCUED

During the following years scores of wrecked mariners, mostly the crews of whaling vessels, were rescued by the *Bear* and returned to civilization.

Each year the *Bear* made the perilous voyage up to Point Barrow, the northern tip of Alaska, seven hundred miles beyond Bering Strait. In order to reach this objective, it was necessary frequently to battle with the ice pack to keep from being permanently caught and crushed. Progress could be made only when the wind blew off the Alaskan shore, clearing the ice pack away for a few hours. While at Point Barrow "all hands" worked hard to complete unloading and loading, for at the first sign of a shift of wind on shore the *Bear* retreated at best speed to the southward.

Time and again the *Bear's* fate was nearly sealed. May I quote from an official report by Captain F. Tuttle: "July 22, 1898, worked through the ice to Icy Cape, anchoring there at 12:55 p. m. Ice still heavy to the northward and westward. On July 23, there appeared to be little or no change in the ice, concluded to send Lieutenant H. G. Hamlet (now Rear Admiral and Commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard) in the native boat to carry provisions to the whaler *Belvedere* imprisoned in the ice, and then proceed to Point Barrow to contact Lieutenant S. J. Jarvis, of the Overland Relief Expedition. At 9:55 a. m. Lieutenant Hamlet started with 400 pounds of flour, 96 pounds of corned beef, and 85 pounds of beans, for the *Belvedere*, and some small stores for Lieutenant Jarvis. Remained at anchor off Icy Cape until July 26, the ice frequently compelling us to shift anchorage to keep clear. At 4:25 a. m., July 26, the ice appeared to have opened, the *Bear* stood around Blossom Shoals, and at noon laid a course for Point Belcher. At 6:20 p. m. a heavy fog set in, and with the water shoaling, came to anchor at 11:00 p. m. Snowing at intervals. At 5:00 a. m., July 28, sighted the Relief Station at Point Bar-

row. Heavy ground ice extended from Point Sheldon to Point Barrow. There being no opening through it, at 8:00 a. m. made fast with ice anchors on the outer side of the ice. The *Bear* was the first vessel of the season to arrive. Twenty-six men from the wrecked whalers were taken on board immediately. On the 29th of July, the steam whaler *Jeanette* arrived and made fast to the ice southward of the *Bear*. The steamers *Fearless* and *Newport* appeared to the eastward of Point Barrow, but could not get around the point on account of the ice. Furnished the *Newport* oakum, spikes and nails with which to make repairs, as she was leaking badly. On July 30, sixty-six more of the shipwrecked men came on board, increasing the number to ninety-seven. On the afternoon of the 30th large pieces of ice drifting along with the current made it necessary to seek a position in an indentation in the ground ice, where the steamer *Jeanette* was made fast. On the 30th Lieutenant Hamlet returned after having delivered the supplies to the *Belvedere*. He reported the vessel still in good condition. On August 1, loose ice drifted in and packed around the *Bear*. As there was only a trifling pressure, no danger was anticipated. At 2:00 p. m., August 3, came a sudden pressure of ice, the four forward masts carried away, and the vessel was forced astern about five feet. The pressure then coming against the starboard side forced the port side against the ground ice. A point of ice under the water abreast the engine room, the weakest place in the vessel, as there were no athwartship timbers there, forced the port side in sufficiently to buckle the engine room floor plates. Men were immediately sent with ice chisels and the ice cut away. As soon as the pressure was released the floor plates dropped back in place. The after section of the rudder was sprung about an eighth of an inch. A vessel less strongly constructed would have been crushed at once. Being in the indentation was all that saved the *Bear* and the *Jeanette*. Knowing that if an on-shore gale sprang up the pack would again move and nothing could save the vessel, I had a large quantity of provisions brought on deck and placed so they could readily be passed to the ground ice in the event of another nip. The ship's papers and books were also packed ready for removal. From the 3rd until the 14th of August we remained in suspense. Meanwhile provisions were furnished the *Jeanie*, *Fearless* and *Newport* by the *Bear*. Several days were required to drag the provisions over the very rough ice on sleds. On August 7 an attempt was made to blast a channel through the ground ice to clear water inside. After expending 150 pounds of powder the attempt was given up. The effect upon the ice, which averaged thirty feet in thickness, was so slight that sufficient powder was not available with which to blast out a channel. On the 14th the ice offshore commenced to move rapidly to the northward. On the 15th used powder to blast away ice near the ship. During the morning a lead broke through the ground ice to the southward of us. In the afternoon the offshore ice commenced to disappear, and the pressure of the ice on the *Bear* diminished considerably. A strong northwest wind coming up, all sail was made and thrown aback to help press the vessel off. Our efforts to get clear were then stopped by a heavy fog setting in. Clear weather the morning of the 16th permitted blasting to be resumed. Soon after 10:00 a. m. the *Bear* was freed." For sixteen days she had been held a prisoner by the ice. After talking with officers who were on the *Bear* at the time, I am convinced Captain Tuttle's report quite modestly expresses the dangerous situation. All will agree there are few vessels in existence who could stand such terrific crushing by ice, and still live.

CAPTAIN COCHRAN RELATES

Another escape from the ice is related by Captain C. S. Cochran, U. S. Coast Guard, while he was in command of the *Bear*. "In June, 1924, when about sixty miles from Nome, with clear water and good weather, there was every indication that the mail would be landed at Nome in the morning. Towards evening the wind shifted to the eastward and fog set in. The *Bear* was immediately headed to the southward and eastward to get into shoal water, but by morning the vessel was surrounded by heavy ice, and that situation maintained over a month. After the *Bear* was jammed in the ice the weather was clear, and when we hoped for a gale from almost any direction, but particularly from the eastward to loosen the ice, we had a dead calm and bright sunlight twenty-four hours a day. Occasionally there would be an open lead, which was always taken advantage of, and we finally got into clear water off Cape Blossom, Kotzebue Sound, on July 5. There were ten days more of delay, when we finally were able to clear the ice by working up the Sound and out along the west shore. While working in the ice two adjacent blades of the propeller were broken off at the hub. There are no good harbors in that part of Alaska, and a very small rise and fall of the tide makes it impossible to beach the ship and do any work on the bottom. A supply of coal had been shipped to St. Michael; it was therefore decided to tip the *Bear* so that the broken blades could be replaced. Two hundred and fifty tons of coal were piled high on the fore-castle, but after the stern had come up to thirteen feet draft (from nineteen feet), about three feet less than required, she rose no more. The *Bear* therefore proceeded south under her own power, and although I have seen smoother running propellers, an especially quick trip was made from Unalaska to San Francisco, a distance of 2,200 miles in ten days."

Whenever caught in ice that was not too heavy, slow progress could be made by backing the vessel and then coming ahead full speed. This caused the *Bear* to ride up on the ice, then her weight would crush it for about one ship-length. During periods of "ice navigation" an officer stood watch in the crow's nest, on the fore-top-gallant mast. When open leads were sighted every effort was made to take advantage of them.

In the numerous instances the *Bear* has been threatened with destruction, "Lady Luck" has always come to her aid. She suffered perhaps the most disastrous accident of her career when, as the result of terrific tidal currents in Seymour Narrows, she was thrown on Maud Island, really only a large rock. Many other vessels have ended their careers on the island. The *Bear* came out of it with a loss of fourteen thousand dollars' worth of iron bark wood, her sheathing for ice work; but she did not even leak!

Adverse conditions grounded the *Bear* on Cape Prince of Wales. A few hours later she was maneuvered off without any damage.

HEAVY SEAS WEATHERED

En route to Seattle from the Far North, in November, 1917, when coasting along Vancouver Island, B. C., a southwest gale overtook the *Bear*, and so heavy were the seas it soon became necessary to "heave to." Then started a battle of two days' duration, to keep from being driven on the shore. There is a strong onshore set of the tide there, which an onshore gale increases to a speed of four knots. This current, the gale and seas a quarter of a mile long could not conquer the *Bear*. Captain P. H.

Uberroth, U. S. Coast Guard, set sails, drove the engines, and used masterly seamanship, and the ship again was victor.

In January, 1920, a hurricane of violence not recalled by the oldest settlers in the northwest, laid low millions of acres of forest in the States of Oregon and Washington. The *Bear* was in this gale. The aerometer at North Head registered one hundred miles an hour and then was carried away by the force of the wind. During the gale a leak developed in the *Bear's* bottom, in the coal bunkers, but an emergency repair was made, and the luck of the ship, or her soundness and good crew triumphed.

Under the late Captain F. S. Van Boskerck, U.S.C.G., fourteen years ago, as the result of continued bad weather the *Bear* was prohibited from receiving her supply of bunker coal from barges, in the open sea roadstead of Nome, Alaska. It became finally necessary to make a run for the sheltered harbor of Unalaska, distant one thousand miles, where coal was available. A severe gale swept down from Siberia and delayed the *Bear*. By the time the region of the Pribilof Islands was reached, the bunkers were practically swept clean. The lee side of St. Paul Island was selected as an enforced anchorage. Then the direction of the gale changed so as to make the island a lee shore. The *Bear* was confronted with the necessity of trusting her existence in a terrific gale and sea, with only her anchors between her and destruction. Things looked bad for all of us. Captain Van Boskerck remained on the bridge night and day. What a helpless condition—would the *Bear's* luck hold this time? If only coal with which to manoeuvre had remained we could have gotten away before the onshore gale increased to destructive force. Once caught there nothing but the anchors could save us. What a testimony to the efficiency of the "old fashioned" stock type anchor it is to relate that the *Bear's* anchors, in spite of the ship's yawing in the gale through 180 degrees, did hold! "Lucky ship"—everyone had that feeling about the *Bear*!

THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY

Operating thousands of miles away from repair stations, it is not surprising that the day came when a mechanical failure found the *Bear* on the north side of St. Lawrence Island, in 1920, with a gale blowing from the North and the island a dangerous lee shore. Captain Van Boskerck set her barkentine sails, manoeuvred clear of the island, and sailed four hundred miles to the southward, then being taken in tow by the Coast Guard Cutter *Algonquin*, and delivered at Unalaska. Captain F. G. Dodge, U.S.C.G., Commander of Bering Sea Patrol, detailed the *Algonquin* to tow the *Bear* to Seattle, 1800 miles distant from Unalaska. Fall stormy weather had set in; the task did not promise to be easy by any means. After good weather for a few days, a heavy October gale came out of the northwest. Speed was reduced by the *Algonquin* to lessen the strain on the manila hawser, which was twelve inches in circumference, but increasing seas parted the line during the night. Losing the steadying effect of the tow line, the *Bear* stood on her ear. Books, chairs, victrolas and similar articles which had been well lashed down, were torn loose and thrown around indiscriminately. Anyone moving about decks had to hold on with a vengeance. The question in our minds was, "Is the *Bear* still Lucky?" Captain W. T. Stromberg, U.S.C.G., commanding the *Algonquin*, also realized the seriousness of the situation. Failure

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"BLOCKING THE BELGIAN BASES"

H. A. DE WEERD
Denison University

■ On the afternoon of April 22, 1918, a naval expedition set out from English ports on a mission of unusual hazard. Since the operation was timed to begin at midnight and St. George's day fell on the 23rd, the Vice-Admiral commanding signalled to the assembled vessels with semaphore code: "St. George for England." The captain of one of the principal vessels took this in for a personal message and answered, "May we give the dragon's tail a damned good twist." The operations introduced by these slightly irregular signals were destined to produce an epic of heroism almost unmatched in the annals of the Royal Navy.

The operations of St. George's day were designed to block the German Flanders bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. The port of Zeebrugge which was occupied by the Germans early in the war had long been a thorn in the flesh of the British Dover Patrol. Connected by canal with Bruges and Ostend, and protected by batteries, Zeebrugge was turned into a very strong naval and seaplane base within a few hours steaming of the Dover area. It was especially useful to the Germans as an advanced base for submarines and as a starting point for destroyer raids in the Channel.

Zeebrugge is an artificial harbour. The channel leading into the canal is protected by a giant mole of masonry which extends out into the sea for nearly a mile and a half. The shore end of the mole is made up of steel girders carrying the railway to the mole, an arrangement made necessary in order to avoid the silt formations which would otherwise be set up by the strong tidal currents. There were several shore batteries of heavy caliber which ranged the approaches to the mole and harbour, and on the mole extension the Germans had mounted a five-gun battery. As a safeguard against landing operations the shore was lined with entrenched machine-gun posts, and wired machine-gun emplacements were located at favorable positions on the mole. The channel was guarded by barge barriers and net booms.


When it had been evacuated by the British early in the war Zeebrugge had not been destroyed, because it was felt that it might again pass into allied hands. After the Germans had established themselves on the Belgian coast, it seemed inadvisable from a naval point of view to attack the port without military assistance. Since military forces were not available, the proposals for attacking Zeebrugge were altered to bombardments. As the batteries on the coast multiplied in numbers and strength, these bombardments had to be carried out at ever increasing range. In general the attacks did little to embarrass the Germans in their use of the port.

The objective of most of the monitor bombardments was the lock gate to the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. By the time the attacks became really menacing, the Germans had constructed an armoured caisson into which the lock could be run at high tide. Reinforced concrete and a bomb-proof roof made the lock gate practically proof against serious damage provided that the attack came at a time when the state of the tide made it possible to run the lock into its shelter.

After the indecisive naval battle waged in the mists off Jutland on May 31, 1916, nothing occurred to disturb the silence of the North sea except the relentless campaigns waged by the German submarines. With no useful method at hand for combating the submarine, the British naturally turned toward the destruction of submarine bases as a possible solution to the problem. For many months the British forces in the channel had developed a secret plan for landing a division of troops back of the German lines in Flanders at a time when the battle of Paschendaele should render this timely. Unhappily for all those involved in the novel program, the failure of the British offensive at Paschendaele caused it to be abandoned. When this operation had to be laid aside, the Dover Patrol turned its attention to the problem of a naval attack on the German bases in Belgium. It was hoped that a successful naval attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend would definitely reduce German submarine activity in the channel. Since the history of blocking operations was not encouraging, the Vice-Admiral at Dover, Sir Reginald Bacon, favoured operations against the lock gate in the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. He planned an attack by monitors, one carrying troops for a mole landing, the other to fire with specially reduced charges directly at the lock gate. On Admiralty suggestion he added blocking operations. Late in 1917, however, Admiral Bacon was suddenly replaced at Dover by Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes who at once plunged into the question of attacking the German bases in Belgium.

Admiral Keyes was given a free hand in the matter of attacking Zeebrugge and made plans which differed materially from those of Admiral Bacon. He planned to block Ostend and Zeebrugge simultaneously. The Keyes plan contemplated landing troops on the mole in order to silence the battery and to create a diversion for the block ships. It also introduced the novelty of an attack on the viaduct by submarines carrying explosives. The new commander rejected the proposal for an attack by monitor against the lock gate, since the state of the tide at the time set for the attack would enable the Germans to run the lock into its shelter. He also decided against the monitor for landing troops on the mole, because he felt that with the slow speed of this type of craft and the strong current great difficulty would be experienced in holding the ship head on in spite of the provisions for anchoring. After much thought Keyes decided to use the old cruiser *Vindictive* in place of the monitors. Two ferry boats with double hulls, the *Daffodil* and the *Irish II*, were to assist the *Vindictive* and participate in the mole landing.

In preparation for the enterprise, the *Vindictive* was fitted with special ramps and with fourteen narrow gangways to be lowered by tackles to the mole parapet. Her mainmast was removed and fitted as a bumper on the mole side of the ship. Parapet anchors were provided to hold the ship in place. Four of the cruiser's 6-inch guns were left for engaging the enemy batteries, and the ship was strengthened by the addition of: one 11-inch and two 7.5-inch howitzers mounted on the deck, two flame throwers placed in steel huts, six Lewis guns and three pompoms mounted in the foretop, four Lewis guns and sixteen Stokes mortars in other parts of the ship. Indeed, the old cruiser draped with mattresses against shell splinters and with masts removed presented



ZEEBRUGGE

a weird appearance. When one of the crew who had been kept in ignorance of the plan boarded the ship for the first time, he was heard to remark, "Well, it's darned good to be aboard a blessed something, but I'm blowed if I know what she is."

The block ships for the Zeebrugge attack were the unarmoured cruisers *Thetis*, *Iphigenia*, and *Intrepid*. These ships were filled with cement and fitted with explosive charges to insure rapid sinking. As in the case of the *Vindictive* they were equipped with additional steering facilities and retained some of their original armament for engaging the batteries. The two submarines C1 and C3 were detailed to attack the railway viaduct. They were to be run between the steel girders and blown up. Each carried seven and a half tons of ammonal.

A covering force of British destroyers was provided to protect the ships against surprise by German torpedo craft, and the mission of screening the operation with smoke was left to the motor launches. Coastal motor boats were to rescue the crews of the block ships, and the Harwich force was to guard against interference from the North. Monitors were to create a diversion by engaging the shore batteries. This brought the

number of vessels involved in the enterprise to the somewhat astonishing total of 165.

The responsibility for providing adequate smoke screens was turned over to a very ingenious officer, Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock R. N. A. S. Because the attack would have to be made under the very noses of the German garrison, a dense and dependable smoke screen was necessary. It was decided to use Chlor-Sulphonic acid. Since this chemical was widely used in the manufacture of Saxin, a sugar substitute for diabetic patients, and since eighty-two tons of the acid were required for the impending operations, it was necessary to halt the manufacture of Saxin in order to acquire the amount needed. So far-reaching are the requirements of modern war.

The expedition included a number of officers whose names are now well known in England. Vice-Admiral Keyes was in general command on the destroyer *Warwick*. Captain A. F. B. Carpenter commanded the *Vindictive*, Commander Valentine Gibbs the *Iris*, and Lieutenant H. G. Campbell the *Daffodil*. The block ships were in charge of Commander Sneyd, and Lieutenants Bonham-Carter and Billyard-Leake. Colonel B. N. Elliot, D. S. O., who had commanded the British

naval forces in Serbia, led the *Marine storming party*. Captain H. C. Halahan, D. S. O., whose three years of service with the naval guns in France had made him widely known, had charge of the seamen landing force. The explosive carrying submarine C3 was commanded by Lieutenant R. D. Sanford; the unfortunate parting of a hawser prevented the C1, under Lieutenant A. C. Newbold, from taking part in the venture. Wing Commander Brock, whose inventive turn of mind solved so many problems for the expedition, served in one of the flame-throwing huts. His versatility and keenness were well known in the service. The crews of the ships were without exception volunteers who had offered themselves for a "mission of unusual hazard." Although the men were not informed of the exact plan of action until late in the program, morale was always very high and secrecy rigidly maintained. Nothing is so trying on the morale of a crew as to have plans altered at the last moment. Yet so high was the spirit of the men involved that after two attempts had to be abandoned, they cheered as lustily as ever on the final departure.

On April 11, 1918, the expedition sailed but when within sixteen miles of Zeebrugge was forced to turn back on account of the wind. All ships returned save one coastal motor boat, which fell into German hands. Papers found on board gave the Germans an indication that blocking operations were to be expected at Ostend. The attempt made on April 14 also ended in disappointment. When the expedition set out on April 22, a light rain and poor visibility made aerial cooperation impossible and delayed the monitor diversion. The only other untoward incidents were the parting of towing hawsers on the *Iris* and *Daffodil* and the submarine C1.

In order to confuse the Germans prior to the mole landing, motor launches fired on the mole with Stokes mortars and carried out torpedo attacks against the destroyers inside the harbor. Although these attacks were carried out with great zeal, they apparently failed to make an impression on the mole garrison.

Just as the storming ships approached the mole, the wind by some perverse chance changed about and blew directly off shore, so that presently the *Vindictive* pushed its way through the screen into the area lighted up by German star shells. Here Captain Carpenter saw the mole for the first time; his ship was heading directly for the mole extension. The ships' guns immediately engaged the battery at about 200 yards, and the *Vindictive* with helm hard over made for her position. This was the moment for the mole battery—all five guns were turned in fury on the cruiser. With range point blank, the German gunners appeared to have fired as fast as they could at the ship which was rapidly moving out of their arc of fire, so that although the upper works of the ship was riddled little damage was done to the vital parts of the vessel. It is probable that no battery ever engaged a full sized warship at shorter range. The temptation to get in all the shots they could appeared to be so great that the German gunners did not stop to aim at the vitals. But the shells crashed through the superstructure, tearing metal, and rending men. *In these first terrible moments the leaders of the landing parties were nearly all killed.*

The *Vindictive* was brought alongside the mole exactly one minute after schedule time, but it was found that the position taken was somewhat farther from the mole extension than was planned. This misadventure made the storming of the battery impossible, for there were German machine-gun emplacements between the

ship and the battery. The shells of the mole battery had wrecked all but two of the landing gangways. These were immediately lowered to the parapet, and the survivors of the landing parties moved forward. From the very start great difficulty was experienced in holding the ship in place. The starboard anchor had jammed, and the current and swells from other vessels made a "cushion of troubled water" which kept forcing the ship away from the mole. The parapet anchors were a disappointment; they were either too heavy to place or they broke with the heavy lurching of the ship. Only the timely assistance of the *Daffodil* saved the situation. Lieutenant Campbell pushed the *Vindictive* to the mole and held her there with engine on throughout the action.

Both flame throwing huts had been hit repeatedly, and when the apparatus was tested it failed to function. Happily Captain Carpenter in one hut and Wing-Commander Brock in the other escaped injury. Thus freed from his other duties, Commander Brock took part in the landing operation and was killed near a German observation station on the mole. *The casualties among the storming parties were naturally very high.* Commander Harrison who took part in the landing in spite of his wounds now met his death leading a forlorn charge against the machine-gun emplacements.

The *Iris* had equal difficulty in grappling the mole. Here again the parapet anchors failed to function, although Lieutenants Hawkins and Bradford sacrificed themselves in feats of desperate valor attempting to moor the ship. Failing to land its parties the *Iris* attempted to transfer them to the mole by way of the *Vindictive*. Some of the men from the *Daffodil* and *Iris* climbed into the *Vindictive*, but none of them actually got as far as the mole.

While the landing was underway every German gun that could be trained on the *Vindictive* was engaged in tearing her upper works to shreds. So continuous was their fire that Captain Carpenter, who miraculously escaped injury, was unable to judge the caliber or location of the guns. Fortunately the height of the mole served to shield the vitals of the ship somewhat. The one howitzer on deck which had escaped damage fired throughout the operation at its pre-arranged targets. *The most valuable counter fire which the Vindictive brought to bear came from the Lewis guns and pom-poms in the foretop.* As in the case of the machine-guns mounted in the *River Clyde* during the "V" beach landing at the Dardanelles, these guns were extremely valuable to the attackers. From their elevated position they sprayed the German batteries on the mole and raked the German destroyers with their fire. In consequence they came in for heavy shelling. Two hits by shells of heavy caliber killed or wounded every man in the foretop, although Sergeant Finch, R.M.A., continued to work his gun until put out of action by another shell.

Shortly after the mole landing, the whole theater of operations was lighted up by a gigantic explosion. As the officers on the *Vindictive* surmised, the submarine C3 had blown up the viaduct. Captain Carpenter and Admiral Keyes both report that although the flash of the explosion was blinding, the roar of battle was so intense that neither of them heard the explosion. Lieutenant Sanford was wounded but escaped with his crew. The explosion tore a great gap in the viaduct and severed communication between the mole and the shore. Since this was about the time that the block ships made their appearance off the harbor, the German commander on

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THE RESERVISTS AND THE NEXT WAR

IT'S ALL A MATTER OF MONEY

CAPT. MILTON V. O'CONNELL, USMCR.

■ Once again, just a bit more than a score of years since the last World War, clouds of international conflict gather over Europe. Whether they will be dispelled by the sun and clear breezes of sane thinking and diplomacy, only time will tell. It is generally agreed by the average citizen of the United States that Europe's differences are none of our concern, and that we should assiduously refrain from any direct or indirect participation in any future struggle on other shores. Military and political figures hold reservations as to this idea, based upon their practical doubts that a world conflict can fail to draw us into it in some fashion or other.

What will be the part of the Marine Corps Reserve in a future struggle?

What should Reserve Corps training officers do toward adequately preparing their young officers and men for such a struggle? What are likely to be the problems confronted by the Reserve; the assignment they may receive? It is highly necessary that consideration be given to such a possibility, by every sane, intelligent officer charged with the safety of his command, and the efficiency of its operation in a future conflict.

As one who served in France during the World War, and who witnessed the wholesale slaughter of inexperienced and untrained American boys in battle, the writer is in a position to consider the future of the Reserve from a practical angle, and even offer some suggestions as to what may be incorporated into the training of Reserve units. Granted that the routine training, based on the present Training Regulations, together with field duty in summer camps, is necessary, what must be done *beyond* that training schedule to bring the youth of the Reserve to the place where they can be expected to cope successfully with the ultra-modern and advanced methods and weapons of the next war?

The fundamentals of mobilization are highly essential. How many Reserve unit commanders are thoroughly familiar with the machinery of such mobilization, and preparation for active field duty? Does the average unit commander know the machinery of equipping for active service, his command? Does he know, on the tips of his fingers, just what equipment he would have to requisition in a hurry to meet the sudden command to put his outfit into the field? Some very definite training on this point is desirable—without, however, giving either unit members or the general public any idea or suggestion that the Reserve, or the nation, is "arming for another war." Such inference would have a backlash from pacifist, political and radical organizations and individuals.

Next in the line of advanced training and instruction, is the matter of protection against chemical attack, against aerial attack, against organized radical uprisings in certain localities, and the handling of a panic-stricken public, caught in the terror of the first onslaught of an enemy air force. How many veteran company commanders in the Reserve would state unequivocally that his men were thoroughly experienced in such work? Would he be able to assure himself and his senior officers, that his men would not become infected with the same panic as

can be expected from the civilian public? And what is he doing to give practical training and instruction along these lines?

While it is a great mistake for any military board of strategy or individual officer, to concentrate his plan of training, or his defenses against any specific nation and consider that nation as a potential enemy, it *IS* the duty of every officer, every board of strategy, to consider carefully the vulnerability of the national geography, of his transport facilities, and of the present system of routine training. He must consider what the average soldier is likely to be called upon to do in the event of a national emergency, and so train the individual soldier to meet those likely situations and conditions that there will be no element of hesitancy or surprise when the man gets into combat.

Obviously there are certain specific duties which the Marine Corps—regular or reserve—will be called upon to do in the event of a new national emergency. And this is referring only to a defensive war, or a war waged on our native territory or its insular possessions or far flung corners. The Marine Corps, in mobile battalion units such as were used in the islands of the Far East, in China and other expeditionary jaunts, will be the swiftly attacking and defending elements of the country first line. Their experience in tropical warfare obviously will point them in the direction of southern borders, or insular possessions where climatic conditions are similar to those met by the regular Corps in Haiti, San Domingo, Nicaragua, Mexico, the Philippines and similar localities. The Corps, even with an expanded Reserve, will be far too small numerically to hold long defensive lines such as the Army will be called upon to do—and it is unlikely, from the experience learned during the World War, that they will again be brigaded with the regular Army. Theirs will be a specific, swiftly moving job, mostly by sea, or in insular defense or attack.

But another element rises for consideration, which may well have the careful consideration of training officers of either the regular or reserve Corps. That is the matter of interior uprising, radical sabotage, communistic objection to any sort of warfare—defensive or offensive. Internment camps in this country will be far more numerous than ever before in the history of modern warfare. And interned in those camps will be nominal American citizens. The duty of the Marine Corps may first be the swift termination of such home disorders; to strike swiftly and prevent local trouble from within city limits—to protect concentration points and military and naval posts from the attacks which organized communistic groups are bound to attempt. Such work will be quickly handled, but should be prepared against.

Therefore, while the Corps, regular or reserve, is not an organization for the quelling of riots, as is the National Guard, it may be that they will have their share of this work in a future conflict, and the men of the Reserve should be taught the practical effective manner of handling rioting mobs. Strategists of the Corps may completely disagree with me on this statement and premise, but I am afraid that unless they include some instruction in the Reserve training curriculum, Marines may suffer and die needlessly in a future war.

One glance at the radical agitations in universities, high schools, and even in the grammar or grade schools,

shows that these outbreaks, these "strikes" are not merely the bubbling over of the youth's energy, but carefully organized, skillfully planned moves of a communistic group of organizers who are putting the youngsters in their own type of "training" against "The Day." Without being an alarmist, this writer feels that some cognizance should be given quietly to these outbreaks and to the attempts to sovietize the members of our military, naval and national guard organizations.

This is a delicate subject to write on—under our present system where our "statesmen" themselves are frequently inveigled into the mesh of radicalism it is not usually politic for an officer to speak his mind on such subjects. But when men die needlessly, there can be no excuse for not having armed them against the elements that ultimately will cause their deaths. The recent experience of an Army recruiting officer who sought reserve recruits on the campus of one of our leading universities, and barely escaped bodily harm from young radicals, should provide cause for careful thought—and immediate action.

And if, as has been suggested widely, in a future war our nation will draft civilians as well as military for duty, it can be seen what will happen when a draft board attempts to control these organized radical groups. I repeat that internment camps will spring up all over the nation—and the faster preparation is made for such a contingency, the better our chances will be of saving our trained soldiers for defense against the attacking enemy from without.

What should an all-around efficient soldier know to be prepared to protect himself and his country in the next war?

Will he know how to protect himself and civilians from gas attack, chemical attack, airplane attack? Does he know the use of the gas mask, the necessary first aid to the wounded and gassed civilian, stricken down in the city's streets? Does he know where to herd panic-stricken civilians, women and children, when the sudden rush of wings above and the burst of bombs below announce the surprise air attack?

What weapons will he be called upon to use? What should he know of aviation and of co-ordinating his effort on the ground with the effective work of our planes overhead? Will the infantryman be transported hurriedly in transport planes, and will he know how to save himself in the event something goes wrong during that journey? How much does, and should, the average Reservist know of aviation's part in a war of defense or offense? How much do our fliers know of the necessity of understanding infantry work, in the event they are forced down and have to become infantry in an emergency? Unless proper instruction and training in air-and-land force liaison is given to the average individual soldier and Marine, serious difficulties will be confronted by our commanding officers, and by the General Staff charged with the conduct of a war.

What does the average Marine reservist know of the ramifications of communications systems; of intelligence work; of transportation difficulties?

The old time veteran training officers of a high command will say perhaps that this sort of thing is "too advanced"—is beyond the ken of the enlisted regular or reservist. But my answer is that the next war will be so far advanced that nothing we can do in the way of "advanced" training, can be too "advanced" to cope with future conditions which we are bound to face.

Not that I would neglect a single fundamental item of

the present training. But I consider that this nation, in its military and naval strategy, should not remain in the kindergarden or grammar school stage, but be prepared to go to and *through* the high school and university grades of military science. By that I mean not only the "advanced" but what I might call the "super-advanced" stages of training against future emergencies.

Where are our "weak frontiers"?

Surely we can, without offending a friendly neighbor nation, admit that our southern border is inadequately protected against any elements of advanced warfare in an attack from that section, despite our gallant army units stationed along the Rio Grande. We expect no trouble from our Mexican cousin, but, like Belgium and Luxembourg, Mexico may provide an entrance to America through which any enemy nation might move. What training do we give our reservist as against the time he might be called to battle for the protection of that territory?

The string of islands reaching from Alaska into the Pacific, almost to the shores of the Orient, offer another corridor through which, under certain conditions, an enemy from that part of the world might move. What are we doing to train our men to confront the conditions of such a battle area? It is hardly necessary to consider our northern border, save along the coastal lines, for Canada and her British forbears are too close to America in spirit and mind, and mutual necessity of defense, to ever be considered a potential enemy.

And now to the defense of insular possessions, and to sea duty, which the Corps are most assuredly going to be called in a future war. What sea training are Reserve troops receiving which would equip them mentally or physically to take their places aboard the vessels of the Fleet? And is such training practicable? Surely with the concentration of the battle fleet on the West Coast, some of those Reserve units could be given a fortnight aboard a first class dreadnaught, for at least two consecutive summer periods, to first acclimatize the reservist with sea duty and ship routine, and in the second cruise, to take him through the higher subjects of gunnery and submarine defense, etc.

On the East Coast there must be at least one suitable vessel available for such sea training. Each summer the Naval Reserve and naval militia, are given shakedown cruises, and there appears no reason why Marine Corps Reserve units could not be given similar experience at sea. The very variety of such training would break what sometimes becomes the monotony of camp training, in the same camp location year after year. Recruiting would be vastly stimulated for the Reserve with the announcement of such a sea duty policy. Unless I am mistaken, the cost of such a fortnight cruise would not be any more than that of sending a unit to a summer camp, inasmuch as the ship itself is in commission and it merely means the additional rations, and quarters for a Marine company or battalion.

The unit which I command has had nearly three years of actual field experience in liaison work with an aviation unit of high efficiency. At our own expense, and as the result of a desire to be better equipped in experience against an emergency, we have engaged in week-end maneuvers in which we were in direct communication and contact with the air forces. Our men know the value of co-ordinating land and air attack and defense. They no longer give way to the impulse—so fatal in France—of gazing upward at the winged instrument of destruc-

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YUKON vs. MAUNA LOA

Much thought and herald have been devoted of late to the relative strategical national importance of these two territories. This debated question is particularly near to the profession of those in the naval service. To the Marine officers of yesterday who served in Sitka and Honolulu it should bring out the well known "I told you so." To the Marine officers of tomorrow it should bring out the pros and cons of the question. To the thinking American citizen it should bring out a spark of patriotic interest.—ED.

■ This story is divided into two parts—thus both sides of the case are to be heard. Take your choice! Mr. Don Carlos Brownell, the Mayor of Seward, Alaska, speaks as follows upon the question when asked for an interview:

While I do not wish to appear as a jingoist or an alarmist, I believe it is pretty well agreed by all thinking Americans that any attack that might be made on our country would come from the Pacific rather than from the Atlantic. The nations of Europe are so keenly distrustful of each other and so deeply involved in their own differences that I think we have little, if any, reason to consider trouble from that direction.

Far out in the Pacific we are today spending countless millions of dollars to fortify the Hawaiian Islands as our western stronghold and yet, a thousand miles closer to our shores and our great cities, lies Alaska, where the door has been left open to any invader.

As Upton Close, the noted traveler and author, has so succinctly stated: "Whoever holds and can operate airplanes and submarines from Alaska, dominates the North Pacific and is within easy striking distance of our great cities." In one sentence, Mr. Close has summed up our gravest weakness in the Pacific, for Alaska most certainly would be in the path of any invading military force.

Only those who have lived on the Pacific Coast can appreciate the tense feeling of necessity for adequate national defense that exists there.

PACIFIC COAST IS FRIGHTENED

When the last gate of the Panama Canal closed behind our fleet as it steamed into the Atlantic last summer, a sharp feeling of uneasiness and apprehension swept our western coast from San Diego to Alaska. It was pressure from constituents that led a California congressman to declare: "The presence of the entire fleet in Atlantic waters leaves California, Oregon, Washington and Alaska defenseless—protected only by old forts with several mortars and naval type rifles."


Today, citizens on the Pacific Coast believe they are defenseless when the fleet is not standing guard within calling distance!

If these feelings and fears are so strong now, when international relations are placid, what would they be at a time of a real war scare? Suppose some smoldering ember (and there are many) blazed up in the Orient, causing diplomatic relations with some foreign power to be severed. What would happen then?

Immediately there would be a loud cry from our great Pacific Coast cities for the fleet to be stationed near them. This demand most certainly would prevent the fleet, or any part of it, from going out of sight of the coast. Instead, our Navy would churn the ocean into a foam as it tore up and down the coast from Seattle to San Diego as frantic reports of enemy craft sighted came pouring in from first one and then another city.

Their cry against being "left defenseless" would effectively prevent our ships from going to the rescue of the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska when they were attacked.

The Hawaiian Islands are heavily fortified, scores of millions having been spent there on defense, and this year Congress is authorizing still more millions. In a year that territory will be as well protected as it is possible for guns and forts to make it, but the reader



must not forget that these islands are 2,400 miles distant from our coast.

Let us assume a state of war exists and, without prejudice or camouflage, draw a picture of the logical course of events. Knowing the state of fear on the Coast the enemy would send a few fast raiders to appear and disappear outside our Coast cities. This would, most certainly, cause our fleet to remain on guard there and allow the enemy free rein to capture the Philippines, Hawaii and Alaska, if it chose. However, before attacking a place an enemy would carefully weigh the cost of seizure, against the value of possession and ultimate redemption.

CAPTURE OF HAWAII WOULD BE COSTLY

To "take" the Hawaiian Islands would cost the enemy heavily both in men and ships, but what would Hawaii be worth to them. The people of the islands would have to be fed during the war. Their retention would require a large occupying force of both ships and men and this would reduce the enemy's force considerably. Such a course would certainly arouse strong opposition at home.

The popular supposition is that the enemy would use Honolulu as a base in attacking our Pacific Coast. That is an hallucination for 2,400 miles is too long a jump to strike by air. No enemy would assemble its whole fleet there, as then it would be defenseless at home. No enemy is foolish enough to stake the outcome of the war on a major battle with our fleet in our own waters.

There remains then, the one questionable advantage of using Honolulu as a base for raiding ships. To outfit raiders at Honolulu the enemy would have to bring coal, oil and supplies from home. But Germany showed raiders do not need a base and so these doubtful benefits would be outweighed by the cost of maintenance.

After studying all the facts I am compelled to conclude that the enemy would not try to take the Hawaiian Islands, now that they have been so well fortified. Its fleet would only make enough hit-and-run attacks to divert attention and mislead.

Some may believe the enemy would take the islands to prevent our using them as a base of attack, but the islands are less attractive to us for that use than they are for the enemy, as the attacking distance westward is twice as far as the distance eastward. The arguments advanced against the enemy using Honolulu are doubly strong against our using it.

Now let us look at the Philippines. What place would they hold in the scheme of war? Conquering those islands would be like raiding a hornet's nest, for the Filipinos would fight to the last ditch against any attempt to subjugate them. But we have already shown that we don't want the Philippines any way, and their occupation by an enemy would in no way cripple us.

Again I point out, however, that to subdue and hold the islands (counting Philippine resistance only) would require a large land force, many transports, several naval vessels and many airplanes. An enemy would not dare detach so large a force on such a mission, leaving its home defense crippled. It is my opinion that the enemy's fleet would stay at home to defend its own shores from possible attack.

The fact of the matter is that both the enemy and the United States would hold their fleets in home waters and rely on fast cruisers, submarines and aircraft

to carry the war to the other's country. But, 5,000 miles is too great a distance for such craft to effectively operate against a foe's territory. To inflict serious damage an enemy would require a harbor base within striking distance of our Pacific Coast States. The Philippines would be an ineffective base and Hawaii would cost too much and is too far away.

Then, where? Alaska! And the spot most valuable, both strategically and commercially, is Seward.

This beautiful little city (named after President Lincoln's Secretary of State, William H. Seward, who purchased Alaska from Russia), is situated at the head of Resurrection Bay. This deep, 15-mile-long arm of the Pacific Ocean is surrounded by a protecting wall of high mountains, except where the railroad comes in through a pass at the north and the half-mile wide water entrance.

On each side of this ocean entrance, Gibraltar-like mountains rise perpendicularly from the sea. The water is so deep, all the way in to Seward, that a submarine could go in or out while submerged to its limit.

No harbor in the world is better endowed by nature for a fortified naval base, either for air, surface, or submarine craft.

Ice never forms on the bay as the water is kept at about 40 degrees by the warm ocean stream commonly called "the Japan current," which flows past the entrance. The air temperature sinks to zero only two or three times during the winter, and then for only a few hours in the early morning. When there are clouds they stay at an even ceiling not less than 2,000 feet high. In fact, the climate on the Alaskan coast is much better during the whole year than in most of the States. Overcoats are worn less in Seward than here in Washington.

Many who have been on the ground and studied possible enemy tactics are convinced that the first blow struck in a war in the Pacific would be the seizure of Seward. An armored mine-laying vessel could alone accomplish this and then lay a row of mines across the channel entrance within 24 hours, thus effectively preventing its recapture.

SEWARD WOULD BE ENEMY ASSET

It is my belief that Seward would be the most valuable war asset an Asiatic enemy could seize, and would cost no life or ships, either to capture or hold. With the "Harding Entrance" mined, any second-rate warship or submarine could hold the harbor against all comers.

Seward is the ocean terminus of the Alaska Railroad, owned and operated by the U. S. Government. The line runs from Seward north 500 miles to the golden heart of Alaska and taps mines that produce high-grade steaming coal.

The railroad also leads to the vast placer producing regions, where enormous dredges scoop up gold by the millions each year. It penetrates the grazing fields of a million reindeer. It runs through vast forests of valuable timber. Seizing this railroad would give the enemy control of all air fields large enough for bombers.

In addition the warships holding Seward Harbor would control the vast halibut fishing ground a few miles away and the dozens of great salmon canneries along the coast.

By rushing 50,000 conscript laborers to Seward the enemy could make a devastating clean-up of fish, coal,



DUTCH HARBOR, ALASKA
Marines were stationed in Sitka until 1912.

gold, copper, meat, timber, seal-skins, land and furs, all of which are commodities of great military value.

In addition, and most important, Seward could be made the base for air-bombing and ship-raiding attacks on Pacific Coast cities. Enemy airmen would be within easy distance of vast centers of population.

I feel sure that even this brief description has shown the reader the necessity of adequate protection of Seward, which is a day closer to the Orient either by water or air than Honolulu, and is 1,000 miles closer to California.

The tens of millions of dollars spent on fortification at Hawaii is of value in protecting those islands from seizure, but otherwise, the expenditure will be of no value in time of war. It will not protect our Pacific Coast States.

Let me repeat the declaration made earlier in this article. In case of war our main fleet would patrol the Pacific Coast, not even going as far away as Honolulu. No chance could be taken of the sacking and destruction of San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland.

This would be true, also, of the enemy's coast cities, and so it is unlikely a major battle would be fought, at least not during the first year. All aggressive naval action then would be by plane, fast cruisers, and cruising submarines, working alone or in pairs, from a base. To seize a base would be the first job of an enemy and

I think it has been shown that any enemy who can operate planes and submarines from Alaska can dominate the North Pacific.

One Asiatic power now maintains a great fleet of fishing vessels—some of 20,000 tons, carrying hundreds of men—just outside the 12-mile limit off the Alaskan coast. No one knows what equipment is below deck, as visitors are not allowed. These large ships supported by hundreds of smaller ones could seize Alaskan ports within 12 hours after war was declared, and by mining the entrances could hold them indefinitely.

There is considerable talk, and some survey work going on in connection with an island some 1,000 miles southwest of Seward in the Aleutian group. Some people have an erroneous idea that we should make another Pearl Harbor base out there. Such a base would be useful for just one purpose—a point from which we could attack the enemy's country. If any money is spent out in the Aleutian Islands for naval bases it will be contrary to American ideals of armament, for defense only!

A base there would not protect Seward and the rich railroad belt! It would not stop the seizure and use of the railroad to drain Alaska of her wealth. It would not stop the use of Seward Harbor as a base of attack on Pacific States.

ALEUTIAN BASE IMPRACTICAL

I believe the reason we entered into a treaty with Japan that no fortifications would be constructed on Aleutian Islands was because we had to admit such fortifications could be used only as a base for invading Oriental territory. To spend millions of dollars making a naval base on a worthless island, hundreds of miles west and south of Alaska, could reasonably be construed an unfriendly act, as Japan contends. Such a base could not prevent the occupation of Alaska, as bombers operating from it would be unable to dislodge camouflaged merchantmen in a mined harbor like Seward's.

As pointed out before, whenever the peace relations became strained, our cities on the Pacific would demand our whole fleet remain close by. This would prevent a sufficient force staying at an Aleutian base to intercept invading ships seizing Alaska.

There is no treaty preventing the fortifying of Seward Harbor. It can be made impregnable at a small fraction of the amount spent in the Hawaiian Islands. Work should be started immediately, as this rich prize of central Alaska must not fall into enemy hands, and Seward Harbor must not be used as a base in attacks on our Pacific Coast should trouble come.

To mine the "Harding Entrance" and establish a station for submarines and naval aircraft at Seward is the crying need in our national defense program. It is more important than any fortification of Pacific Coast States. To neglect it longer may mean the sacking of Alaska and dangerous attacks on our great Western cities.

From Seward as the base a squadron of hydroplanes could not only protect interior Alaska, but also, because of its central location on the Coast, protect the towns of Cordova-Valdez, Saldovia, Kodiak and Bristol Bay regions with their rich canneries and fishing fields.

A submarine flotilla under Admiral Cole and a naval hydroplane squadron under Admiral Johnson spent several days in Seward harbor last summer. The officers praised the wonderful natural advantages of the location.

ALASKA FRONT DOOR LEFT OPEN

While so much money is being spent at Honolulu, 2,300 miles out in the Pacific, it seems strange that our front door is left wide open, making it possible for an enemy to obtain entrance without even forcing a lock.

We, in Alaska (who see constant evidence of alien activity) wonder why others do not realize this. We can lay it only to the mistaken belief that Hawaii alone is in the path of invasion.

Ordinary maps do give this erroneous picture of the geographical relation. The accompanying specially prepared map gives the true positions, and shows why the seat of action, in a possible war, will be along the Alaskan Coast.

As a necessary auxiliary to fortifying Seward, the Postoffice Department should contract for an all-year-round air mail service up the coast from Seattle to Seward, which would be perfectly feasible. By that means a group of pilots could become well trained in Alaskan weather conditions and made familiar with the intervening coast line.

An erroneous belief is that fogs are prevalent along the Alaskan Coast. For 100 miles west of Seward, clear down to Seattle, there is far less fog than any other coast line of the United States. There is not but one

or two days a year that a ship blows its fog signal while entering the harbor of Seward. Furthermore, the coast is broken by innumerable little bays and shore lakes that afford safe emergency landings for planes.

This summer will see maneuvers of our fleet in Alaska waters for the first time. All the past years the war games have been played down near Mexico, where no conflict is ever possible. It is wise that the Navy has chosen for the scene of its 1935 maneuvers an area in which it may some day be called upon to battle the enemy.

Now Mr. David Marsh, who writes for the *Washington Post*, presents a well known symposium of opinion after consulting others and rushes to the defense of Hawaii in this matter as follows:

AN EXPEDITION TO ALASKA WOULD BE COSTLY TO AN ENEMY

IT WOULD NOT BE WORTH ATTEMPTING THEY INSIST

The picture which Mayor Brownell of Seward draws of a possible future war in the Pacific, in order to make a plea for more adequate defense of Alaska is perhaps a little overdrawn, according to high authorities. He makes several assumptions which those conversant with the situation seriously question.

In the first place, he states that, in case of a war with Japan (and that country might as well be named openly), the Pacific Coast cities would be so alarmed they would be able to keep the Navy churning up the ocean between San Diego and Seattle allaying the fears of terrified citizens.

That possibility to experts seems very remote. It could only happen, it is pointed out, if we had a President in the White House who knew so little of naval affairs that he did not trust the judgment of his naval advisers and allowed himself to be influenced by the unsubstantiated fears of Western constituents.

Of course, this very thing happened during the Spanish-American War. Charleston and Savannah raised such a storm of protest that the Navy did not move on Cuba until it was definitely known that Cervera was in Santiago Harbor. But most students of the subject believe that we have progressed since that time.

APPREHENSION IS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

As for the apprehension felt by the Pacific Coast whenever the fleet goes into Atlantic waters, it is natural but not entirely justifiable. The United States would obviously not be so unwise as to make such a maneuver if there were any sign of trouble in the Orient.

Most students know that every country has means of knowing when an enemy is getting ready to launch an attack, aside from what it can gather from diplomatic sources. Modern warfare requires large-scale mobilization of raw materials, manufactured goods and means of transportation as well as the machines of war, before the enemy can strike. There are well-known methods of detecting any sign of this mobilization.

Next comes the question of whether Japan would attack Alaska. She would have to believe there was some value in doing this. The small differential in distances as between Alaska and Honolulu would probably be a negligible factor as compared with other more important considerations.

Hawaii, authorities point out, is the best defense of Alaska. As Mayor Brownell states, these islands are

(Continued on page 60)

DIPLOMATIC SPURS

Our Experiences in Santo Domingo

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES J. MILLER
U. S. Marine Corps

(Continued from February number)

POLICIA NACIONAL DOMINICANA

On April 7, 1917, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, now designated as the Policia Nacional Dominicana, was organized. Its strength until October, 1922, when definitely fixed by Executive Order at eighty-eight commissioned officers and twelve hundred enlisted men, had been a variable quantity fluctuating with the amount of national funds appropriated for its establishment and upkeep.

The Guardia or Policia when first organized operated under the Department of Interior and Police, but later was assigned to the Brigade for the purpose of organization, training, and military operations. The Department of Interior and Police only retained a nominal control over certain administrative functions relative to appropriations.

During the time the Policia was maintained as an activity of the Military Government, it was officered almost entirely by Marine officers and non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers and petty officers of the Medical Corps, U. S. Navy. A few of the junior officers and all of the enlisted personnel were Dominicans.

Due to the uncertainty of the duration of the Occupation, the shortage of government funds, and the probable conditions surrounding the withdrawal, the adoption of a well defined, progressive, and permanent program for the organization and training of the Policia was impracticable. Nevertheless, a general scheme for training and organization had for its motive the taking over of the Brigade's duties after the evacuation of Santo Domingo in so far as would be conformable to the Dominican law. Later when the Dominican people signified an intention to accept proposals for the evacuation, a plan was prepared, approved, and placed in operation. The salient features of this plan were as follows:

- (a) The policing of the provinces by the Policia during the year 1923 and the withdrawal of the Brigade to ports of embarkation.
- (b) Progressive training of native officers for duties they would fall heir to and for the gradual assumption of responsibility by carefully regulated steps.
- (c) The establishment of training centers and the intensive training of native officers and enlisted men so as to attain maximum authorized strength by March 1, 1923.
- (d) Prior to the withdrawal of the armed forces, the operation of the Policia under the same distribution that would prevail after the withdrawal.

It was believed, that if the above plan could be carried out in its entirety, some degree of success would be assured to the establishment of a national constabulary force qualified as a relief for the forces of Occupation. This was a paramount military necessity and of prime im-

portance in any policy involving a change of government. A government capable of surviving could not hope to safeguard its integrity without the support of a strong, loyal, and efficient constabulary force.

An adherence to this plan in all items was frustrated shortly after its inception by the installation of the Provisional Government. There was, however, no material interference in the training feature of the plan, which was carried out in the main essentials. Two training centers were established and a course of eight weeks' training was given to the enlisted men, similar in many respects to our recruit training, supplemented by instruction in constabulary duties. A school for native officers was also instituted, comprehensive in character, entailing a few months' course of instruction.

During the time the Policia fell entirely under the jurisdiction of Military Government, its forces were usually stationed by companies in the provincial capitals less detachments at smaller towns and along the Haitian border. Its principal duties were those of a constabulary force, and as such, it was charged with the suppression of outlawry and other crimes, apprehension of fugitives from justice, prevention of smuggling, execution of court orders, care and custody of civil prisoners, and the enforcement of the laws in general. It performed splendid service both independently and in cooperation with the Brigade in the suppression of banditry.

Regardless of the fact that the organization and training of the Policia Nacional Dominicana has been confided solely to the Brigade, and accepted without reservation, the Brigade could not assume the responsibility for its military efficiency. Any attainment towards proficiency was dependent upon time, control, and unity of command. Conditions approaching such an ideal situation did not long prevail. The change in the status of the Military Government, together with the contemplated evacuation of the Occupation, placed the Policia in an insecure position, vulnerable to influences that might affect its morale, and ultimately destroy its efficiency and terminate in disorganization.

From observations of the past, the constitution of a native military force must be viewed in the light of an experiment for such a force, organized, trained and controlled, had never existed. There are no precedents upon which to form a basis for estimating in advance those military assets that might naturally accrue to a force recruited from the native population.

CIVIL PATROLS

The training and employment of civil patrols or guards was not an established practice. As a matter of fact, they were seldom, if rarely resorted to, and then only in cases of emergency. An account of this activity might be dispensed with, yet it may be of conspicuous interest to know, that their organization was frequently advocated by the civil authorities and not infrequently recommended by officers of the Occupation. Moreover, in the few instances where they were employed, when placed under analysis give rise to certain deductions, which constitute a set of rules governing their general use.


As far as can be determined, there was no policy appertaining to the employment of the civil population for purely military reasons. However, some intimation of a radical change in the political situation in Santo Domingo, led the Navy Department in May, 1923, to announce a policy which had for its main object the divorcing of all civil and police functions from the Brigade, and the assumption of these functions by the Policia. This

seemed to cover the problem as far as the Brigade was concerned. The terms, "civil guards" and "civil patrols" are used synonymously, although the former was intended to apply to civilian organizations employed defensively in communities where the absence of the military forces or the numerical weakness of the municipal police did not afford adequate police protection against the descent of the bandit groups upon the more populous districts. While never specifically organized for this purpose, they were, however, employed offensively against the bandit groups. Therefore, the term civil patrols would appear to be more appropriate.

The employment of the native population by a force in occupation, as an improvisation, for police or military purposes should ordinarily be condemned and viewed as an undesirable recourse to means that properly belong to other agencies. Numerous disadvantages inseparable to the formation of civil patrols can only be neutralized by the most inflexible supervision. Where such forces were authorized to operate either independently or in concert with the forces of the Occupation, the Military Govern-

ment public. If the Military Government desired to adhere to a policy which had for its purpose the divorcement of the civil authorities and politicians from all military connections, then the sanctioning of civil patrols was in direct discord with such a policy. Based on this idea, the leadership of a civil organization, possessing military characteristics, might be expected to develop certain political aspects. The command of a large patrol would naturally enhance the prestige of the leader, and in a country where politics play a predominant part in the lives of the people, the supposition was, that the leader would be disposed to use his influence for political aggrandizement.

One example will serve to illustrate some of the disadvantages outlined above. A Dominican of considerable prominence in the Province of Seibo was authorized to collect about fifty native followers to operate against the bandits. This band was armed, and directed to destroy a certain notorious bandit leader and his followers. Outside of securing information, the band rendered no service whatsoever to the Occupation. On the contrary these irregulars did irreparable damage, and were an actual



THE RECEPTORIA, SAN DOMINGO CITY, D. R., NOW REMODELED, PRESIDENT'S PALACE

ment was accountable for their acts, and thereby became the likely recipient of severe censure. Furthermore, with patrols of this sort, there was the grave possibility of encountering the forces of the Occupation or the Policia, who might mistake their identity with disastrous results. Again, any carelessness in the selection of the members composing these patrols was potent with the danger of placing firearms in the hands of irresponsible, inefficient, and undisciplined persons—much to the detriment and chagrin of the Military Government.

Like so many problems affecting the population, the Occupation could not ignore giving some attention to the political side of the military induction of the civil population. Especially did reflection seem imperative in such cases, where the civil authorities or politicians sponsored movements associated with the military affairs of the Re-

embarrassment to the Military Government by making hosts of enemies among all classes of Dominicans. Evidently the leader interpreted the authority conferred upon him as carrying with it an unbridled license to commit depredations against the peaceful inhabitants, whose cause he had agreed to support by force of arms. According to reports, the history of the band was one of pillage and lawlessness, which necessitated the immediate disarming and disbandment of the group, and the placing of the leader under surveillance.

Another example where civil guards were utilized would tend to discredit many of the above objectionable features, and, moreover, offered, in lieu of, certain redeeming virtues. But in this instance, the most rigid control was exercised. The system used was similar in many respects to the method followed in the western part

of the United States when outlaws were numerous; namely, the employment of posses of civilians, inhabitants of the country in which the outlaws were operating, and who in a great many cases were impelled to action by some personal grievance against the outlaws. In Santo Domingo these groups consisted of the better known, more courageous and trustworthy citizens, practically all of whom were actuated by a grudge against the bandits. They were organized into small bands of not more than sixteen men. These small groups had the advantage of being highly mobile, easily concealed, and readily controlled. Each member of a group was thoroughly instructed by the armed forces of the Occupation in the use of the rifle and automatic pistol, especially, in firing rapidly and accurately at short ranges. The groups were not permitted to operate until they were competent to handle their firearms with some degree of skill, and with some knowledge of their powers and limitations. To obviate any promiscuous use of these weapons, they were kept locked in gun racks when not absolutely required.

Four groups were originally established at posts where the military forces were stationed. With some assurance of their success, three more groups were organized later. Each group was placed in charge of an officer, who supervised the training and accompanied the group when on patrol. In order not to restrict the initiative of the groups, or to interfere with their freedom of maneuver, this officer allowed the native leader to employ his own methods in the conduct of the patrol, but was, nevertheless, in a position to observe and correct the behavior of the group should the necessity arise.

The character or composition of the groups facilitated the gathering of information concerning the bandits, their movement, location of camps, and rendezvous. An inhabitant would have little or no hesitancy in giving pertinent information to the native leader of a group, that he would under no circumstances divulge to a member of the Occupation. As already cited the collection of bandit information was a most essential item looking towards the destruction of banditry.

Each patrol's operations were confined to a well defined section of the country with which all the members were thoroughly familiar. Upon the receipt of information of any bandit movement within an area, the proper group was ordered out, while all the armed forces of the Occupation were simultaneously directed to remain in their garrisons until the group was recalled. This precaution eliminated any possibility of mistaking the armed natives for bandit groups. This system possessed the marked advantage of keeping the bandits continually on the move.

A variation of this method, frequently consisted in sending out all the native groups, each group assiduously patrolling within its designated area for three consecutive days of a week. Upon their return, they were promptly relieved by the military patrols, which scoured the country for the remainder of the week.

The operations of these groups gave evidence of the confidence reposed in them for their behavior was irreproachable. They were able to secure a number of contacts with the bandit groups, and in each encounter conducted themselves in a most creditable manner, inflicting severe punishment on the bandits. Then again, the effect of witnessing their own countrymen assist the Military Government in the repression of lawlessness and disorder must have been demoralizing to the bandits. These patrols combined with the activities of the military forces were primarily conducive to the final suppression of banditry.

Shortly before the installation of the Provisional Government, the Military Government directed the severance of all relations with the native guards, although several of the sugar estates were authorized to retain their services. It was felt that with the installation of the Provisional Government any semblance of control over these civil guards by the forces of Occupation would create an unfavorable impression in the minds of Dominicans.

It is doubtful if this same system could have been successfully employed in the early days of the Occupation, in face of the general opposition to the Military Government and the mistrust of its purposes. In other words, a change in conditions demanded or permitted the application of new remedies to old ailments, that formerly would neither have been suitable nor advisable.

MAPS AND HANDBOOKS

As a narrative of the Brigade's activities, relative to the preparation and completion of military maps and a handbook of Santo Domingo has no direct bearing on the problems effecting the occupational or military rule of the Republic, the subject will be treated briefly. Yet this is in no way intended to belittle the magnitude and importance of the work, or to detract from the credit and praise due those officers and men who undertook and accomplished a most tedious and laborious task.

Not until late in 1921, did circumstances seem to favor or fully warrant the utilization of any considerable force to carry through to completion so significant an undertaking as the production of a combined map of Santo Domingo, augmented by additioned data in the shape of handbooks and monographs. So a plan was prepared that set in operation a well directed and coordinated system of mapping, and the collection and compilation of other data, that could not be placed on maps, or otherwise dispensed with, because of its great importance.

Any task culminating in the efforts of several organizations required the concentration of control in a central authority, and in conformity with this rule, the Brigade Commander directed the Brigade Intelligence Office to assume immediate charge of all activities. Upon it fell the task of outlining all preliminary arrangements and the exercise of general supervision. Appreciating the value of attaining uniformity in procedure, and the necessity of facilitating and simplifying the innumerable details incident to a problem of these proportions, the Intelligence Department issued a series of mapping circulars. These circulars prescribed instructions regarding the proposed maps, instruments, sketching methods, conventional signs, standardizing strides, methods of computation, control maps, and miscellaneous instruments and data.

Each Regiment was made responsible for the mapping of its district. Regimental schools were instituted for the training of an ample personnel in mapping, using the subject matter of the mapping circulars as a basis for instruction. To retain continuity of control and to further systematize the work a mapping section was organized in each regimental intelligence office, with the intelligence officer directing all operations within the military district.

Approximately eighteen months were consumed in the preparation and final production of the maps and handbook. Six or eight months were devoted to the actual field work of mapping during which time about one hundred men were engaged in sketching. In order to expeditiously record, combine, and complete the great amount of material submitted, the office work was continuous over the entire period. In the year and a half the following maps were completed:

- (a) Strategic Map, scale 1:63360, consisting of forty-four sheets, covering the entire Republic.
- (b) Political, Judicial and Administrative Map, scale 1:15840, showing extent of provinces of the Republic, their communes, together with the latest census figures.
- (c) Road Map, scale 1:21120, consisting of ninety-six sheets, covering the most important areas of the Republic.
- (d) City or Town Maps, scale 1:4000, consisting of twelve sheets, which are composite of airplane photographic mosaics and ground maps, showing all important cities and towns of the Republic.

The Handbook of the Dominican Republic, 1922-1923, was prepared simultaneously with the maps, and appears in two parts: Part I consists of 253 pages covering the Southern and Eastern Districts; Part II consisting of 203 pages, covers the Northern District. This handbook is in tabular, graphical, pictorial, and descriptive form, and contains both original and research work. It was meticulously prepared as to verification of fact and statistics, and is a broad comprehensive study of the geographical features, climatic conditions, resources, industrial and economical conditions, communication systems, civil government, history, inhabitants and military defenses of Santo Domingo.

PROVOST DEPARTMENT

In an effort to give a clear portrayal of other tasks, that fell as a heritage to the Brigade, repeated mention must be made to the activities of the provost department. Therefore, in passing, occasion is taken to explain, somewhat in detail, the duties and organization of this important adjunct of the Military Government, and the extent of its influence in relation to the Occupation and Dominican people.

The status held by the provost marshal service was unique and distinctive, and it early proved an invaluable accessory to the efficient management of the administrative machinery of the Military Government. With the exception of a few native interpreters, the personnel of the provost offices was drawn exclusively from the Brigade, and, moreover, performed duties under the command of the Brigade. Nevertheless, the innate character of provost system, not only made it advisable, but necessary to maintain it as a separate and individual establishment, unhampered by the ordinary routine of Brigade affairs.

The provost department performed all those duties peculiar to its office, together with other tasks not generally assigned to this recognized institution of military occupations. The organization and disposition of the provost offices, while clearly marking a channel of command for the enforcement of many orders and mandates of the Occupation, simplified their execution, and overrode the many delays which otherwise would have meant a real loss to their effectiveness.

The Brigade records fail to show when the provost offices were first instituted, though presumably their establishment occurred either simultaneously with the announcement of the Occupation or shortly thereafter. Undoubtedly, a provost office, which later became known as the district provost office, was immediately installed at each regimental headquarters, and furthermore, it appears to have been customary to open a provost office promptly upon the establishment of any military post of importance. The number of offices varied at times, that is, they were opened or closed as the necessity demanded,



OZAMA RIVER, 1920

or abandoned with the withdrawal of garrisons to which regularly assigned. At one time there were as many as sixteen, all actively functioning and turning over a considerable amount of business. During the greater period of the Occupation an office was located at each provincial capital, where it was easily and readily accessible to the inhabitants, and, moreover, facilitated the execution of the orders of the Military Government in conjunction with the local civil officials.

Not until 1920 were the various provost offices really organized into a department. Prior to that time there seems to have been little or no connection between the different offices; each carried on its duties independently of the other within the limits of its jurisdiction. When Santo Domingo was divided into military districts, a district provost marshal was appointed at each district headquarters. This officer either by force of seniority or appointment did, in instances, exercise some administrative control over the provost offices of the district, and was even permitted to prescribe general methods of policy. However, this authority seems to have depended largely upon the degree of latitude and confidence the district commander was willing to repose in his subordinate. All records, reports, and recommendations relative to pertinent matters were forwarded or referred to the district commander and in some cases sent direct to Brigade Headquarters.

In September, 1920, the office of provost marshal general was established at Santo Domingo City. This office was charged with the administration of all provost offices, and even through constituted primarily for the purpose of regulating the collection and distribution of provost funds, resulted in a much closer amalgamation of the provost system.

The amount of personnel attached to the different offices bore no uniformity in strength, nor was the sphere of their activities equal in all respects. This was due entirely to the location of the various offices, together with extent of their duties and the strength of the commands to which they were attached. In one or two instances, the office was represented by the provost marshal himself, who was usually the senior officer present at the smaller posts. Frequently the personnel consisted of the provost marshal, a small office force, an interpreter, and a few military police; while again at the larger posts, especially at the district headquarters, the office was augmented by

an increased office force, a provost prison guard, and a considerable force of military police.

The object for which the department was maintained is briefly and best illustrated by the following duties, many of which were a matter of almost daily performance by several of the offices:

1. Maintenance of peace and order throughout the Republic.
2. Detention and bringing to justice offenders against the Executive Orders and the Proclamation of Intervention.
3. Repression of crime.
4. Enforcement of the Executive Orders and execution of the mandates of the Military Authority.
5. The trial of persons charged with offenses against the Military Government or the preparation of charges and specifications for the trial of persons by exceptional military courts.
6. Execution of sentences of exceptional military courts.
7. Arrest and detention of suspects. Investigation of reports bearing on important matters.
8. Special investigation of complaints made by civilians against members of the Occupation, Policia, municipal police, etc.
9. Observe civil officials in performance of their duties, and report any official found violating his trust.
10. Intelligence surveillance and espionage. (This in conjunction with the brigade and regimental intelligence sections.)
11. Custody of certain prisons and their inmates, enforcement of prison regulations and supervision of prison labor. Care and treatment of prisoners.
12. Issue and cancel firearm permits in accordance with Brigade Orders.
13. Control over the storage and release of firearms, ammunition, and explosives imported into the Republic. The sale of ammunition to persons possessing arms on permits.
14. The enforcement of the road laws and traffic regulations.
15. Receive and forward to the Department of Foreign Affairs all applications for passports made by Dominicans. To issue emergency passports when necessary.
16. Receive and forward to the American Legation, Santo Domingo City, certificates in case of Chinese requesting passports.

In order that the military authorities might be kept thoroughly informed of the many activities of the provost department, all of which more or less affected the entire fabric of the occupational administration, each office was obliged to submit numerous and sundry reports. The following were regularly submitted to Brigade Headquarters:

1. Monthly report of arm permits issued and cancelled.
2. Monthly report of provost funds.
3. Quarterly report of ammunition sold.
4. Quarterly report of provost prisoners to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy via Brigade Commander.
5. Report of investigations and provost courts when occurring.

The provost department, through a process of development and a knowledge of conditions gained by experience, built up a high state of efficiency, and combined with

the activities of the troops rendered the violation of the orders and decrees of the Military Government, if not extremely rare, at least precarious. It demonstrated on more than one occasion the undeniable right to be regarded as an indispensable attribute of the government of the Dominican Republic as administered by the Military Government of the United States, and was virtually an elemental corollary to the necessity of the Occupation. If the provost service was brought into being for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the Occupation, it was no less created for the reason of benefiting the inhabitants of the country. In fact the provost marshals were the representatives of the Occupation to the civil population, and acted as impartial intermediaries between the Military Government and the people. Not only did they look after the interests of the Occupation, but listened to the grievances and complaints of the inhabitants, and when within their scope and authority made the appropriate adjustment, or lacking the necessary power directed the individual to the proper place for adjudication. The very character of the duties of provost marshal offices made them, in truth, an important part of the police and judicial system of the Republic.

One difficulty prevailed within the provost department, which previous to the appointment of the provost marshal general's office, bid fair to undermine the efficiency and the maintenance of the offices. For several years the provost service was erroneously supported by various funds: Brigade Intelligence funds, Secretary of Interior and Police appropriations, certain small allotments from the Marine Corps, and fines imposed by sentences of provost courts. The aggregate amount of these contributions or revenues was not only unreliable but insufficient, and the provost marshals were continually casting about for other means of defraying the expenses of their offices.

Unfortunately the chief source of the above income was the penalizing of offenses committed by the inhabitants against the Military Government. The very idea of exercising justice for maintaining the provost offices by the imposition of fines was fundamentally wrong and repellant to a due sense of justice. Then again, it was calculated to offer undue temptation, for provost marshals or members of exceptional military courts might unthinkingly be moved to impose larger fines than the offenses warranted for the purpose of covering the expenses of the provost offices, realizing full well that the continuance of these offices was for the ultimate good of the people. Such a practice, if it had once been recognized by the Military



MARINE CORPS PACK TRAIN, SEIBO, D. R., 1930

Government would have been an invitation for the invidious condemnation of its methods in administering justice.

There seems to have been an unwillingness on the part of some of the authorities to concede that the cost of upkeep of the provost department was a legitimate expenditure of funds from the Dominican treasury, incident to defraying the expenses of the government of the occupied territory, and to admit fully that the provost service was dedicated to the improvement of the inhabitants and to the security of their lives and property. This contention, if it can be called such, was refuted, when in December 1920, the Military Governor issued an order stating that in the future the upkeep of the provost system would be borne by the Dominican treasury in so far as fines, etc., did not suffice to cover the necessary cost of the service. This action, while materially obviating further trouble, was the first official recognition of the provost system as constituting a part of the Dominican Government, notwithstanding the fact that it was an appendage of the Military Government; furthermore, that it in no way belonged to the Navy or Marine Corps, and therefore the cost of maintenance by the United States would have been an improper expenditure.

A few words should be spoken of the officers who served in the position of provost marshals as their selection had a great influence in establishing friendly relations with the inhabitants, and in the inculcation of the proper attitude of the members of the Occupation toward the inhabitants. The success of the provost offices depended largely upon the individual judgment and actions of the provost marshals. The selection of an officer unsuited for the performance of provost duties, either through a lack of the necessary qualifications or sympathy in the work, while probably not vitally derogatory to the interests of the Occupation, was not contemplated to promote its prestige and standing in the community. However, as a rule the choice of officers for these positions appears to have been well made, for a great many of the provost marshals, as their military records will attest, gained an enviable reputation among the inhabitants for fairness, impartiality, and kindly thoughtfulness, and were spoken of as "muy sympatico." The provost marshals were thrown in daily contact with the people and had the opportunity of studying their characteristics, customs, prejudices, and shortcomings. Possessed with an inflexible sense of justice and duty, together with a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants and a keen understanding of the object of the Occupation, the provost marshals made their offices serve a most admirable purpose, which was unsurpassed by any other institution or organization of the Military Government.

DISARMING THE POPULATION

The disarming of the Dominican people followed instantly upon the formal declaration of the Military Government, and must be regarded as the most drastic and effective step in the restoration of domestic tranquillity. This measure divested the inhabitants of the only physical means of protracting armed resistance, and conclusively convinced them of the futility of further opposition in the face of the new order of things.

Although the disarming of the native population of a country in military occupation will be the invariable rule, its application to the case of Santo Domingo was an immediate and imperative necessity. It was customary, as statistics later proved, for every man and boy, who could afford it to carry a firearm, notwithstanding that such possession was contrary to the Dominican law. There was a

logical and basic reason for the extraordinary large number of weapons in the hands of the inhabitants. The arbitrary methods whereby the political activities were carried on, frequently culminating in armed revolutions, and the lawlessness practiced by a perceptible portion of the population greatly influenced the conduct of human affairs in the Republic. The professional politician, and the revolutionary and bandit leader, together with their numerous cohorts were habitually armed. The legal institutions could not prevail against this distressing condition; persons and property were left to the mercy of unscrupulous despots, until in self preservation peaceful and law abiding inhabitants were forced to have recourse to arms. In this respect the Dominican people virtually constituted themselves an armed garrison.

No incident of the Occupation could have been fraught with graver consequences than a failure to deprive the Dominican people of all firearms and other deadly weapons. In this dispossession the Military Governor promptly removed one of the most likely causes for fostering enmity and hatred, and further served to cut off a large supply of firearms to the revolutionary and bandit leaders. An unprejudiced estimate would disclose in the light of past situations and circumstances that the disarming measures were as much, if not more, to the interest and protection of the Dominican people than to the forces of Occupation.

On November 29, 1916, the Military Governor issued the disarming order, forbidding all inhabitants to carry or have in their possession firearms, ammunition or explosives, except under exceptional circumstances of whose existence and duration the Military Government was the sole judge. This order was addressed to the Brigade Commander, directing that he place it in effect. It specified that the prohibited articles would be turned in to the proper officers of the forces of Occupation, who would receipt and care for such as were voluntarily surrendered, but that such articles as were not voluntarily surrendered would be confiscated. It further stipulated that the carrying of concealed weapons of any description was forbidden, and that any person cognizant of the above orders and knowingly violating them would be liable to punishment by the Military Government. As would be expected the details of carrying out the order, that is, the manner in which arms, ammunition and explosives would be turned in, and the methods that would be adopted in securing those prohibited articles not voluntarily surrendered, was left to the discretion of the Brigade Commander.

To give the order the force and character of a public notice, it was published in the "Gaceta Oficial" for the information and guidance of the citizens of the Republic. It might be well to mention here, that the "Gaceta Oficial" was the official publication of the Dominican Government, issued periodically and comprised a complete record of all the acts and laws enacted by the Government. This governmental record had a wide circulation, being distributed among the provincial, judicial, and municipal officials of the Republic. The Military Government continued to use this well established medium of expression for the official and public announcement of its executive and administrative orders. Therefore, on this occasion, as in many others, the Dominican officials became responsible for bringing the contents of the disarming order to the attention of the inhabitants and to impress upon them the significance of complying with the order.

It has not been possible to discover from the Brigade files, what written orders, if any, were issued to the armed forces simultaneously with the disarming proclamation, relative to the procedure to be followed in the collection of

firearms and other deadly weapons. Furthermore, there has been no way to determine whether or not any time limit was fixed within which the inhabitants were to surrender their weapons. No date was specified in the Military Governor's order; it apparently was not deemed practicable. However, it is manifest from a reading of certain papers that the Military Government did lay great stress upon prompt obedience to the disarming proclamation, and that the armed forces instituted the most energetic measures to secure all firearms in possession of the Dominican people.

The following forces or agencies were employed in the collection of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other deadly weapons:

- (a) Provincial governors and local police authorities, particularly *jefes comunales* (communal chiefs) *jefes de orden* (chief of police) and *alcaldes pedaneos* (rural policemen).
- (b) The forces of the Brigade.
- (c) Special agents or operators of the Brigade intelligence office or provost marshal department.
- (d) The forces of the Policia.

From an examination of the records, it is inferred that the civil authorities received supplementary orders, concurrent with the disarming proclamation, stating explicitly the manner in which firearms, ammunition and explosives would be collected and later turned over to the military forces. There are evidences of where field commanders visited various towns and communes, and issued verbal instructions to the local officials imposing restrictions as to the time and place the prohibited articles would be surrendered. The civil officials were either obliged to make personal delivery of the collected articles, or a detachment was sent to procure them at some place previously designated.

Great quantities of firearms were collected by this means and contrary to expectations met with more success and favor than first predicted. Many of the civil officials conscientiously complied with the demands made upon them as demonstrated by the expeditious manner in which they acquired large number of firearms. However, some of the officials, considering the disarming order an unjust imposition, performed their duties in a most perfunctory manner, while a few, unworthy of any trust that could be placed in them, disarmed some of the people and permitted others to retain their weapons for personal or monetary reasons. In some instances, the inhabitants reacted against this behavior on the part of the local authorities by reporting the maleficent official, and suggested that other measures be taken to collect their weapons.

The disarming of the inhabitants through the intervening instrumentality of the civil officials possessed many redeeming features over the utilization of the armed forces for the same purpose. It was the most peaceful means of accomplishing the desired object, less provocative, and the least likely to engender antagonism and end in friction. It gave the peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who were worn out by the constant political abuse of the past, the opportunity to gracefully hand over their weapons without being subjected to what they might consider the indignity of making a personal surrender to the military authorities. Misunderstandings were avoided that would have otherwise occurred had the armed forces been employed, because of a difference in language and custom. Moreover, it relieved the armed forces of an unpleasant responsibility and eliminated the factor of personal contact at a time when the population must have viewed the intentions of the Occupation with considerable doubt and suspicion.

However, it is not to be assumed from the success al-



SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS, D. R.

ready noted that an order so exacting and far reaching in its effect was to meet with a willing and universal compliance. An appreciable percentage of the inhabitants deliberately failed to surrender their firearms or reluctantly obeyed the summons of the order. As a consequence of this attitude, it was necessary as a military measure to resort to the most drastic methods; the employment of the military force followed, in order to compel the recalcitrants to surrender their weapons. Either the civil officials were made to secure the prohibited articles, or the armed forces conducted a house to house search for concealed weapons. These forcible measures while not tending to promote good feeling were unavoidable and wholly justifiable in the effort for an early return of peace and order.

There were incidents where special agents or operators of the Brigade Intelligence Office and the provost marshal offices made collection of deadly weapons. In these enterprises, action was taken on more or less reliable information relative to the hiding or retention of large quantities of firearms and ammunition by certain notorious individuals. The success of these operations depended upon the skill and courage of the agent as he had to rely solely upon his own initiative and resources. In December 1916, an operator from the Brigade Intelligence Office made a trip to the San Juan valley and the Haitian border and succeeded in returning to Santo Domingo City with 826 rifles and over 14,000 rounds of ammunition. The trip was made in less than three weeks, practically alone and unassisted, and at great personal risk to the operator. He fearlessly confronted the rulers of San Juan valley and intimidated them into surrendering their weapons.

With the establishment of the Guardia, this organization assisted the Brigade in the collection and confiscation of firearms. It performed notable services in this connection, and as a native constabulary force had the marked advantage of ferreting out the more difficult and pertinacious cases.

In June, 1917, the Brigade Commander issued an order directing that in the future, Marines and Guardia would be the only persons authorized to represent the Military Government in the collection of arms. What may have been the occasion of this order, the writer has no way of knowing, though it is imagined that the Military Government now proposed to deprive the civil officials of further authority or interference in the matter, and concluded that the inhabitants had had sufficient time in which to

(Continued on page 52)

CAPTAIN HEALY'S REINDEER

How a surgeon's "grateful patient" was responsible for reindeer being in Alaska

COMMANDER J. C. CANTWELL
USCG, Retired

■ At the time of the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 by the United States, so little was known of the Territory and of its vast natural resources, that its acquisition for the sum of \$7,200,000 was designated by unfriendly critics of Secretary of State William H. Seward, who negotiated the treaty of cession, as "Seward's Folly." After almost a century of occupation by Russia, with the exception of the Aleutian Archipelago, the Pribyloff Islands and a narrow strip of territory adjoining the British possessions in the extreme southwestern portion of the Territory, the vast interior of the country with a total area equal to that of all the New England States with that of Michigan and Iowa combined, was practically unexplored and unknown. Of its rich deposits of gold, silver, copper, tin, lead and other minerals we knew next to nothing. We were equally ignorant of the fact that we had come into possession of the largest cod-fishing banks in existence, and that in almost every stream flowing into the sea salmon and other fish were so abundant as to furnish the basis in later years of building up an industry which was destined to control the markets of the world for these essential articles of human consumption.

The Russians had devoted their entire energies to the exploitation of the Seal Fisheries and to the acquisition of the pelts of the sea-otter and other fur-bearing animals indigenous to the region. Aside from these activities, the Russians did little to develop the country or to ascertain by exploration its potentialities. In so far as the numbers of the native inhabitants were concerned, their locations or manner of living, there had been, apparently very little attempt made to obtain any accurate information on the subject. It is believed, however, as the result of later information received from various sources, that the native population of Alaska at the time of the acquisition of the Territory by the United States was about 33,000 souls. Of this number approximately 13,000 were Eskimos living in scattered communities along the shores of the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea as far south as Bristol Bay. These people lived almost exclusively on the products obtained by hunting the sea-mammals of the Arctic, such as the whale, walrus and seals which were to be found in those waters, for their food supply and by trapping the fur-bearing animals found on the tundra plains adjacent to the coast. The Eskimos seldom ventured far inland, and their relations with the natives of the interior were never of a very friendly nature, so that they were practically a self-contained tribe and it is with them that this article is principally concerned.

With the exception of the comparatively few natives of the Aleutian Islands and the coastal tribes in the vicinity

of Sitka, who had been brought into contact with the Russians, we knew almost nothing of the native inhabitants of the country and still less of the geography of the newly acquired territory. Altogether the purchase of Alaska was one of the greatest examples of "buying a pig in a poke" that has ever been recorded. For nearly ten years after the cession, very little was done to increase our knowledge of the region. But during this era the pursuit of the whale was carrying the fleet of American whalers farther and farther north, and finally it extended into the hitherto unhunted waters of the Arctic Ocean. In order that the lives and property of the whalers might be protected the government each year dispatched one of its revenue cutters to Alaskan waters with orders to afford such assistance to the whalers as might be necessary as well as to prevent any illicit trade between them and the natives. The commanders of the cutters were directed to obtain such information as was possible in relation to the country, its resources, the number and location of its inhabitants and in general all such information as would be of value in enabling us to form some comprehensive plan for its future development.

As a result of these investigations the officers of the government were brought into contact with the Eskimos and much valuable information was obtained. It was soon seen that we had not only come into possession of a territory which was far richer in natural resources than was at first suspected, but we had also assumed the responsibility for the safe-guarding of a large number of people who, if left to the mercies of an oncoming civilization were doomed to extinction. For centuries the main and practically only sources of food supply for the Eskimos had been obtained, as has already been stated, from the whale, walrus and seal which abounded in these waters. With the advent of the whalers and the indiscriminate slaughter of these animals for commercial purposes which followed, the problem of a food supply for the natives was each year growing more and more acute. Unless some form of relief could be devised it would be inevitably wiped out by starvation. Already, the studies made of the situation during the period covered by this article, namely from about 1870 to 1884, showed the native population of the coast line of Arctic Alaska had decreased from an estimated number of approximately 25,000 as reported by the early explorers of the 17th and 18th centuries, to a bare 4,000 souls in 1884.

TO PRESERVE POPULATION

It became increasingly apparent that if the country with its vast natural wealth was to be developed this last remnant of the native population must be preserved. This would naturally become our duty from the standpoint of humanity. But there were other reasons of almost equal urgency why this should be done, among which was the assistance to be rendered by the natives in the event of shipwreck or other disaster happening to the whalers or other white men who might be cast ashore and be compelled to pass the winter in this desolate region. The distance from civilization, the lack of means of communication with the outside world, and the short summer season of open navigation would leave such persons exposed to almost certain death unless they could be succored by the Eskimos. Sufficient information as

to the character of these people had made it certain that they would gladly give shelter and share to the utmost of their ability their supplies of food with any white men who might be left destitute in their midst, without a thought of either repayment or reward. Under these circumstances it would be a neglect of our national duty to allow present conditions to continue.

Many plans to solve the problem had been advanced, but none were found to suit all conditions. It was at one time suggested that the Eskimos be removed to some central location and furnished subsistence by the government. But this would make it impossible to utilize their assistance to white men who might be cast away on the shores of the Arctic Ocean, and it would also be necessary to take them out of an environment in which they had for centuries lived in contentment and subject them to conditions which would destroy their independence of action and ultimately make of them a useless and unhappy burden upon the government. Added to these objections was the fact that the whole nation was still filled with pity and horror over the story of suffering, starvation and death of members of the Greely Polar Expedition at Fort Conger and Cape Sabine during the

send a boat expedition up the Kowuk River, a hitherto unexplored stream flowing into the Arctic Ocean at Kotzebue Sound, and the writer was detailed to head the party. Professor Charles H. Townsend, an ornithologist attached to the U. S. National Museum, was on board the *Corwin* at this time and requested permission to accompany the expedition, his purpose being to extend his observations of bird-life into the interior of the country. His application for permission to do this was granted. During the progress of the expedition, which finally reached the headwaters of the Kowuk at a point in the interior about five hundred miles from the coast, we had the opportunity of ascertaining the character of a large portion of territory never before visited by white men, and among other things we discovered, was the fact that with the exception of a narrow belt of timberland along the banks of the stream, the region was treeless and covered with a dense growth of lichens, moss and sphagnum which extended in every direction as far as the eye could reach. Professor Townsend made an examination of this growth and stated it as his opinion that it was identical in character with that to be found on the moss-covered plains of Siberia and he could see no rea-



SIBERIAN DEERMEN, ST. LAWRENCE BAY, SIBERIA, 1886

dreadful winters of 1883 and 1884, all of which might have been averted if it had been possible for the expedition to reach the inhabited shores of Greenland, a distance of less than two hundred miles across the ice obstructed waters of Baffin's Bay. Under these circumstances, any plan for the relief of the Eskimos which contemplated the abandonment of their settlements along the coasts of the Arctic Ocean would be unthinkable.

A WHIMSY OF CHANCE

At this juncture, through one of those whimsies of chance which have so often influenced the creation of great events, it happened that a young scientist employed by the United States Museum of Natural History, was a passenger on board the *Corwin* and was engaged in the study of bird-life in Alaskan waters. It was through a suggestion made by him that the problem of furnishing a new source of food supply for the Eskimos was adopted and as we shall see was carried out to a most successful conclusion. During the summer cruise of the *Corwin* in Alaskan waters in the year 1886 the commanding officer, Captain M. A. Healy, decided to

son why the propagation of domestic reindeer could not be as successfully carried out in Alaska as had been done for hundreds of years by the Siberian deermen.

NO TIME LOST

Upon the return of the exploring party to the *Corwin*, no time was lost in bringing to the attention of Captain Healy the suggestion made by Townsend in regard to the possibility of the introduction of domestic reindeer into Alaska as a means of solving the food problem of the Eskimos. With characteristic energy Captain Healy at once began an investigation, the object of which was to determine whether or not the character of the coastal plains bordering the sea was the same as that had been reported as existing in the Kowuk River region. It was soon ascertained that it was practically the same in all that portion of the territory lying north and west from the Yukon River delta to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. In this vast area there was an inexhaustible supply of reindeer moss which would furnish pasturage for the maintenance of enough reindeer to supply the needs not only of the entire Eskimo population, but also satisfy the

demands of any possible number of white immigrants who might be expected to come into the country in the future. The question of pasturage having been satisfactorily settled, the next matters to be taken up were, as follows:

1. Where could a heard of breeding animals be obtained?
2. How could it be taken care of during its first year of introduction into Alaska?
3. How could the initial experiment be financed?

DR. SHELDON JACKSON

In regard to question 1, it was known that large numbers of the Siberian deermen annually drove their herds of reindeer from the interior to the shores of the Arctic Ocean in the vicinity of East Cape, which is only a short day's run by steamer from the Alaskan coast. If the deermen could be induced to sell some of their animals alive, it would be an easy matter to transport them on the *Corwin* to any point on the Alaskan side of Bering Strait that might be selected as being best suited for the inauguration of the great experiment.

Fortunately for the success of the project the Reverend Dr. Sheldon Jackson, the commissioner of education in Alaska, was at this time on the *Corwin* engaged in his annual inspection of the various native schools which had been established in Alaska, and when the subject of the possible introduction of domesticated reindeer was presented to him, he gave the matter his enthusiastic approval, and stated that if the live animals could be procured, he would guarantee that they would be taken care of if left under the care of the teacher at any native school which might be selected. This disposed of question 2. Question 3, in regard to financing of the project, was settled by the commissioned officers of the *Corwin* agreeing to share whatever expense might be entailed in the purchase of the first lot of reindeer to be obtained from the deermen. It only remained to win the consent of the Siberian deermen to permit the exportation of the requisite number of reindeer, in order that the project should be launched at once.

At this point it may be well to give a short description of the Siberian deermen and their methods of living in order that the reader may be better able to appreciate the difficulties which had to be overcome before even the first steps in the proposed scheme could be successfully taken.

IN IVAN'S TIME

When Ivan IV, sometimes called "Ivan the Terrible" invaded Siberia during the 15th Century his soldiers encountered a race of natives differing in life-habits from those of any other natives of the Muscovite Empire, in that they were nomadic in character and depended for existence solely on immense herds of domesticated reindeer finding an abundant and never-failing source of food supply in the cryptogamic plant life covering the vast plains of northeast Siberia and extending in all directions to the shores of the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea. In their efforts to conquer these people, the soldiers, although immensely superior to them in point of arms and military knowledge, found it almost impossible to get within reach of them on account of the fact that their movements over the vast moss-covered plains of the region were so much more rapid than those of the soldiers, who were delayed by the necessities of transportation of equipment and supplies while those of the natives were unhindered by such considerations, as their

herds of reindeer not only furnished them with ample supplies of food, but also with transportation for all their belongings as they fell back before the advancing army. It was not until the deermen with their herds were brought to bay on the shores of the sea that they were finally compelled to yield obedience to the will of the Tsar and to forever after give up all idea of an independent life.

The origin of the Tchuksis or Deeremen of Siberia, is shrouded in mystery. They have no written or legendary history, but their physical characteristics plainly point to the fact that they are of Mongol ancestry. Most of the men are above the average height, with coarse black hair which is invariably worn tonsured, high cheek bones and narrow mongoloid eyes, and with little contact with other races, they have preserved this type through generations. Their life is one of incredible hardship and only the strongest among them survive to old age. When a man or woman of the tribe grows too weak to keep pace with the constantly moving tribe, they are simply left on the trail to die, or else if circumstances permit, a certain ritual is observed and they are put to death. In such cases the victim shows no sign of fear but takes it all as a matter of course. In spite of this apparent heartlessness, the people are naturally kind and helpful in their relations with one another, and are especially devoted to their children for whom they display the utmost affection.

CENTURY-OLD TRAFFIC

The Siberian deermen have for centuries formed a most important link in the chain of inter-tribal traffic which, beginning as far east as Greenland, stretches around the Polar Basin and ends somewhere in the vicinity of Lake Baikal in Western Siberia. This traffic for the most part consists of the pelts of fur-bearing animals, whalebone and walrus ivory, which are exchanged by the Alaskan Eskimos for tea, tobacco, cloth, and other articles of Russian manufacture brought to the coast by the deermen. The most important item of this traffic, however, has been the skins of the reindeer furnished by the deermen to the Eskimos for the manufacture of their winter clothing. No suitable substitute for this purpose has ever been discovered and as the deermen have had the practical control of its production for centuries, any interference with this long established traffic would most likely meet with serious opposition.

The Tchuksis never cross to the mainland of Alaska; neither do the Eskimos ever come into contact with them on the Asiatic side of the Strait. All trading between the two tribes is done through a community of natives living on the Diomedes Islands situated in Bering Strait about mid-way between the two continents. It will readily be seen that these middlemen would also be opposed to any plan which might result in a disturbance of these trade relations.

CONFIDENCE IN HEALY

Under these circumstances, it was indeed most fortunate that the negotiations for the purchase of the first herd of reindeer should have fallen into the hands of Captain Healy for execution. He had had many years of active service in Alaskan waters and as the sole representative of federal authority in that far-away region he was looked upon as the final arbiter of all disputes that might arise between the natives and the members of the whaling fleet or among themselves individually. His decisions in all such matters had been so marked with justice that he had won the confidence and respect of all

concerned. In his dealings with the natives he had always exercised the utmost patience and consideration. In many cases of distress encountered he had contributed generously from his private stores supplies of food for the alleviation of their sufferings and whenever a native settlement was visited he invariably directed the ship's surgeon to give such medical aid to its inhabitants as was necessary and possible under the circumstances without thought of payment of any kind for such services. On one occasion word reached Healy that the son of Koharra, a native headman of the Tchuksis settlement situated on St. Lawrence Bay, had been accidentally wounded with a walrus spear and was in danger of death. He immediately directed the *Corwin* to be headed for the spot and upon its arrival dispatched the ship's surgeon ashore to render what aid was possible to the wounded boy. When the surgeon entered the tent in which the boy lay, he found it filled with smoke and fetid with the emanations from the bodies of the natives who had crowded into the interior. The native medicine men were howling and beating their tom-toms in an effort to drive out the malignant spirits and the women members of the family were wailing and sobbing in an excess of terror.

MEDICINE MEN PROTEST

The surgeon decided at once that proper treatment of the boy, who was unconscious and suffering from an advanced condition of gangrene in the wound, was not possible under the existing conditions and if his life was to be saved, he must be removed to the ship. In spite of the violent opposition of the medicine men, this was done, and the surgeon, after days of treatment, finally checked the progress of the disease and in the course of a few weeks, during which he was kept on board the *Corwin*, he was completely cured and returned to his home. His father, Koharra, never forgot this act of kindness on the part of Healy and during all the succeeding years of their acquaintance he never failed to show his gratitude for the kindly action of Captain Healy and the service rendered by the surgeon of the *Corwin* in behalf of his son. As will be seen later, this act of kindness was to play a most important part in the negotiations between Healy and the Tchuksis for the purchase of the first herd of reindeer for introduction into Alaska. It was not until the summer of 1887 that it was possible to visit St. Lawrence Bay and open these negotiations. By this time Captain Healy had been transferred to the revenue cutter *Bear* and when he reached St. Lawrence Bay, he had no doubt of his ability to overcome any objections which the Tchuksis might have to the projected sale of a small herd of reindeer for transportation alive to Alaska, but he was informed by Koharra that the deermen had received information as to the intentions of his present visit and that he feared that they could not be induced to part with any of their animals. The native shamans had strongly advised them not to permit any live reindeer to be taken out of the country, as it would bring them all bad luck. The rest of the herds would sicken and die and the people would starve to death.

SUPERSTITIONS

Healy realized that in order to overcome the superstitious beliefs of the deermen, he must proceed with the utmost tact, and consequently when he and a party of his officers landed at the village, everything was done to impress the native with the idea that his visit was in

no way different from those that had been made before, and that the proposed purchase of the reindeer was only one of the many subjects for mutual discussion. A few of the native headmen were on the beach when the party from the *Bear* landed and after the customary greetings had been exchanged, the party climbed the steep bluff back of the village and proceeded to the encampment of the deermen situated on the level plain a short distance from the shore. Here they found a large number of natives assembled in groups in front of their deer-skin tents, evidently waiting and anxious to hear what Healy might have to say. But Captain Healy realized that it would be unwise to exhibit any signs of undue haste in explaining the object of his visit, and so he moved slowly from one group of natives to another greeting old acquaintances, inquiring as to the whereabouts and condition of others whom he knew and were absent and in general trying to allay any feeling of uneasiness that might have been aroused by the news which had already been received by them as to the real object of his presence at this time. The usual exchange of small gifts was



SIBERIAN DEERMEN AND BOYS, 1886

made, the ship's surgeon made a round of visits to the several tents of the encampment and rendered what medical aid was found necessary, and finally supplies of ship biscuit, tea, sugar and tobacco were presented to the deermen as a contribution to the feast of reindeer meat which was being prepared in honor of the occasion.

HUGE BONFIRES

A huge fire of driftwood had been made on the beach, upon which were laid the carcasses of several reindeer. Soon a dense column of acrid smoke arose from the mass of cooking flesh, which made it almost impossible for white men to breathe but which caused no inconvenience to the natives at all. Some of the native men now formed a circle and gave an exhibition of their ceremonial dances. The shamans beat their tom-toms, the women unbraided their hair and sang a weird chant keeping time with the spasmodic contortions of the dancers; while in the background the fog-drenched levels of the tundra plains, on which thousands of reindeer peacefully grazed, sweeping away to a vague and illimitable horizon, combined to form a scene of primitive barbarism impossible to adequately describe and never to be forgotten by the small group of white men for whom the entertainment had been prepared.

(Continued on page 58)

GENERAL LITTLE SPEAKS FRANKLY

To the Basic School Graduating Class

■ Having been designated by the Major General Commandant of our Corps to represent him at the Graduation Exercises, I wish to offer you in his name hearty congratulations on your success.

You have started your training at a school where you are taught the fundamentals of a highly specialized profession. Bear in mind that this is but the start. On your way to achieve your professional education, school will follow school until the end of your military career. These schools are but the assistance we can give you to reach your goal. With you rests the task of making leaders of yourselves. Art comes from within you. We can but direct.

Our efforts toward a military training are simplified by a ceaseless attention to the function our Corps is designed to fulfill in its close affiliation with the Navy. Our minds must not wander from the fact that the Marine Corps is that part of the Navy which, for purely naval purposes, is trained in the technique of the Army.

Article 552 of the Navy Regulations gives, in general, the various duties of our Corps. Among the paramount uses which the Navy has for the Corps is to act as its Advanced Base Force; a force to seize and hold bases in the immediate theater in which the Fleet may be called to operate. The Fleet Marine Force is directly charged with this duty. As a part of the U. S. Fleet, this force must at all times be prepared for such landings as the Commander-in-Chief may require of them. Landings may be in the face of strong enemy opposition, and once ashore, heavy enemy attack may be encountered. We must furnish the resistance, for the battle units of the Fleet must never be tied to a base for its defense.

Mobility of the Base Force must likewise ever be maintained. The Fleet Marine Force must never be misused as a permanent garrison, for as the naval action shifts, so must the power to establish bases shift. The very character of this type of base requires that it be ever near to provide a point for the emergency refitting and refueling of the battle units.

I particularly stress mobility as an important characteristic of the whole Marine Corps, both in peace and in war. In war, it is the role of the Navy to act immediately to prevent an enemy from reaching our shores, to gain time for our country to mobilize its resources and its man power.

The passage of the sea is among the most difficult of military operations when undertaken on a large scale. The Navy must profit by our geographic remoteness to hamper every enemy movement from its start. Such action must begin close to the opponent's side of the ocean. Such obstruction may readily consist in the seizing of bases near the enemy's ports, either for our own use or to deny such to the enemy.

In peace, the Navy may be called upon without warning to take immediate action for the protection of the lives and property of our citizens in trouble abroad, a task requiring a tact and sympathy that can only come from careful pre-study of such situations.

We must at all times be prepared for an instant move

to do our job for the Navy. It is our part to be the "first to fight."

Let us never forget it!

RESERVE TRAINING CAMP SCHEDULE

■ The following is the approved list of Summer Training Camps for our Reserve Organizations:

(a) In training at New Jersey State Camp Grounds, Sea Girt, N. J., 16-30 June, 1935:

1st Battalion, USMCR-NY., Fr. New York, etc., 12 Off., 160 Enl.; 3rd Battalion, FMCR., Fr. New York, 9 Off., 200 Enl.; 4th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Newark, N. J., 9 Off., 180 Enl.; 6th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Philadelphia, 10 Off., 200 Enl.

(b) In training at Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., 16-30 June, 1935:

2nd Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Boston and Portland, Maine, 6 Off., 90 Enl.

(c) In training with 10th Marines (Art), at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., 16-30 June, 1935 (This unit to make practice March to Fort Bragg, N. C.; train there and march back to Quantico):

7th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Philadelphia, 15 Off., 108 Enl.

(d) In training at Camp Beauregard, Alexandria, La., 16-30 June, 1935:

10th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. New Orleans, La., 12 Off., 180 Enl.

(e) In training at Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., 16-30 June, 1935:

11th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Seattle and Aberdeen, Wash., 7 Off., 90 Enl.

(f) In training at Mare Island Navy Yard, Mare Island, Calif., 16-30 June, 1935:

12th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. San Francisco, etc., 8 Off., 158 Enl.

(g) In training at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif., 7-21 July, 1935:

13th Battalion, FMCR., Fr. Los Angeles, etc., 12 Off., 220 Enl.

(h) In training at Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Ill., 14-28 July, 1935:

8th Battalion, FMCR., Toledo and Detroit, 10 Off., 178 Enl.; 9th Battalion, FMCR., Chicago, Milwaukee, etc., 9 Off., 257 Enl.

(i) In training at Marine Baracks, Quantico, Va., 4-18 August, 1935:

5th Battalion, FMCR., Washington, D. C., and vicinity, 22 Off., 432 Enl.

(j) In addition to the above 14 enlisted men of the Volunteer Reserve were authorized to associate themselves with the 11th Battalion, FMCR., Seattle, Wash., for the training period. Three Volunteer Officers were also authorized to train with the 9th Battalion, FMCR., Chicago, Ill., provided they agree to report for training at no cost to the Government for transportation.

(k) Major Melvin L. Krulewitch, FMCR., who is Coordinator of Reserve Activities in the New York Area, has been assigned duty as Camp Commander of the Sea Girt Camp.

(l) Major Chester L. Fordney, FMCR., who is Coordinator of Reserve Activities in the Central Area, has been assigned duty as Camp Commander of the Great Lakes Camp.

Ed.

TAPS

■ WITH the sounding of "To the Colors" on the morning of May 14, 1935, at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, a sorrowing post paid honor to its dead commanding officer as the flag dropped slowly to half-staff.

Major General Harry Lee, who during nearly forty years of military service enjoyed the love, loyalty and affection of every officer and man with whom he was associated, had travelled the last mile.

A heart attack complicated by pneumonia brought death to General Lee during the night of May 13, after a brief illness. His passing marked the end of one of the most distinguished careers in the Marine Corps, climaxed by service of exceptional distinction during the World War in France and later as Military Governor of Santo Domingo.

The last homage of his brother officers and those who served under him was paid General Lee at a funeral with full military honors at the Post and later at services in Arlington National Cemetery.

General Lee was born in Washington, June 4, 1872, and entered the Marine Corps during the War with Spain with the rank of second lieutenant for the duration of the war. He served at the Naval Station, Havana, Cuba, until the early part of 1899 when he was honorably discharged. On April 17, 1899, he entered the regular service with the rank of first lieutenant.

He served on various ships and at shore stations until 1912, when, with the rank of major, he was ordered to duty in Nicaragua, and participated in the bombardment, assault and capture of the fortifications of Coyotepe and Barranca. He also served in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Cuba.

In August, 1917, General Lee, then a lieutenant-colonel, was ordered to the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., for duty with the Sixth Marines. He arrived in France February, 1918, and was in the engagements around Chateau Thierry, and when the Colonel commanding the regiment was wounded, took over the command. While under his command the regiment earned eternal fame in the Aisne-Marne offensive; the Marbache sector; the St. Mihiel offensive; the Meuse-Argonne offensive (Champagne and Argonne forest); and in the march of the allied army to the Rhine. He returned to the United States in August, 1919, having in the meantime been promoted to the rank of colonel.

Upon being promoted in 1921 to the rank of Brigadier General, he was ordered to Santo Domingo in command of the Second Marine Brigade, for the purpose of assisting in pacifying the country and to assist in the establishment of a constitutional government, with a view of withdrawing the Marines. He completed this mission and withdrew the brigade in 1924. From October, 1922, until the withdrawal of the



MAJOR GENERAL HARRY LEE



BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES LAURIE McCAWLEY

Marines General Lee was Military Governor of the country—the only Marine Officer ever to hold that position.

For his services during the World War General Lee was awarded four Second Division citations; the Croix-de-Guerre by the French Government for gallantry in action during the battles near Cresnes and Noroy, and three palms for his leadership in other engagements. He also was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal by the President; the Silver Star Medal by the War Department, and a citation by General John J. Pershing, U. S. Army. He was also awarded the French Legion of Honor.

In addition to his service in France General Lee spent more than nine years in Haiti, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Panama, Nicaragua, The Philippines, Mexico, China, and Germany, as well as more than seven years at sea.

In 1912 General Lee married Henrietta Mercedes Saltmarsh of Pensacola, Fla. He is survived by her and five children, Harry, Jr., Ernest, Mercedes, Evelina and Laura. ED.

■ DEATH again struck amid the ranks of general officers of the Corps when Brigadier General Charles L. McCawley, U.S.M.C.R., died at his home in Washington, D. C., on April 29, 1935.

The seventy-year-old retired officer was stricken with a heart attack on April 23, and died six days later.


Outstanding in the Corps for his long and successful term as Quartermaster, General McCawley gained for himself an enviable reputation in that position while serving in it during the World War.

His full term as Quartermaster extending from 1913 to the date of his retirement, August 24, 1929, upon reaching the statutory age of 64 years and after 47 years of service in the Marine Corps.

General McCawley received the Navy Distinguished Service Medal for his service during the World War.

From one of Washington's oldest families and the son of a former Commandant of the Corps. Aide at the White House under Presidents "Teddy" Roosevelt and Taft. One of the charter members of the Chevy Chase Club, officer in the Metropolitan Club and the Alibi Club. ED.

★ PROMOTED ★



MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES H. LYMAN

■ Concluding its deliberations late in May, a Board of nine Rear Admirals of the Navy closed the record of Brigadier General Charles Huntington Lyman and recommended that the President award him the two stars of a Major General.

The new honors came to General Lyman—one of the best known of the Marine Corps general officers—while he was in the midst of participation in the Fleet Maneuvers as Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force.

Necessity of promoting a Brigadier General to rank of Major General came upon the death of Major General Harry Lee, and temporarily General Lyman will have the dual duty of Commanding General of the Quantico post and of the Fleet Marine Force, which he played a major role in developing.

Thirty-six years of active duty as a Marine Corps officer and diplomas from both Army and Navy War Colleges give ample assurance that the burdens of the two positions hold no terrors for General Lyman.

Thumbing through his record we see why the decision of the Naval officers is so loudly applauded by his brother officers.

Brigadier General Lyman was born in Ravenna, Ohio, September 22, 1875, and first served as an enlisted man in the District of Columbia National Guard during the Spanish-American War. He was commissioned first lieutenant in the Marine Corps July 1, 1899.

During the Boxer uprising General Lyman served abroad the U.S.S. *Monocacy* on the Yangtse River, and with the First Regiment of Marines at Peiping. He took part in the Marine expedition to the Isthmus of Panama in 1903, and returned to Panama in 1909 as adjutant general of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Brigadier General Lyman in 1911 took command of the Marine Barracks, Sitka, Alaska, and was in command until that post was abandoned in 1912. He was Division

Marine Officer of the Fifth Division, Atlantic Fleet in 1916 and 1917.

After service at Headquarters, Parris Island and San Diego, Brigadier General Lyman went to Santo Domingo in 1921 and assumed command of the Fourth Regiment.

During his tour at home Brigadier General Lyman graduated from both the Army and Navy War Colleges. In 1927 he took command of the Marine Corps Base at San Diego, California. In 1928 he went to China and took command of the Sixth Regiment then stationed at Tientsin. Upon the withdrawal of the Marines from that city Brigadier General Lyman went to Shanghai, where he took command of the Fourth Regiment. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, September 1, 1933.

Ed.

■ When six of our generals concluded their labors recently they found that Colonel James T. Buttrick was "their man." This popular decision came with no surprise to the Corps—it was, in reality, a confirmation of a long standing surmise. Still young—sixty years of age—General Buttrick prides himself on his New England associations, and will always say a good word for his home town, Newport, R. I.

Tall, quiet and considerate; easy to approach; calm in contemplation of all problems; possessing a well rounded career and a Navy Cross for distinguishing himself as Commander of the Fifth Regiment of Marines during his service in Nicaragua in 1929-1930. His 35 years of service has carried him to virtually every foreign and home post assigned to Marines. His experience in these countries has created for him an enviable reputation among officers both senior and junior to him. He is a graduate of the Naval War College and the senior course of the Marine Corps Schools.

Ed.



BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES T. BUTTRICK



VICE-PRESIDENT GARNER'S PARTY REVIEWING F.M.F. AT QUANTICO

Left to right: Vice-President Garner (Texas); Colonel C. F. B. Price, U.S.M.C.; Speaker of the House Byrnes (S. C.); Majority Leader of the Senate Robinson (Ark.); Senator King (Utah); Senator Shipstead (Minn); Minority Leader of the House Snell (N. Y.); Senator Byrnes (S. C.), Majority Whip; Governor Nice (Md.); Senator Bulow (So. Dak.); Senator Guffy (Penna.).

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ENTERTAINS CONGRESS AT QUANTICO

From the above picture it can be seen that at no time in the history of Quantico have so many prominent National figures visited there in a group. The occasion was the annual outing of the Senate Press Gallery, the House Press Gallery and the membership of the National Press Club to the members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives.

At noon on Saturday, May 25, 1935, the good ship *City of Wilmington* sailed from Washington down the smooth waters of the Potomac for two hours, and then slid alongside the dock at Quantico.

The afternoon roll-call contained every member of the political machines of both the Upper and Lower Houses of Congress, plus Governors Peery, of Virginia, and Nice, of Maryland, also the never-to-be-forgotten "Crack-Down" General Hugh Johnson, aided by approximately 100 additional members of Congress. The National Press Club membership were present to the number of about 150, with a sprinkling of Naval and Military Attachés, as well as Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers.

The program at Quantico included a five inning base ball game between the "gentlemen of the press" and certain members of Congress. The gentlemen of the press,

as long as the weather permitted, which was only two innings out of the ball game, wore whiskers a la House of David. The whiskers disappeared from sight along with the hat of the Vice-President. Rumor has it that neither the V.-P.'s hat nor the whiskers were ever found, but a leak a week later disclosed the fact that the Governor of Maryland is the proud possessor of the V.-P.'s felt fedora.

The ball game was a burlesque from start to finish, and the next week the first-aid room and the family doctor at the Capitol rendered 24-hour sick calls. Prior to the ball game, as can be seen from the above, the Vice-President's party reviewed the Fleet Marine Force. After the ball game, and because of the undue heat, the "tap-room" in rear of the gymnasium had every appearance of not being struck by the well known depression, whose output whetted the appetites of the nearly one thousand guests for a cold supper which was eaten during three boxing bouts staged by the local "pugs" at Quantico.

The evening was concluded by returning on the steamer *Wilmington*, which had a bar aboard. Shortly before midnight Washington was reached. The next morning — "headaches"!

—EDITOR.



Ross E. Rowell

■ Born in Iowa and raised in the saddle in Idaho, Colonel Ross E. Rowell, after thirty years of service, at the age of fifty, has been made Chief of Marine Corps Aviation, with a record good enough for any man's album. He has an enviable reputation and well deserves his new billet. Among his friends "Rusty." Quiet, mild and keen best describes him. Wearer of the Distinguished Flying Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, Medal of Merit of Nicaragua, plus five different campaign medals. Holder of two diplomas, one from the Advanced Flying School, U. S. A., and the other from the Tactical School, U. S. A.

AVIATION CADETS

■ For the securing and training of twenty-five (25) reserve aviators to be sent to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla., the sum of \$19,500 was placed to our credit in the Naval Appropriation Bill this year. Circulars for the government of same have been issued by the Aviation section, and it is anticipated that 25 very fine young Americans will be procured. The requirements are exceedingly high.

Candidates are enlisted as Privates first class, Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve, and Aviation Cadets, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, until graduation from flight training. Their pay will be that of privates first class, plus flying pay, and subsistence allowance at the rate of \$1.95 per diem.


While on active duty undergoing training at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Aviation Cadets will receive pay at the rate of \$75.00 per month, which pay shall include pay for flying risk as provided by law.

During the period of their active duty, Aviation Cadets will be paid at the rate of \$125.00 per month, which pay shall include pay for flying risk as provided by law; also while on active duty undergoing training and on active duty, shall be paid, in addition, a money allowance for subsistence of \$1.00 per diem.

Upon first assignment to duty after the completion of training Aviation Cadets shall, in addition, be paid a uniform allowance of \$150.00.

The insurance feature is also carried. Aviation Cadets will be issued life insurance in the sum of \$10,000, the premiums on which shall be paid by the Government. They will also be allowed the usual benefits authorized for civilian employees of the Government in case of injury or death, and upon release from the period of active duty of four years or more (including active duty undergoing training at Pensacola, Fla.) shall be paid a lump sum of \$1,500.00, which sum shall be in addition to any pay and allowances heretofore mentioned.

So, all in all, Congress has been very generous in allowances for the training of Aviation Cadets for the Navy and Marine Corps.



ATOLL MIDWAY

■ The exploits of the giant American Clipper in laying the pioneer work for the forthcoming trans-Pacific air route recalls to mind that Marines were once stationed on the tiny Midway Island which will be used as one of the bases for the planes.

The first detachment of twenty Marines under command of Second Lieutenant Clarence S. Owen, U.S.M.C.,

landed at Midway, May 4, 1904. Service for the Marines on the Island continued until they were permanently withdrawn March 19, 1908.

The only officers who commanded Marine Detachments at Midway and who are still in the Corps are Lieutenant Colonel Jeter R. Horton and Lieutenant Colonel M. E. Shearer. (See page 38.)

Ed.

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

It's Our Business

LIEUTENANT COLONEL P. A. DEL VALLE, U.S.M.C.

■ Some say it is infantry. Others say it is ships of war. Still others, with pardonable pride, say it is aviation. Each and every branch of the military service, doing its bit of horn-blowing in its own way, has in some manner laid claim to being the First Line of Defense of our beloved country. By taking all this nonsense with a large grain of salt and relegating it to the limbo of inept attempts at publicity marking the post-war period, we can devote our attention to a more plausible definition of the term. There is a first line of defense. But it is nothing so concrete and tangible as the various branches of the combatant arms. That is to say, not as separated entities; nor as fighting machines per se. The first line of defense includes us all, the naval and military forces in toto. It includes others as well, but we shall restrict ourselves to a consideration of it within our own ranks. For it is nothing in the world but our system of intelligence; and the object of this article is to point out how very intimately it should touch each one of us. Every thinking man in every branch of our national defense is a valuable and potentially important portion of the intelligence net of the country. And the time has come when we can no longer relegate this function to the established intelligence agencies alone. To be sure, the bulk of evaluation and dissemination will always be their burden, but it is high time that each one of us should put his shoulder to the wheel in the gigantic task of securing information. Because that is our true first line of defense, information. Ferdinand Foch was credited with saying: *"To accomplish a very little one has to know very much."* Aye, no truer word was ever spoken. We have to know very much before we can even plan an intelligent defense against a potential enemy.

It may perhaps not be amiss to pause at this point and clear away some mental cobwebs which inevitably accumulate during peace time. There are many pacifists and pollyannas who will contend stoutly that we have no foes. These gentlemen are no doubt sincere in their belief that "our splendid isolation" needs only to be strictly maintained by keeping out of other people's affairs, both on the American Continent and elsewhere, to ensure peace and good will. It requires only a consideration of our enviable position as an industrial, commercial, and agricultural country to upset this naive conception. The world no matter how we may deplore it, is still a worldly world. It progresses towards a better, more rational international modus vivendi at a snail's pace. Meantime there is still human greed, human envy, human guile to be contended with. Putting forward the plausible mask of self preservation, the nations of the earth push and scramble and fight each other for their place in the sun. The world moves, and we move with it. Great upheavals are of constant occurrence. Great rivalries in commerce lead to great wars. The desire for power and conquest lead to great wars. An ever increasing population ever reaching out for the land upon which

to subsist leads to great wars. We are part and parcel of this seething, volcanic mass called humanity, and we cannot escape from its struggles and their consequences. In a word, we are among ferocious and wily Indians who consider us as just another Indian. And we had better be a smart Indian or we shall soon be a dead Indian. So much for our splendid isolation. Because we are part of the world we naturally have enemies, and to enable us to survive as a nation we must be well-informed about the strength and weakness of the others. Hence we should build up our first line of defense, our intelligence system, to the best advantage.

The average person in the military service is apt to give the matter of gathering intelligence but little thought during peace time. It would be highly profitable to the country we serve to extend the maxim: RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS, to include peace as well as war. This is not intended as a criticism of our present intelligence system, which is sound, and functions ably. It is simply reaching out to all intelligent officers and men, to make them volunteer agents of the system. The more people we have using their eyes and their ears for us the better informed shall we be. The established agencies are limited in numbers and resources. By all hands turning to we spread the net much wider. And it is truly a fascinating game, once you have tried it. We do not have to travel to far places and sneak about spying in order to become valuable assets to the system. Right here in these United States we have more enemies who require watching than the present system allows for. No matter where we are serving there will be an intelligence officer somewhere in the organization. He is the natural focus for such information as we gather in that area. He may be the sort of person who would hesitate to ask you; or you might hesitate to approach him. But this is not a personal matter, and all eyes, ears, and brains are needed. It is up to us individually to get busy in order to expand and electrify into action the infinite potentialities thus offered to our intelligence system.

I have said it is a fascinating game and so it is. However, there is no place in it for men with an over-developed sense of publicity. Quite the contrary, for the rules of the game are such that the less noise the better. We should be ready to work, not for any credit that might accrue to us as individuals or as a Corps, but for the ultimate benefit of the country we serve. The fascination of the work itself, the contacts one makes in the course of it, and the satisfaction of knowing that we are doing something worth while are the only rewards. The very essence of intelligence work is that no person be aware that you are engaged in it. One of the most successful secret operatives it has been my good fortune to know has kept so well in the background that his very existence is at times in doubt. He is somewhat of a myth even to those for whom he works. The only thing that counts with him is results. He never "fronts." He can never be pinned down to anything because he is never actually present when the trap is sprung. He has agents who do all his "fronting." They maintain offices, see people, make investigations, do all the talking, wear disguises, contact the police, and take all the blame and all the credit. The all-prevailing brain that coordinates and directs their activities never emerges from the shadows. No poltroon was ever more willing to avoid risk; no violet more modest. He has put the hero role away definitely, although possessed of more than ordinary courage.

Not that our volunteer work calls for such extremes, but that we should constantly have the violet in mind when thinking what big thing we have accomplished. And we *shall* accomplish things that will enable us to avoid wars and to fight them intelligently when necessary. The first flush of enthusiasm may result in our becoming a nuisance to the intelligence officer or agency with which we are working, due to the nature and volume of information submitted. But in time we shall become quite expert in our own way, and the danger of becoming a nuisance is completely overbalanced by the possibilities opened up by a general dissemination of the spirit of intelligence work among us. The intelligence agency becomes a focus and a laboratory for weighing the information thus gathered. These agencies are largely relieved of the actual procurement work, and thus become infinitely more valuable because they: (1) Have more time to make plans and estimates, and to evaluate and transmit information; (2) They have more ears and eyes working for them than they had before; (3) They are less likely to be linked with any activity the discovery of which may close up a valuable source of information.

To a person starting from scratch it might prove somewhat of a puzzle where to get information. Among the best sources are publications of all sorts. It is well to consider them first whenever the nature of the information sought allows it. I shall illustrate by the experience which a certain intelligence officer had in a foreign port. He had an assignment to report the movements and cargoes of certain vessels of a foreign merchant marine which habitually visited the port in question. It was desired to cover a period of about six months. The ships were tramp steamers and called at many ports with varied cargoes. The intelligence officer approached the agency for these ships with some caution, went from there to Lloyds, tried the local customs officials, and still he could obtain little of the information sought. He obtained only a meagre outline of what he wanted, last port of call, cargo destined for the port he was in, destination, etc. Being energetic and not too scrupulous he managed to get hold of some copies of the ship's papers of some of these vessels. As they belonged to the local customs this entailed some risk and expense, but he wanted to do the best he could with the assignment, as time was dragging and he did not seem to be getting anywhere. With the manifests in hand he sat down to write a report containing a portion of the information wanted, and, feeling that he had exhausted his resources and had yet failed, he happened to think of a friend of his in the shipping business. He paid him a visit, and quite by chance, mentioned that he wanted to know something about the movements of these ships. His friend produced a copy of a certain magazine which is published in New York, and which contains in some detail the movements, cargoes, etc., of every merchant ship in the world of or above a certain tonnage. Here was everything he wanted and more, all without any more trouble than reading a magazine. Suffice it to say he had the sense of humor to mention this magazine in his report.

The daily press, weekly news magazines, news reels, radio broadcasts, books of travel, contemporary biographies, and even novels are astonishingly good sources. It is only a matter of reading a bit beyond the printed word, reconstructing in your mind the motivating forces, and interpreting the significance of things. It is the business of the press to ferret out items of news value. Hence the members of the fourth estate, more vulgarly known as "news-hawks" are ever so much keener than

the average layman in their own line of endeavor. They can be found everywhere; they usually have excellent sources, access to the seats of the mighty, plenty of agents. The service man in search of information must cultivate their acquaintance and gain their confidence. Many are willing to cooperate with the military intelligence system with little urging. All that is required is sufficient discretion to safeguard their sources and not embarrass them. Even where the old fashioned "scooper" is found, the man who has a professional distrust of all other men in the business of getting information, one can still find ways of getting around them. Human ingenuity and a little patience will extract from him painlessly what he will not willingly divulge. At the very worst, you can read his despatches after they have been sent if you know how to go about it. But this type is the exception, and you will find that the average are excellent companions, and keen to play the game. They will give you a hand if you will help them out when they need you. Once there was one who was caught in the palace of a certain president when the revolutionists began their attack on the palace in an attempt to overthrow the government. Thus he had red hot news to send, but could not get away to send it. He got hold of one of the palace 'phones and found to his delight that it was working. He quickly called his best friend and drinking partner, the intelligence officer of a certain unit that was present in observation at that place. The latter filed his despatches as they came over the wire, right from the front lines. It made a great hit with the agency which employed him, and the correspondent was accordingly grateful to the officer who had made it possible. No intelligence officer was ever better served than this one was from then on.

Another valuable source, employed by nearly every organization engaged in the business of securing information, is the commercial communications system; telephone, telegraph, radio, cable, and to some extent, the mails. Without resort to the practise known as wire-tapping, which is in reality only reprehensible in certain situations, there are many ways of getting at these sources of news, and even of getting items from them that will never be printed as news. In war time a proper censorship will cover this source fairly well. In peace time one must resort to a more subtle technique. For instance, we know that a certain powerful country covers this field by placing its nationals in strategic positions wherever possible in the international communications system. Without taking time off to criticise this practise, which in reality is simply being rather smarter than the rest of us, let us see what can be done about it for our team. In the first place these fellows are often quite humanly willing to give you a hand whenever the point in question does not touch their own interest. Personal friendship with the men in key positions, therefore, may open up a valuable source of this type. Then, of course, there is the profit motive, but one had better be careful about this business. It is directly under the supervision of the intelligence officer that all such approaches should be made, for the matter is a delicate one. It must be borne in mind that all files of cable and telegraph offices are of a confidential nature, and the employee who is suspected of divulging such information would be dismissed and might be prosecuted. Bribing is too often a boomerang, and the bribee too apt to double cross his corrupter. An understanding with some one in authority or with an intelligent person

(Continued on page 61)

NEW SECOND LIEUTENANTS FROM COLLEGES

■ Here is a partial list of our new second lieutenants from civilian life coming from certain distinguished colleges. Others will be announced in our next issue. There will be about 90 in all. Ed.

McHaney, Joe C., Texas A. & M., care Kemper McHaney, 1102 Main Ave., San Antonio, Tex.

Murray, Ray L., Texas A. & M., care Kemper McHaney, 1102 Main Ave., San Antonio, Tex.

Platt, Wesley McC., Clemson Agri., Summerville, S. C.

Moore, Floyd R., Purdue, 211 North Street, West Lafayette, Ind.

Oldfield, John S., Oklahoma, 1415 North Klein Street, Oklahoma City, Okla.

Proffitt, William E., Jr., Minnesota, 2526 Thomas Ave., South, Minneapolis, Minn.

Hochmuth, Bruno A., Texas A. & M., 1207 Wagner Street, Houston, Tex.

Stage, John W., University of California, 1929 Vine Street, Berkeley, Cal.

Chapman, Leonard F., Jr., University of Florida, Florida State Prison Farm, Raiford, Fla.; care the Superintendent.

Schmitz, Harry A., University of Alabama, 928 10th Ave., Tuscaloosa, Ala.

Brackett, Elmer E., Jr., Nebraska, 3230 Starr Street, Lincoln, Neb.

Floom, Marvin H., Cincinnati R. D. No. 4, Massillon, Ohio.

Frazer, James G., Washington, 4730 17th Ave., N. E., Seattle, Wash.

McLeod, Kenneth F., Michigan State, 1011 8th Street, Port Huron, Mich.

Randall, Carey A., Louisiana State, Box 301, Gloster, Miss.

Cheever, Dwight M., Michigan, ROTC Camp, Camp Custer, Mich.

Barnes, Wilmer E., North Carolina State, 1107 Mordecai Drive, Raleigh, N. C.

Jorgenson, Kenneth A., University of Missouri, 8512 Rockefeller Ave., Hollywood, Ill.

Van Ryzin, William J., Wisconsin, 625 West Packard Street, Appleton, Wis.

McCormick, William S., Mississippi State, P. O. Box 1055, Laurel, Miss.

Walker, Harold G., West Virginia, 71 Wilson Ave., Morgantown, W. Va.

Goen, Dixon, California, 210 Medio Drive, Village Station, Los Angeles, Cal.

Wilde, Ronald B., New Hampshire, 17 Bugbee Street, Plainville, Mass.

Roll, George A., Pittsburgh, 69 Hempstead Ave., West View, Pa.

Marks, Mortimer A., Northwestern, 1578 Oak Ave., Evanston, Ill.

Crockett, Richard H., Tennessee, 1056 Roland Street, Memphis, Tenn.

Thompson, Richard E., Indiana, CCC Co. 1528, Rising Sun, Ind.

Fairbourn, William T., Utah, R. D. No. 1, Box 148, Sandy, Utah.

Houser, Ralph L., Iowa State, 430 Iowa Ave., Iowa City, Iowa.

Stannah, Robert E., Carnegie Tech., 181 George Street, Rochester, Pa.

Syms, Eugene F., Norwich, 19 Cherry Street, Gardner, Mass.

Sulkosky, Leo F., Washington, Rt. No. 3, Box 370, Puyallup, Wash.

White, Chevey S., Kansas, 404 North 2nd Ave., Norton, Kan.

Damke, Kenyth A., Colorado Agri., 616 South Howes Street, Fort Collins, Colo.

Walters, Julian F., Maryland, 409 Baltimore Road, Rockville, Md.

Hart, Donn C., North Dakota, 723 North 6th Street, Grand Forks, N. D.

Groves, Gould P., Arkansas, P. O. Box 146, Alt-heimer, Ark.

Miller, John C., Jr., South Dakota, 202 East Clark Street, Vermillion, S. D.

Fiske, Willard C., Arizona, 1420 North 3rd Street, Phoenix, Ariz.

McMillan, Hoyt, Citadel, Conway, S. C.

Totman, Clayton O., Maine, 27 Walnut Street, Greenfield, Mass.

Brockway, George H., Wyoming, 325 South 4th Street, Douglas, Wyo.

Amey, Herbert R., Jr., Penn. Mil. College, 114 Race Street, Ambler, Pa.

Trachta, Stanley W., Montana, Oilmont, Mont.

Riley, Thomas F., Va. Mil. Inst., 512 Collicello Street, Harrisonburg, Va.

Burton, Custis, Jr., Va. Mil. Inst., 311 Allen Avenue, Hopewell, Va.

Rowley, Elmer C., California, 2291 Telegraph Ave., Berkeley, Cal.

Bailey, Kenneth D., University of Illinois, 102 Michigan Ave., Danville, Ill.

Nickerson, Herman, Jr., Boston, 184 Appleton Street, Arlington, Mass.

Hager, F. P., Jr., Citadel, The Citadel, Charleston, S. C.

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MARINES ON MIDWAY

■ A Marine Detachment was first stationed at Midway Island on May 4, 1904, with Second Lieutenant Clarence S. Owen, U.S.M.C., in command of 20 enlisted men. This detachment remained until March 21, 1905, when Lieutenant Owen and his command were relieved by Second Lieutenant Epaminondas L. Bigler, U.S.M.C., with a detachment of 20 men from the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Honolulu, T. H., Lieutenant Owen and his detachment being transferred to the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Honolulu, T. H., via the U.S.S. *Petrel*. On January 4, 1906, Second Lieutenant Jeter R. Horton, U.S.M.C., joined from the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Honolulu, T. H., via the U.S.S. *Saturn*, and assumed command as the relief of Lieutenant Bigler, who was ordered to the post at Honolulu, T. H.

On June 5, 1906, Second Lieutenant Maurice E. Shearer, U.S.M.C., with 10 enlisted men, left Honolulu via the U.S.S. *Iroquois*, and arrived at Midway and assumed command on June 12, 1906, as the relief of Lieutenant Horton, who with 10 enlisted men, was transferred to the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Calif.

Lieutenant Shearer remained in command until April 30, 1907, when he was relieved by Second Lieutenant John D. Nevin, U.S.M.C., in command of a detachment of 21 enlisted men, Lieutenant Shearer and his detachment of 22 enlisted men being transferred to the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Honolulu, T. H. Lieutenant Nevin and his detachment remained at Midway until March 19, 1908, when the post was abandoned and the entire Marine Detachment was transferred to the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Honolulu, T. H.

At the time the Marine Detachment was ordered to Midway Island Milliken Brothers of New York, N. Y., were constructing the building of the Pacific Cable Company, and had a considerable number of laborers, mostly Japanese, on the Island. The principal duty of the Marines was to maintain order on the Island and to prevent the destruction of bird life. The species of albatross on the Island furnished valuable feathers which the Japanese were anxious to procure. In order to carry out this duty Lieutenant Owen found it necessary to require that all firearms in possession of the civilian population be turned in to him. This order caused many protests, but was carried into effect.

While the detachment was stationed on Midway it received necessary supplies from Honolulu by schooners and the U.S.S. *Iroquois*.

The camp of the Marines was destroyed by a hurricane July 19, 1905, and was replaced by a small barracks building. Assistant Surgeon James Miller, U. S. Navy, died while on duty with the detachmen under Lieutenant Horton.

Early in 1905 the Schooner *Kennedy*, bearing three months supplies for the Marines, was completely wrecked. At the earnest request of the commanding officer the U.S.S. *Iroquois* was dispatched from Honolulu with necessary supplies to relieve the situation. On December 27, 1906, the bark *Carrolton*, of San Francisco, was totally wrecked off Midway, and its crew of fifteen (15) men were taken care of by the Marines.

Due to conditions arising out of the Russo-Japanese War, all ships of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company enroute to the Orient, called at Midway for orders.

So we can say that Aviation has put Midway on the map once more.

Ed.

WE MUST ALL DO OUR PART

■ "Where do we go from here?" is a good old Marine expression of long standing and considerable aptness. It is indicative of an active roving spirit which is never satisfied to rest on laurels won, but is forever seeking new worlds to conquer.

Right now it is a pertinent question. Where *do* we go from here? The past year has been liberally studied with success. Our demonstrations of auxiliary weapons at the rifle range on various occasions have exhibited a satisfactory degree of proficiency; our parade ground evolutions have won the praise of the many distinguished visitors who have witnessed them this year. We appear to have reached the peak of efficiency—or so we may think. Perhaps to venture further would be to perpetuate an anti-climax. Well, those of you who think so, hold fast.

The good old pride, so somebody somewhere has told us, goeth before a fall. Every good seagoing Marine knows that it does not take a particularly rough sea to slap down a boat if the oarsmen persist in resting on their oars. In other words, in order to perpetuate a state of efficiency it is necessary to perform daily the tasks and drills by which efficiency was attained. So much for parade ground soldiering.

There is another phase of our profession which we must keep constantly in mind, and that is training for active service in the field. Essentially that is the *raison d'être*, as our French comrades would say, of our existence. Here in Peiping it is not until the winter months come, with the concomitant clearing of crops from the fields, that we are able to get out in the country and brush up the application of tactical principles. That, then, will be our goal for the next two months; to determine just how effective has been the theoretical instruction we have absorbed during the past months, and to make the most of the opportunity for tactical exercises and maneuvers in the field.

For us there can be no marking time, no turning back. We must go on, and on and on.—Courtesy, *The Legation Guard News*.

DUES OVERDUE

■ The fact that our "fogies," or increase in pay for every three years' service, has been restored, beginning July 1, by virtue of S. 2287, which was signed by the President on June 13, 1935, should be another reason why the members of the Association who are in arrears in dues should send in their checks.

Ed.



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ADDITIONAL U. S. MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL

Congress provided for an increase of 51 officers but no enlisted men. It is understood, however, that next year our enlisted strength will be increased by approximately 2,500 men.

For the fiscal year it gives us 1,074 commissioned officers, 150 warrant and commissioned warrant officers, and 16,000 men.

BUILDING PROGRAM

In this connection it may be pointed out that the need of the Marine Corps for shore construction is so urgent that it cannot be over-stated. Of the total sum made available for public works in the National Industrial Recovery Act, only \$150,000.00 was allocated to the Marine Corps for renovation of buildings, roads, railroads, and service lines at Marine Corps posts. In addition, certain sums were made available for expenditure by the Civil Works Administration for general maintenance. No allocation whatever was made to the Marine Corps from funds made available by the National Industrial Recovery Act for new construction except \$350,000.00 for the flying field at the Marine Barracks, Quantico.

At the Marine Barracks, Quantico, at the present time, there are 120 officers for whom no quarters whatever are available. These officers are forced to live in Fredericksburg, Alexandria, Washington, and in such accommodations around about Quantico as they can find. The lack of quarters for these officers produces a situation that is most detrimental to the military efficiency of the station. Married noncommissioned officers stationed at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, are living in old converted wooden barracks. These buildings are a veritable fire trap and a menace to health. They approximate slum conditions. The sick at Quantico are cared for in old war-time structures that are held unsuited for the purpose for which used. A school building is urgently needed at Quantico for the accommodation of Marine Corps schools in order that a barracks building now used for this purpose may be made available for the housing of troops.

The following is a list of projects for the Marine Barracks, Quantico, all of which have been approved by the Shore Station Development Board, and all of which are included in the list submitted with reference (a), but most of them with very low priority. The need for these projects has existed for years and their construction should be undertaken just as soon as funds can be made available:

QUANTICO, VA.

MAIN STATION—

1 Four 6-family apartment houses for officers	\$300,000
2 Ten 6-family apartment houses for officers	750,000
3 Dispensary—65 beds	250,000
4 Post Exchange and auditorium	400,000
5 Twenty 6-family apartment houses for N.C.O.	891,000
6 Laundry	60,000
7 Officers' school building	200,000
8 Storehouse	250,000
9 Administration building	125,000
10 Shop building	162,000
10a Extension of distributing and sewer system	145,000
	\$3,533,000

FLYING FIELD—

11 Aircraft storehouse	\$175,000
12 Administration building	85,000
13 Distributing system	75,000
14 Combined aircraft and engine overhaul	150,000
15 Paving, roads, walks	45,000
16 Reconstruction of overhead bridge	30,000
17 Motor test stand	16,000
18 Improvements to new flying field	392,000
19 Garage	40,000
20 Storehouse for inflammables	8,000
21 Lighting and air markings	25,000

\$1,041,000

TOTAL FOR STATION **\$4,574,000**

MARINE CORPS BASE, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

1 Four barracks buildings	\$700,000
2 Gymnasium, lyceum, and swimming pool	250,000

TOTAL FOR STATION **\$950,000**

PARRIS ISLAND, S. C.

1 One barracks building, receiving unit	\$465,000
2 Four barracks buildings, Main Station	1,232,000
3 One barracks building, Rifle Range	310,000
4 Roads	50,000
5 Distributing systems; steam, water, electric and sewer	200,000

TOTAL FOR STATION **\$2,257,000**

GRAND TOTAL FOR MARINE

CORPS **\$7,781,000**

The purchase of land at Snyder Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa., covered by Item No. 234, should be effected with the least possible delay. This land is held under lease and buildings constructed by the Government during the war and now used for storage purposes for Marine Corps supplies are located thereon.

RESERVES GET NEW CLOTHING ALLOWANCES

OLD	\$16.00	NEW	\$46.43
1 Belt, web,		1 Belt, web,	
1 Leggins, pair,		1 Leggins, pair,	
1 Scarf, cotton,		1 Scarf, cotton,	
1 Hat, field,		1 Hat, field,	
1 Ornament, cap,		2 Shirts, wool,	
2 Shirts, cotton,		1 Insignia, cap,	
2 Trousers, S/S		3 Trousers, S/S,	
Necessary insignia of rank.		1 Trousers, wool,	
		1 Cap, barracks,	
		1 Coat, wool,	
		2 Insignia, collar,	
		2 Shoes, pairs,	
		1 Overcoat,	
		1 Raincoat,	
		2 Sox, wool.	

NOTE: Naval Reserves receive \$50.00 clothing allowance, National Guard receives \$48.26 clothing allowance, Marine Corps Reserves \$46.43.

All on the basis of an allowance for each 4-year enlistment.

Funds are also provided to secure 25 Marine Corps Reserve aviators from the so-called "Flying Cadets." The cost is \$144,000; also for the training of 250 Reserve officers (platoon commanders) selected from students attending non R.O.T.C. colleges; this cost is \$40,250.

FIRSTS IN FRANCE

COLONEL FRANK E. EVANS, U.S.M.C.

■ Shortly after the war I began to collect data covering details that are normally lost in war histories, the "firsts to happen." A few days ago I ran across these notes and forwarded them to the GAZETTE in the hope that others that I have not recorded will be in turn forwarded by others to the GAZETTE. We are all familiar with the story of the first shell fired by an American battery overseas. Such a story has human interest. The future historian of the Marine Corps may find it well worthwhile to incorporate similar stories. It is quite possible that some zealous officer of the Fifth Marines will recall a battle casualty that antedates those of the Sixth Marines.

The first Marine to die of wounds received in action was Private Harry Robert Williams, 82nd Company, Sixth Marines, Captain Dwight F. Smith Commanding, on April 2, 1918.

The first Marine to be killed outright was Private Edward Adolph Grober, 96th Company, Sixth Marines, Captain Duncan Commanding, on April 5, 1918, by shell fire.

The story of the first Marine killed beyond our front lines is a dramatic one. At the time Major Robert E. Adams' First Battalion was in line on the extreme right of the regimental front, with his battalion command post in the ruined village of Tresavaux in the Verdun sector. On his left was Sibley's battalion and on his right a battalion of French troops. A few kilometers to the right loomed the famous Crete des Eparges, its few remaining trees bare and shattered by three years of rifle and shell fire.

Fifty meters northwest of the Tresavaux-Champlon and the Tresavaux-Fresnes road junction was a stone blockhouse that was kept under close observation. Beyond there was a stretch of No Man's Land, flat and devoid of cover clear to the German lines, averaging close to a mile and half in depth. Our position was on a slope that was well wooded, giving excellent cover and observation, while the Germans were reduced to the use of captive balloons for their observation. The blockhouse had been frequently examined by night patrols but no evidence of its occupation for observation or ambush purposes had been discovered.

On the night of April 6-7, 1918, an officer's patrol was ordered out from Captain Oscar R. Cauldwell's Company, the 95th. First Lieutenants J. F. Gargan and Frederic C. Wheeler were assigned to the patrol, and First Lieutenant Carleton Burr, the battalion intelligence officer, accompanied them. The orders in general were to sweep the sector immediately in front of our lines to drive back any enemy patrols that might be operating there. On the right a similar patrol from the French moved out in cooperation. Word had been sent to the artillery giving the time and limits of the operation.

A large German patrol was flushed, rifle fire broke the silence of the night, and the whole battalion front sprang into action, raking the plain with rifle and machine gun fire according to a prearranged plan that would inflict damage on the enemy, hold back enemy reinforcements, and at the same time inflict no losses

on our own patrol. The enemy, caught flat, broke and sent up a rocket for a covering barrage. The patrol returned in due time but with one man missing, Corporal Charles K. Toth. Lieutenant Gargan found his body at 5:30 A. M. on the 8th, lying close to the stone blockhouse where he had undoubtedly taken cover against the German barrage. He was wearing his gas mask, and a bullet hole was in his head. Death had been instantaneous.

In gathering data for the patrol report Major Adams discovered that Toth, an old-timer, was of German birth. It was recalled that he had served in the German army. Immediately suspicion was aroused that Toth, as a member of the patrol, had planned to desert to the German lines. Division headquarters sent up its specialists from the G-2 section, and a thorough investigation was launched. Men were questioned as to any pro-German sentiments that Toth might have expressed, as to any possible significant utterance or actions on the day preceding his death, and a thorough search was made of his effects. Had he planned and executed desertion the Germans would have gained damaging information as to our presence in the lines. It developed, however, that Toth was a reticent soldier and investigation cleared him completely of suspicion.

Of that patrol Lieutenant Gargan is no longer in the service. Prior to his entry into the service he was a noted athlete at Holy Cross. Wheeler, a Yale graduate, is a commissioned officer in the crack City Troop of Philadelphia. Both won their captain's bars before their service ended, and both were wounded and decorated.

Burr was an officer of unusual promise, fearless to a fault, skilled in patrol work and of a charming personality. He was a Harvard graduate. At Soissons a shell struck full in the center of the temporary command post of the battalion, then under command of Major John A. Hughes. He himself was the only one of the battalion staff, officers and men, who was not wounded by the flying steel fragments. Burr was killed outright. On the night of the patrol operation, as Burr told me later, the patrol scattered for cover as the German barrage and our answering barrage came down. He found shelter in a shell-hole, up to his armpits in icy water, until it was safe to return.

While the above "firsts" are confined to the Sixth Marines, I recall three incidents in which the Fifth Marines figured. The first Marine battalion despatched to France was the First, then under the command of Major Julius S. Turrill, since retired after a signally brilliant career overseas. Before the *DeKalb* nosed into the dock the Quad trucks had been loaded with the battalion's galley crews and with all necessary equipment and food for two meals. Captain George K. Shuler, Commanding the 66th Company, was the first officer ashore as the *DeKalb's* cranes lowered the loaded Quads. Arriving at the camp site Shuler selected an Adrian barracks in a choice corner of the camp and when the battalion swung into camp savoury reminders of chow greeted it.

It was between 2½ and 3 hours before the first army contingent of the advance guard of the A.E.F. marched into camp. From its ranks an amazed voice queried: "Where in hell did you guys come from?"

The Fifth also won honors on the Rhine when Captain Gaines Moseley, one of its most distinguished soldiers, raised the first American flag on the banks of the Rhine.

LEGISLATION

(Continued from page 6)

Naval Affairs Committee February 28, 1935. Passed House March 27, 1935. Reported in Senate April 3, 1935. Passed Senate April 9, 1935. Approved April 15, 1935. Public Law No. 36."

Includes provision for Marine Barracks, South Boston, Mass., officers' quarters at Quantico, and non-commissioned officers' quarters at Quantico.

In addition to the above, money was actually obtained from general relief funds to the amount of about two and a quarter million dollars, most of which will be expended for general improvements at Quantico, such as a new fire house, new laundry, repairs to roads and walks, and additions to the new aviation plant. Work on these will begin immediately. The Quartermaster's Department is making a determined effort to procure from PWA funds the money necessary to carry out the construction program for apartment houses at Quantico.

H. R. 4764, "For the relief of the officers and men of the United States Naval and Marine Corps Reserves who performed flights in naval aircraft in connection with the search for victims and wreckage of the United States dirigible Akron."

Introduced January 25, 1935, by Mr. Kniffin and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported March 1, 1935. Passed the House April 23, 1935. Reported in Senate June 7, 1935.

Would give active duty pay for the time spent in such duty.

H. R. 4799, "To provide for the reimbursement of certain officers and enlisted men or former officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps for personal property lost, damaged or destroyed as a result of the earthquake which occurred at Managua, Nicaragua, on March 31, 1931."

Introduced January 25, 1935, by Mr. Kennedy (by departmental request) and referred to Committee on Claims. Reported March 5, 1935, with an amendment. The amendment provides that no agent or attorney shall receive more than 10 per centum of the amount appropriated in the Act. Objected to and recommitted May 7, 1935.

Included in *H. R. 8108*, Omnibus Claims bill, second. Reported May 16, 1935.

H. R. 4808, "For the relief of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company."

Introduced by Mr. Kennedy January 25, 1935, and referred to the Committee on Claims. Reported March 11, 1935. Passed the House May 7, 1935. Reported in Senate June 12, 1935.

To reimburse the railroad company for half of the amount expended in the construction of a bridge over Chappawamsic Creek.

H. R. 4814, "For the relief of Lieutenant Colonel Russell B. Putnam, United States Marine Corps."

Introduced January 25, 1935, by Mr. Kennedy (by request). Referred to Committee on Claims. Reported March 11, 1935. Passed the House May 7, 1935.

To credit Col. Putnam's accounts in the amount of \$235.40—payments made to First Lieutenant Walter W. Wensinger.

H. R. 4846, "To provide for the reimbursement of certain enlisted men and former enlisted men of the Marine Corps for the value of personal effects lost, damaged, or destroyed by fire at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, on October 5, 1930."

Introduced by Mr. Kennedy January 25, 1935 (by

departmental request) and referred to Committee on Claims. Reported April 24, 1935.

H. R. 5577, "To provide for aviation cadets in the Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve."

Introduced February 12, 1935, by Mr. Delaney and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported February 22, 1935. Passed the House March 27, 1935. Reported in Senate April 2, 1935. Passed the Senate April 9, 1935. Approved April 15, 1935. Public Law No. 37.

H. R. 5731, "To amend in certain particulars the Act approved February 28, 1925, entitled 'An Act to provide for the creation, organization, administration, and maintenance of a Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve,' as amended, and for other purposes."

Introduced by Mr. Vinson February 14, 1935, and referred to Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported April 9, 1935.

Section 6 to be amended to provide for discharge in discretion of Secretary of reservists sentenced by civil authorities to confinement in State or Federal penitentiary.

Section 14 to be amended by adding a proviso that officers and men physically injured in line of duty while performing authorized drills, etc., shall be deemed to have received such injury while performing authorized training duty.

Section 21 to be amended in certain particulars in regard to drill pay, etc.

Section 35 to be amended to provide \$240 a year for administrative duties performed by officers of the Volunteer Naval Reserve regularly assigned to and commanding organizations of the Reserve.

Section 38 to be amended by adding a paragraph requiring the Secretary to submit separately in connection with annual estimates for Navy Department the estimated amount for all purposes for the Volunteer Naval Reserve.

H. R. 6120, "To give highest temporary rank to retired officers of the Navy."

Introduced February 22, 1935, by Mr. Vinson and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Would apply to the Marine Corps. No officer now on the retired list would be affected.

H. R. 6708, "To authorize the presentation of a Distinguished Flying Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Francis T. Evans, United States Marine Corps."

Introduced March 13, 1935, by Mr. Maas, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. Reported from Naval Affairs Committee May 14, 1935.

On February 13, 1917, Lt. Col. Evans successfully looped a seaplane for the first time, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of such a maneuver, which up to that time had not been considered possible. This flight demonstrated to aviation personnel that a pilot could recover safely from a voluntary or involuntary spin, which knowledge created in the pilots more confidence in themselves and their planes and has materially aided in the advancement of naval aviation. This maneuver was performed before parachutes had been developed and consequently required more courage than would have been the case had there been available a means of escape should the experiment prove unsuccessful.

H. R. 6710, "To provide for the retirement of certain enlisted men of the United States Marine Corps and of the Marine Corps Reserve who served as officers in the Garde d'Haiti."

Introduced March 13, 1935, by Mr. Millard and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. March 20, 1935, Committee on Military Affairs discharged and referred to Committee on Naval Affairs.

Would authorize the President to appoint as captain and first lieutenant sixteen certain enlisted men who served in commissioned grades in the Garde d'Haiti and to retire them immediately with the rank, retired pay and emoluments of the grade to which appointed. Department recommends against its passage.

H. R. 7030, "To place George K. Shuler on the retired list of the United States Marine Corps."

Introduced March 26, 1935, by Mr. Delaney and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported June 24, 1935.

S. 2479. Same title as *H. R. 7030*.

Introduced March 13 by Mr. Copeland and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

These bills would authorize the President "to appoint George K. Shuler, formerly a captain, United States Marine Corps, a captain in the United States Marine Corps, and to place him upon the retired list of the Marine Corps as a captain with the retired pay of that grade or upon the active list in the rank and grade entitled."

H. R. 7110, "To authorize the President to bestow the Congressional Medal of Honor upon Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, United States Marine Corps, deceased."

Introduced March 28, 1935, by Mr. Maas and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported May 14, 1935.

H. R. 7144, "To extend the benefits of World War veterans' legislation to certain military and naval personnel, permanently disabled as a result of aviation or submarine activities."

Introduced March 29, 1935, by Mr. Hoeppel and referred to the Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation.

H. R. 7378, "To amend the provision in the Act approved June 10, 1896, prohibiting the employment of officers of the Navy or Marine Corps on the active or retired list by persons or companies furnishing naval supplies or war material to the Government."

Introduced April 9, 1935, by Mr. Maas and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

H. R. 8010, "For the relief of Colonel Richard M. Cutts, United States Marine Corps."

Introduced May 10, 1935, by Mr. Darden, and referred to the Committee on Claims.

This would reimburse the estate of Colonel Cutts for loss of personal property incurred in a fire of incendiary origin on April 26, 1930, at Port au Prince, Haiti.

S. 93, "To authorize certain officers of the Navy and Marine Corps to administer oaths."

Reported in Senate March 12, 1935. Passed Senate March 29, 1935. Referred to House Naval Affairs Committee April 3, 1935. Reported April 19, 1935. Passed House April 22, 1935. Approved April 25, 1935. Public Law No. 42.

Provides that in places beyond continental limits of the United States where Navy or Marine Corps is serving officers who are authorized to administer oaths for purposes of administration of naval justice shall have general powers of a notary public or U. S. consul in administration of oaths, etc.

S. 95, "To amend Paragraph 1 of Section 22 of the

Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, by providing for the carrying of officers and enlisted men of the military and naval service while on leave of absence or furlough at own expense at reduced rates.

Introduced January 3, 1935, by Mr. Trammell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported March 19, 1935. Passed Senate March 29, 1935. Referred to House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, April 3, 1935.

S. 1210, "Authorizing certain officials under the Naval Establishment to administer oaths."

Reported in Senate March 12, 1935, by Naval Affairs Committee. Passed Senate March 29, 1935. Referred to House Naval Affairs Committee April 3, 1935. Reported April 19, 1935. Passed House April 22, 1935. Approved April 25, 1935. Public Law No. 44.

Authorizes chief clerks and certain other officials in field services and at navy yards, etc., and Marine Corps posts and stations to administer any oath required or authorized by any law of the United States or regulation promulgated thereunder relating to any claim against or application to the United States of officers and employees under the Naval Establishment; also to administer oaths of office to officers and employees under the Naval Establishment. No compensation or fee to be demanded for administering any such oath.

S. 1211, "Authorizing the assignment of two officers on the active list of the United States Marine Corps not below the rank of colonel to duty as assistants to the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps."

Introduced January 21, 1935, by Mr. Trammell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported in Senate April 11, 1935. Passed Senate April 15, 1935. Referred to House Committee on Naval Affairs April 17, 1935.

S. 1606, "To prohibit the unauthorized wearing, manufacture, or sale of medals and badges issued by the Navy Department."

Introduced February 4, 1935, by Mr. Trammell, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Passed the Senate March 13, 1935. Now in House, referred to Committee on Naval Affairs, April 3, 1935.

S. 1610, "Authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to accept on behalf of the United States a certain strip of land from the State of South Carolina."

Introduced February 4, 1935, by Mr. Trammell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Passed Senate April 15, 1935. Passed House April 23, 1935. Approved April 29, 1935. Public Law No. 47. (Archers Creek, Parris Island).

S. 1611, "To authorize an exchange of lands between the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company and the United States at Quantico, Virginia."

Introduced by Mr. Trammell February 4, 1935, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported in Senate April 11, 1935. Passed Senate April 15, 1935. Referred to House Naval Affairs Committee April 22, 1935. Reported April 23, 1935. Passed House, amended, June 12, 1935. Senate agreed to House amendments June 14, 1935.

S. 1940, "To fix the value of subsistence and rental allowance under the Pay Readjustment Act of June 10, 1922."

Introduced February 15 by Mr. Sheppard and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. Reported March 4, 1935. Passed Senate March 13, 1935. Referred to House Military Affairs Committee March 15, 1935.

Fixes rental at \$20 a room and subsistence at 60c a ration.

S. 1966, "Providing for the advancement on the retired list of the Marine Corps of Hiram I. Bearss."

Introduced February 22, 1935, by Mr. Van Nuys.

Provides for advancement on the retired list to brigadier general, in recognition of his distinguished services, but without any increase in pay or allowances.

S. 1976, "To amend the Act entitled 'An Act making appropriations for the military and non-military activities of the War Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1927, and for other purposes, approved April 15, 1926, so as to equalize the allowances for quarters and subsistence of enlisted men of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.'"

Introduced February 15, 1935, by Mr. Trammell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported May 24, 1935.

Authorizes allowances to enlisted men when absent on temporary duty.

S. 2287, "To authorize the crediting of service rendered by personnel (active or retired) subsequently to June 30, 1932, in the computation of their active or retired pay after June 30, 1935."

Reported in Senate April 5, 1935. Passed Senate April 15, 1935. Referred to House Military Affairs Committee April 17, 1935. Reported May 24, 1935. Passed House June 5, 1935. Approved June 13, 1935. Public Law No. 133.

S. 2460, "To amend the Act of June 6, 1924, entitled 'An Act to amend in certain particulars the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended,' and for other purposes."

Introduced March 13, 1935, by Mr. Trammell and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. Reported May 24, 1935.

Would allow enlisted men who served honorably as commissioned officers in military or naval service during the World War the pay and allowances of a warrant officer of that branch of the regular service in which they were serving at time of retirement.

S. 2504, "To incorporate the Marine Corps League."

Introduced March 13, 1935, by Mr. Walsh and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

H. J. Res. 294, "Authorizing the award of a Medal of Honor to Ralph E. Updike."

Introduced May 17, 1935, by Mr. Larrabee and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Ed.

"THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORVILLE"

■ On May 2, 1935, before a crowd estimated at 50,000 the "rebel yell" of the Confederates resounded on the historic Chancellorville battlefield as 800 Marines, 240 cavalrymen from Ft. Myer, Va., and cadets from the Virginia Military Institute reenacted the famous battle. The sham battle, which portrayed very accurately the movement of troops of the two armies over 70 years ago, was the main feature of the afternoon. History reports that this was one of the bloodiest engagements of the Civil War; over 30,000 Union and Confederate troops fell during the campaign.

Under a sultry sky, Dr. Douglas S. Freeman, the noted historian, of Richmond, Va., started the day's program at Bivouac Stone, near Chancellorville, with an address describing the campaign which saw General Joe Hooker's forces crushed by General Lee's gray-clad army of the Confederacy.

After Dr. Freeman's address the V. M. I. cadets, headed by the cavalrymen from Ft. Myer, passed in review in a parade dedicated to General "Stonewall" Jackson, beloved Confederate leader, who lost his life in the engagement.

At noon the spectators, who included a number of high Federal and State leaders, had lunch at the numerous inns near the battlefield.

During the afternoon an exhibition drill by the cavalry was followed by a demonstration of air maneuvers by a squadron of 36 Marine Corps planes, which flew over the graves of the dead and dropped flowers.

A reception at Kenmore to members of the Daughters of the American Revolution, and a military ball for the Virginia Military Institute cadets and service officers closed the occasion at a late hour.

Ed.

DISTRIBUTION OF 51 ADDITIONAL OFFICERS

(FISCAL YEAR 1936)

Rank:	Present. 1036	Future—1935-36 1050	Distribution 1065	1074	1085
Maj.-Gen.	3*	4* (1)	4* (1)	4* (1)	4* (1)
Brig.-Gen.	7	7	7	7	7
Colonel	41†	42† (1)	43† (2)	43† (2)	43† (2)
Lt.-Col.	83	84 (1)	85 (2)	86 (3)	87 (4)
Major	155	157 (2)	160 (5)	161 (6)	163 (8)
Captain	311	315 (4)	320 (9)	322 (11)	326 (15)

* Includes the MGC.

† Includes 3 Heads of Staff Departments.

It is understood that the maximum enlisted strength of the Marine Corps for 1936 will be 19,000, while the average strength will be 17,500.—Editor.



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FRAT PINS AND SABERS

■ Loaded with javelins, ukes and a determined lusty-voiced bunch of bare-headed youngsters, a new move of "On to Quantico" and "San Diego or Bust" is about to begin in Model "T's" of any vintage under \$25.

Privates now, but future Platoon Commanders in the Marine Corps Reserve upon their graduation, a trek of 250 college sophomores and Juniors will start this summer for the first time to two training centers at Quantico and San Diego.

Carefully selected from some 500 applicants in more than a score of colleges and universities throughout the country, the 250 successful applicants will begin their first period of six weeks of training early in July. Only schools having NO Reserve Officers Training Corps were placed on the Marine Corps list of accredited schools from which the men were taken, in order not to conflict with the Army's student training program.

If the students could be said to be in pretty deep water when they talked "Marines" to the several recruiting officers who toured the schools, then it could be certainly said that the Marine officers were on the bottom of the ocean when the students shop-talked about the "Sigs," "Dekes" and "Chis."

Unconsciously some of the schools selected were rather widely known in scholastic circles as having decidedly "Peace" leanings and officers assigned to recruiting in these schools approached them with a feeling akin to sawdust resting uneasily on the stomach.

Strangely enough these were the schools where the authorities gave the best cooperation and larger numbers of students applied for enlistment than in other schools more friendly to the military.

Athletic directors, where assigned the preliminary line-up duty by school authorities, gave wholehearted cooperation and had many applicants ready upon the arrival of recruiting officers.

Every type of collegeman from six-feet-four football players to half-pint sized bookworms applied. Everyone had a different question and desire. By far the largest number asked about aviation.

Recruiting officers explained the general set-up of the plan to students and there descended about every conceivable question. Here are some encountered by the writer in five colleges visited:

Can I take a canoe along? Is there any place where I can practice with a javelin? Can we form a baseball team? Do you have a pipe-organ I can practice on?

The faculty members in various schools also had questions which were somewhat surprising. In one school, famous throughout the country for its insistence on nothing but hard book-work, a member of the faculty suddenly asked the recruiting officer, who appeared before a faculty meeting to explain the plan:

"Are these students going to have a lot of drill?"

The recruiting officer, knowing the attitude of the school about studies went to great length to explain that drill would be only a part of the training program and that other subjects helpful to their school program would be given.

"But they will have some stiff drill, won't they," the professor insisted.

The officer replied they would, fully expecting an unfavorable reaction.

"That's fine," the Professor replied, 'for it certainly will be good for them."

The training will be carried out under a \$41,000 item in this year's appropriation bill.

The colleges on this year's eligible list were:

Dartmouth College, Tufts College, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Colgate University, University of Rochester, Bucknell University, Washington and Jefferson, Miami University, University of Ohio, University of Toledo, Washington and Lee University, University of Virginia, University of North Carolina, University of South Carolina, Duke University, Tulane University, Centre College, Santa Clara University, University of Southern California, California Institute of Technology, University of Colorado.

Quotas in virtually every school were exceeded.

The task confronting the Marine Corps in the training of the students as platoon commanders for Corps units in the event of mobilization is one of infantry training. About 200 students will be assembled at Quantico, and about 50 at San Diego, from about July 8 to August 17, 1935. Each week's training program will have 35 training hours. A special attempt will be made to utilize the knowledge of the students who come from technical colleges, especially engineers. The week ends will be left free, so the students can visit nearby civic interests and public works projects.

The course will be divided into two phases, first for the members of the 1936 classes, who will upon receiving a degree from their colleges be presented with a second lieutenant's commission in the Reserve, and second, for the members of the 1937 classes, who will be required to attend two of these camps of application. The rule has been fixed so that second lieutenants' commissions in the Reserve will not be given to any college man who does not receive a degree from his college, and also the necessary recommendations from the Commanding Officer charged with the conduct of these camps. The Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico will directly supervise the camp at Quantico, and the Commanding Officer of the Base at San Diego will directly supervise there.

So when you see those Model "T's" rolling along the roads in a few days, you will know what it's all about.

Ed.

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MEMBERS OF NAVAL ACADEMY CLASS OF 1935 TO BE COMMISSIONED SECOND LIEUTENANTS IN THE MARINE CORPS

BIERMAN, Charles Oliver
 BLACK, Robert Attick
 COSGROVE, John Joseph, Jr.
 CROWTHER, James White
 CUSHMAN, Robert Everton, Jr.
 DAVIS, Leonard Kier
 DORSEY, Elmer Thomas
 DUNKLE, Bernard Edward
 HEMPHILL, Bruce Tillman
 HENDRICKS, Gordon Eugene
 HOLMES, Merlyn Donald
 HUGHES, Richard Donald
 JOHNSTON, Arnold Ford
 KERBY, Kenneth David
 LASTER, Carl Abram
 MCGILL, William Neil
 MILLER, John Montgomery
 NELSON, Wallace Martin
 PENNEBAKER, Edwin Preston, Jr.
 RAMSEY, Frederick Augustus, Jr.
 SHELBURNE, Charles Wesley
 STIVERS, Robert Tyler, Jr.
 TINGLE, Charles Thomas
 WALSETH, Harvey Sanborn
 WEEDE, Richard Garfield

Confirmed by the Senate for two years revocable commission, May 28, 1935, to rank from June 6, 1935.

CONGRATULATIONS

■ The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE congratulates:

Majors Lucien H. Vandoren and Carleton Penn, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, upon their being selected to represent the U. S. Marine Corps during the conferences of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Locke Smith, U.S.M.C., on being awarded the Haitien Order of Honor and Merit with rank of "Officer" by the President of the Republic of Haiti, for services rendered that Republic.

Second Lieutenants Peter J. Negri and Alexander B. Swenceski, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, on their being found qualified and recommended for appointments as Second Lieutenants in the U. S. Marine Corps.

Sergeants Michael S. Currin and Lewis J. Fields, and Corporal Henry B. Cain, U.S.M.C., on their being found qualified and recommended for appointment as second lieutenants in the U. S. Marine Corps.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Schmidt, U.S.M.C., who for the second time during 1935, has secured the largest number of new members for the Marine Corps Association.

Captain J. V. Babcock, U.S.N., on his very fine story "PAPER WORK VERSUS BRAINS," which appeared in the March, 1935, issue of the *Naval Institute Proceedings*.

Lieutenant-Commander Frank W. Wead, U. S. Navy, retired, on his very splendid new play "Ceiling Zero," in which, together with Warner Brothers, he is making a powerful plea for caring for pioneers of Aviation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Melvin J. Maas, U.S.M.C.R., upon his recent promotion, and upon his selection as Head of the Reserve Officer's Association.

Mail for Colonel Maas in his capacity of President of

this Association will reach him at the House of Representatives Postoffice, U. S. Capitol, Washington, D. C.

The Officers of the General Board of the Navy Relief Society on their highly meritorious work, especially during the past year.

U. S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

APPOINTMENTS

NAME, RANK AND DATE

2nd Lieut. George W. Eddleman, January, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. John L. Day, Jr., February, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Herbert P. Beyer, February, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Kenneth A. Willard, February, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Robert K. Crist, February, 1935.
 Captain Albert G. Skelton, March, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Thomas A. Pace, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Edward R. Hagenah, March, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. James P. Tharp, April, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Henry Eickhoff, Jr., April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. John V. Kipp, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Robert E. Eklund, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Alfred Stuart, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Harlan Hull, May, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. John W. Stage, May, 1935.
 Captain Walter A. Churchill, May, 1935.

PROMOTIONS

Major Bernard S. Barron, February, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Paul S. Brunk, February, 1935.
 Captain James E. Webb, February, 1935.
 Captain Milton V. O'Connell, March, 1935.
 Major Stephen A. McClellan, March, 1935.
 Major Alford J. Williams, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Nathaniel S. Clifford, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. George D. Omer, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Elliott E. Bard, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Mark F. Heaney, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Theodore O. Brewster, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Wilbur N. Loveland, May, 1935.
 Captain Chudleigh R. Long, May, 1935.
 Captain Edward F. Venn, May, 1935.
 Captain Thomas P. Barton, May, 1935.
 Captain Robert F. Davidson, May, 1935.
 Captain Philip N. Crimmins, May, 1935.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Melvin J. Mass—Rank from May 25, 1935.

RESIGNED

2nd Lieut. William F. Murray, January, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Floyd W. Howard, January, 1935.
 Captain Vincent M. Carter, February, 1935.
 Captain Albert H. Jenkins, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. William M. Parker, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Marcus H. Muller, May, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Ramon B. Ford, May, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Smith W. Brookhart, April, 1935

DISCHARGED

2nd Lieut. William E. Hess, January, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Elias F. Haddad, March, 1935.
 Captain Harold P. Nachtrieb, March, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Harry S. Davis, April, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Henry T. Walker, April, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Joseph R. Ramser, April, 1935.
 Pay Clerk Otto J. Cass, April, 1935.

TRANSFERRED TO HONORARY RETIRED LIST

Captain Frank L. Ach, April, 1935.
 1st Lieut. Samuel F. Eldredge, Jr., May, 1935.
 2nd Lieut. Charles N. Baltz, May, 1935.

DIED

2nd Lieut. Daniel J. Murphy, January, 1935.

THE OLD BEAR OF THE NORTH

(Continued from page 9)

met repeated attempts to shoot lines between the two cutters. The heavy seas and strong currents broke the shot lines before a next size larger line could be run. Similar conditions balked the *Algonquin's* efforts to float a line to us with a buoy. Captain Stromberg, with grim determination and with full realization of the danger of both ships being lost if his judgment erred, executed one of the best pieces of seamanship imaginable. In spite of the heavy seas running, he approached the *Bear* with his ship until he was close enough to permit a line to be hove right on deck of the *Bear*. This manoeuver of course meant that the *Algonquin* would be flung nearly into the *Bear* by the next sea, and before he could work his vessel free by use of full power. Observers, upon viewing the splendid judgment of Captain Stromberg, which provided the few feet margin necessary to prevent a disastrous collision, sent up a throaty cheer for this brave and resourceful skipper. After hard work by the crews of both vessels, another tow line was run from the *Algonquin* to the *Bear*.

FAR NORTHERN TRAGEDY

One of the outstanding tragedies of the Arctic, with which the *Bear* was closely linked, occurred in 1913. Vilhjalmur Stefansson's exploration ship *Karluk*, under command of the well known Arctic skipper, Captain Robert A. Bartlett, who accompanied Admiral Peary to the North Pole, was caught in the ice well to the eastward of Point Barrow. May I quote the first paragraph of Captain Bartlett's "The Last Voyage of the *Karluk*." "Fifteen months after the *Karluk*, flagship of Vilhjalmur Stefansson's Canadian Arctic Expedition, steamed out of the navy yard at Esquimaux, British Columbia, the United States revenue cutter, *Bear*, that perennial Good Samaritan of the Arctic, which thirty years before had been one of the ships to rescue the survivors of the Greely Expedition from Cape Sabine, brought nine of us back again to Esquimaux—nine white men out of twenty, who, with two Eskimo men, an Eskimo woman and her two little girls—and a black cat—comprised the ship's company when she began her westward drift along the northern coast of Alaska on the twenty-third of September, 1913." Held with the Arctic ice pack the *Karluk* moved with it, to a point about sixty miles north of Herald Island, where she stove and sank on January 11, 1914.

TERRIFIC PRESSURE

From Captain Bartlett and the other survivors, much first hand information concerning the catastrophe was learned. They related that time and again, before the final destruction of their fine ship, those aboard were alarmed by the terrific pressure of the buckling ice. Preparations, thorough to a degree, were soon made for abandoning the ship, should she be crushed. Provisions, rifles and ammunition were prepared against exposure to the elements. The Eskimo woman, assisted by members of the expedition, busily sewed watertight and warm skin and fur clothing for all hands. Good hunters conducted hunting expeditions on the ice, in the vicinity of the imprisoned ship. Scientists aboard obtained much valuable data. Life aboard was not altogether dull.

By December 15, land to the southwestward was sighted. It later proved to be the higher land of Wrangell Island, in range with the lower lands of Herald

Island. The pressure of the Arctic ice pack against the shore ice extending out from these islands finally squeezed the *Karluk*. On January 4, 1914, the ship experienced terrific pressure which made her groan and crack like a shot. Then on January 14, true to Captain Bartlett's prediction, as the result of a change in tide, at 7:15 p. m., the roaring ice pack crushed the *Karluk*. The ship heeled to starboard several degrees and water flooded the engine room. The Captain gave the command "Abandon Ship" which, thanks to his foresight and detailed preparation, was carried out with maximum saving of gear and provisions. Before the final crushing of his ship, Captain Bartlett had placed almost everything on the adjacent ice. In that bleak Arctic waste, it was a grave moment when the personnel watched the *Karluk* fill with water and sink, her ensign still flying. Soon the space, where a short time before their ship had loomed, was packed solid with ice. They constructed two "houses," made from boxes of hard bread and sacks of coal, reinforced with canvas and snow. For reference it was named Shipwreck Camp. Well was it the fate of these helpless people lay in the hands of Captain Bartlett. Seasoned in the trek to the North Pole, he did not underestimate the hazards confronting the safe transfer of all personnel, together with provisions, to the barren islands lying to the southward. With deliberation he slowly worked out a program, which if it had been followed by everyone, would doubtless have saved the lives of those lost. First he established food supplies, at distances from Shipwreck Camp of one, two and three days travel. These were to be available when sled loads of provisions were lost in crossing open leads or other emergencies arose.

FAILED TO HEED ADVICE

On February 1, 1914, Dr. A. F. Mackay, Oceanographer James Murray, Dr. Henri Beuchat, of Paris, France, and Seaman S. S. Morris, by special permission, but against the advice of their commander, made an independent start for shore. Inexperienced in ice travel, with its hazards of buckling ice, of wide pressure ridges through which it is actually necessary to hew a path, with open leads of water to cross, and worst of all lack of knowledge how to take care of themselves during a protracted blizzard, they set out on their own. They failed to reach land, all four of the party being lost.

Another party consisting of First Mate Alexander Anderson, Second Officer Charles Barker and able seamen Morris A. King and John Brady, after being sighted three miles from Herald Island, disappeared from sight. They, however, had been on a mission to land advance stores on the island and were acting under orders from their commander. It is believed they were lost while attempting to cross a wide open lead of water.

AN ARDUOUS TRIP

After a long, hard trip, especially so resultant from the great amount of provisions being transported ashore, the main party reached Herald Island. On this trip Fireman F. W. Maurer froze his feet, and Messroom boy Ernest F. Chafe was lost from the party for two days, his life doubtless being saved by three of his remaining team of dogs practically dragging him to shelter of the camp. So trying had been the trip over the ice, the party rested a few days, and then forged on across the ice to Wrangell Island.

PERSONNEL DIVIDED

On the latter island, the Captain divided the personnel

into widely separated parties, to better provide game for food. Now, the brave skipper took stock. Eight lives had been lost in covering a total distance of about one hundred miles over the ice. The Siberian shore lay about one hundred and ten miles to the southward. Bartlett knew only too well it would be a different proposition to traverse the latter distance, than from Shipwreck Camp to Wrangell Island, the worst obstacle was the strong current, known to exist between the island and the mainland. He wisely decided not to attempt conducting the whole party further. Picking one of the best Eskimo men, Kataktovick, to accompany him, on March 18, 1914, Captain Bartlett set out across the ice for the Siberian shore. A very modest man in describing the perils through which he passed, on this journey, Captain Bartlett gave out enough information for those at all acquainted with ice travel to learn that his trip to Siberia over the ice was the most difficult kind of travel one can experience and still live to tell the tale. So terrific were ice pressures and ruptures in the area he traversed that, after having been disturbed by a polar bear during the night, and as the result of the ice telescoping practically where they were sleeping, it was found out the next morning that where the bear's trail had been broken by the rupture, the ice had been bodily moved about three hundred yards. Another time the Captain fell and hurt his side.

SIBERIA REACHED

On April 4, 1914, seventeen days after the start the bleak Siberian coast was reached. Even now their journey was hardly started. Over six hundred miles lay ahead of them, overland, before a point could be reached where help might be summoned. Prior to starting on the journey from Wrangell Island Kataktovick had expressed great fear of the Siberian Eskimos. He had heard they were unfriendly toward the Alaskan Eskimos, and consequently would murder him on sight. Now that the dreaded land was reached his fears took charge. Captain Bartlett did his best to assure him the natives would treat him kindly. Finally the time came when smoke was smelled by the alert Eskimo. Excitedly he called Captain Bartlett's attention to it. It looked as though fear would overcome the Captain's assurance. A compromise was struck—Captain Bartlett would first investigate the igloo, while Kataktovick remained in hiding. This was done and finally a much doubting Eskimo was led to what he considered his last stand. It was said that the Captain's companion Eskimo distrusted his new found "friends" to such an extent he lay awake throughout the first night. Slowly, as the time passed he became used to the Siberian Eskimos and finally fully realized they meant him no harm.

The journey to provide rescue for the marooned mariners on Wrangell Island was hardly started; six hundred miles lay ahead of them. Not miles in the sense we are well acquainted with, but endless units of distance, never ending, over the barren wastes of Northern Siberia. Thirty days more of hardships and Captain Bartlett was continually harassed with an increasing scurvy condition. At Cape North a Russian trader by the name of Karaieff extended hospitality. The last few days of the overland trip were brightened by the company of Baron Kleist, Supervisor of Northeastern Siberia. The Baron piloted Captain Bartlett and his companion from East Cape to Emma Harbor, Siberia. From this point another of the Karaieff brothers kindly sent Eskimo messengers to intercept the steam trading vessel *Herman*, at Indian Point.

CAUGHT IN THE ICE

At the time the *Karluk* was caught in the ice pack, the *Elvira*, Captain Pederson, master, was crushed in the ice and sank off the Northern coast of Alaska. Captain Pederson made his way ashore, then overland to Fairbanks and on to San Francisco, where he obtained command of another ship, the *Herman*. When Captain Pederson received word regarding Captain Bartlett's presence at Emma Harbor, he lost no time in reaching there. Through the kindness of Captain Pederson, the two brave men, all the way from Wrangell Island, were carried two hundred and fifty miles across Bering Sea, through the ice, to St. Michael. From this point by radio the world first learned of the *Karluk* disaster, and rapid plans for the rescue of the survivors on Wrangell Island were gotten underway.

Captain C. S. Cochran, U.S.C.G., was in command of the *Bear* when word was received from St. Michael from Captain Bartlett. Speaking of the *Bear's* commander, who has to his credit eight long cruises in command of the *Bear*, Captain Bartlett said: "I had been told, too, that the *Bear's* master, Captain Cochran, was not afraid to put his ship in the ice, for he had served under that fearless and true-hearted man, the late Captain Jervis. On the whole, it seemed to me that it would be a matter of singular interest for the *Bear* to rescue the *Karluk* survivors as she had rescued the Greeley party thirty years before, on the other side of the continent." Without delay Captain Cochran proceeded with the *Bear* to St. Michael, where he took on board Captain Bartlett and his Eskimo companion.

DOG TEAMS ASSEMBLED

After minute preparations for the voyage, including the gathering together of dog teams, sleds and skin boats, for use if necessary in crossing the ice to reach the survivors on the island, the *Bear* set out for the Arctic. Quoting from Captain Cochran's account: "After several attempts to land on Wrangell Island, the *Bear* was forced to return to Nome for coal. Since this is an open roadstead, coal can only be delivered in a smooth sea. After the *Bear* was finally coaled, we returned to the Arctic to find that the day prior to our arrival, the small trading schooner *King and Wing* had landed at Rogers Harbor and picked up the survivors of the *Karluk*. It was later learned from the rescued men that the day the *King and Wing* arrived was the first day the weather was clear and the island clear of ice. The *Bear* received the men on board and after proceeding to the vicinity of Herald Island, which could not be approached nearer than ten miles on account of the ice, the survivors were transported to Victoria, B. C."

The immediate rescue by the *King and Wing* with the *Bear* close following, brings out the splendid spirit of comradeship existing in the Far North. In addition to sailing master Captain Jochimsen, there was also aboard the *King and Wing* Mr. Olaf Swenson, one of the owners of that vessel. Mr. Swenson caused his craft to cruise about six hundred miles out of the way, exposed her to the likelihood of loss from being crushed and gave little thought to the valuable time lost out of the all too short trading season. Another splendid character came to the front. Mr. Jafet Lindeberg, of Nome, who fearing failure to get the party off the island would result in their loss, and well knowing the *Bear* and the *King and Wing* were liable to be caught in the ice, at a personal cost of \$10,000, chartered the arctic steamer *Corwin* in an attempted rescue. There is not a region the world over where less selfish men are to be found.

MEETS THE BROTHERS

In 1919 it was my pleasure to meet in Siberia both of the Karaieff brothers, who were so kind to Captain Bartlett at Cape North and East Cape, Siberia. At Emtown we conversed all night over cups of tea. The oldest brother is a graduate of the University of Vladivostok. Being then extensive fur traders, it was while the younger brother was on a long dog team trip that he met near Cape North, Captain Bartlett and his "odd" looking Eskimo companion. Karaieff stated when he first saw Captain Bartlett, he could hardly believe his eyes. Suffering from scurvy and having lost forty pounds, Captain Bartlett plainly showed the results of his hardships. Both brothers were emphatic in describing Captain Bartlett's long trek over the ice from Wrangell Island, thence along the coast past Bering Strait as a most difficult one and only possible of accomplishment by a man of his type and experience.

ESCAPED BOLSHEVIKS

One year later, in Nome, I met the Karaieff brothers. Before the Bolsheviks they had managed to escape to Alaska, leaving behind them most of their worldly goods. They attributed the saving of their lives to the small power boat that faithfully carried them across Bering Sea.

In 1920, after the red wave swept across the long reaches of Siberia and finally came to the coast, the *Bear* was ordered to investigate, for our State Department the seizing and confiscating of the American trading station at Anadyr, Siberia. Upon arrival there we found that all merchandise, and several thousand dollars in gold had been seized. Anadyr, being a fair-sized town, we were amazed to note its lifeless condition. At first not a soul appeared. Finally the agent for the American trading company and the representative of the Hudsons' Bay Company came aboard. They informed our captain, the late F. S. Van Boskerck, that the inhabitants, fearing the *Bear* would shell the town in retaliation, had fled to the hills. An envoy was sent to notify the Russians that the *Bear* would not open fire if they would rendezvous aboard ship for a parley. Two days later, a chugging small craft, with the Russian red ensign proudly displayed in the "bow," swung alongside the *Bear*, as she lay anchored in the strong current of the Anadyr River. A dozen rough and ready Bolsheviks tumbled aboard. Through an interpreter they advised that the seized money was gone and all of the seized provisions used up. "We have no way of replacing the seized items, what can we do," they asked. The best settlement that could be arranged was for restitution, over a period of years.

MUCH SUFFERING

There being much suffering from hunger in the village of Anadyr, persons on the *Bear* so desiring, were allowed to contribute money. Flour, which was replaced by purchase from Army stores at St. Michael, was sent ashore.

A startling account of the taking over of Anadyr, Siberia, was told us. The White Russians occupying the town when the Bolsheviks approached, were told by an emissary from the Red forces, that a peaceful occupation of the town would be made, providing representatives of the White Russians gathered at the town hall the next noon, both sides to go unarmed. We were reliably informed that the White Russians gathered in the hall, nineteen of them without arms. As the parley was about to start, concealed pistols were drawn by the Reds

and all nineteen of the White Russians murdered. *Bear* personnel viewed scores of bullet holes in the walls and floor, and fairly visualized the slaughter of the unsuspecting White Russians. The bodies were then thrown out on the river ice, passing out to sea with the spring breakup, shortly before our arrival.

A pitiful occurrence at Anadyr, incident to the Bolshevik occupation, was brought to our attention. A young married couple, Russian refugees of the better class, managed by untold hardships to precede the Red wave all the way across Siberia, only to be overtaken by it at Anadyr. She was a marvelous auburn beauty, he an upstanding, talented and fine-looking musician. Their hope lay in escaping to Alaska on a trading schooner. Ice still in the river had prevented this. Terror stricken they helplessly watched the inroad. When the Bolshevik leader spied the beautiful girl, he immediately appropriated her. The crushed young husband was stilled by a look of steel. Under cover of the *Bear's* presence in the harbor, the couple managed to escape and to board an American trading schooner then in port. Upon our return to Nome, at a party given by Mr. Jafet Lindeberg, it was the pleasure of the officers from the *Bear* to meet this talented couple. Mrs. Baronski accompanied on the piano, a splendid violin recital given by her husband. As we listened to the plaintive music our thoughts pondered, for we had learned from the sober young man the story of their experience above related. Mr. Lindeberg furnished the couple money for passage by commercial steamer to Seattle, where they were met by my mother, who piloted their start anew in a land strange to them.

IN 1921

In 1921 the *Bear* transported to various Siberian Coast ports, an officer of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. The officer made observations to determine the change of variation and magnetic force at these points. Reference tablets that he placed were later dug up by the Bolsheviks and destroyed.

In September, 1923, the *Bear* again visited Anadyr, Siberia, and other trading posts along the Siberian shore, to pick up American traders, who had been forbidden by the Bolsheviks to conduct business there.

NEWS COMES OUT

In the fall of 1923 full particulars of a Far North tragedy were first learned. The incident goes back to the landing, by the *Silver Wave*, on September 16, 1921, on Wrangell Island, an expedition consisting of four men and one Eskimo woman. This Canadian party consisted of Allan Crawford, a college student, Errol Lorne Knight and Frederick Maurer, men who had spent years in the far north, and Milton Galle, together with an Eskimo woman seamstress and cook, from Nome, Alaska, by the name of Ada Blackjack. The party planned to remain on this desolate island one year, hunting and prospecting, and incidentally to establish by occupation, a claim to the island in behalf of Canada, providing the latter country decided later to take advantage of their occupation. Knight was a polar traveler of extended experience over both arctic ice and land. He had accompanied Vilhjalmur Stefansson on his long sea-ice journey through the Beaufort Sea and far to the northeastward, where new lands were discovered. Maurer had also been a member of far north expeditions. Provisions for two years were carried to cover emergencies and a plentiful supply of arms and

(Continued on page 57)

BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

■ The Presidents of the Dominican Republic and Haiti issued on February 27, 1935, a joint statement concerning the settlement of the last remaining difficulties in connection with the demarcation of their common boundary, of which statement a translation follows:

On October 18, 1933, in the border cities of Dajabón and Ouanaminthe, General Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic, and Dr. Sténio Vincent, President of Haiti, began a series of direct personal conversations with the purpose of agreeing on a plan to end difficulties in marking the boundary line between the two republics, under way in accordance with the treaty of January 21, 1929.

These conversations were successfully continued, first in Port-au-Prince during the visit of President Trujillo Molina to Haiti last November, then in Santo Domingo in February of this year, where President Vincent was the guest of honor of the Dominican Government and people. All but one of the matters pending were decided in Port-au-Prince, and that was satisfactorily resolved in Santo Domingo. The long-standing and vexatious boundary question has thus been happily settled and the clauses of the 1929 treaty have been scrupulously observed.

With the settlement of these five difficulties which had been pending and which had hindered the execution of the survey agreed upon by the treaty of January 21, 1929, the controversy on the subject of the execution of the aforesaid treaty is definitely ended.

In the interests of peace and to strengthen the ties of friendship which should exist between countries, the two Governments considered it advisable to rectify the 1929 boundary in the sector from the point on the *camino real* (which goes from Bánica to Restauración and crosses the Libón River at Passe Maguane) to the point at which the *camino real* crosses the Artibonite opposite the town of Bánica. It was agreed, however, that this rectification should not lessen to the slightest degree nor prejudice at any time the ease of transit assured in that section of the boundary to Dominican citizens by the treaty of January 21, 1929.

President Vincent and President Trujillo, embodying the common aspirations of the two peoples which share the sovereignty over "the marvellous isle," have manfully and wisely decided to put an end to the old and at times bloody frontier dispute through an agreement negotiated in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, fraternal friendship, and reciprocal understanding of the true national interests of each with such political foresight that the diplomatic instrument, even before being ratified by the respective National Assemblies, received the unanimous and enthusiastic approval of the two Republics which, to quote the felicitous expression of that great Dominican prelate, Monsignor Nouel, have at last "marked the boundary in order to efface it."

The executives of all countries, the foreign offices of all Governments, the League of Nations, the Director General of the Pan American Union and other persons and institutions that labor fervently for the maintenance of universal peace have sent congratulatory messages to President Trujillo and the Dominican Foreign Office on the occasion of the happy and definite settlement of its boundary problem. The answers given by the Presidents of the Spanish American nations to the opportune message of President Trujillo suggesting the joint and

fraternal offer of their good offices so that the sister Republics of Bolivia and Paraguay may put an end to the bloody armed struggle of annihilation have likewise been satisfactory because of their manifest spirit of solidarity.

In laying the resolution before the Board the Hon. Cordell Hull, chairman, said:

I cannot refrain from saying just a word expressive of the deep satisfaction I know each of us and our respective governments feel at this heartening news that two of our sister Republics have had a will to peace, and a disposition for the peaceful settlement of a long-standing boundary question, to such a degree that they have been able to come together in a spirit of justice, fair dealing, and fair play, and to work out a thoroughly satisfactory adjustment. Just now when so many other governments, in other parts of the world, are seemingly unable to come together in this spirit, at least to the extent necessary to make possible the peaceful and satisfactory settlement of differences, the example which these two American Republics are setting should make a deep impression in every foreign office, in every capital of the world. I know I voice the sentiments of my colleagues on this Board when I say that we join in extending our most enthusiastic congratulations, and in paying the tribute of our admiration to these two sister Republics who, amidst all the fog and confusion that pervades international affairs in so many parts of the world, have set this splendid example. I hope that it may be long remembered, and that each of us will take pains to keep it alive wherever we go.

I suggest that the members of this Board signify their assent by rising. The resolution is unanimously agreed to and the Director General will forward this resolution to the Governments of the Dominican Republic and of Haiti.

Referring to the boundary settlement between the two countries the President of the United States described it as an outstanding example of statesmanship and international achievement. The President of Bolivia praised the true American spirit shown, and the President of Costa Rica commended the solution of the boundary question which had divided the two nations for 91 years. The President of Ecuador considered it a magnificent monument erected as a tribute to cooperation, racial vigor, and the great destiny which history reserves for the American continent. The President of El Salvador expressed his deep rejoicing at so notable an event, and the President of Guatemala declared it to be a noble and patriotic example of civic virtue given to the world and to the cause of peace in America by the two Chief Executives. The President of Nicaragua said that the happy conclusion of the boundary question by the Dominican Republic and Haiti had helped to stabilize peace in America. The President of Panama described it as a lofty example of Americanism, and the President of Paraguay as a superlative manifestation of concord. The President of Venezuela expressed his heartfelt satisfaction at the example which the two nations and their distinguished Presidents had set. And finally the Secretary of State of the United States declared that the settlement arrived at is a most significant event in Pan American annals and clearly demonstrates that good will among neighbors will surmount any difference arising between them.

EDITOR.

PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

WHAT PRICE PISTOL?

MELVIN M. JOHNSON, JR.
Second Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.R.

■ The service pistol occupies a rather peculiar place in military armament. It is certainly not the foremost nor yet the hindmost weapon in our national defense. A great many individuals who are equipped with the automatic have very little use for it in either sense of the term. Of course officers are primarily equipped with the pistol; yet amongst those there are relatively few who could be called "pistol-conscious." This is no place to go into all the reasons why individuals do not like pistols. Perhaps it may be said that "we don't like pistols because we don't know them, and we don't know them because we don't like them." The writer once saw a rather delicate woman for the first time in her life fire the service pistol on the L target for a ten. Thereafter she couldn't hit the paper. The reasons are obvious. Anyone who has fired the service pistol either with or without success is quite capable of giving honest reasons for his inability to use it effectively, either upon all or certain occasions. However, no attempt is to be made here to tell anyone how to become an expert pistol shot in ten easy lessons, except perhaps to say that it must be properly held in the hand, held the same way each time, accurately sighted; that it must be fired calmly and with deliberate application of trigger pressure, with the least possible tremor of arm and body, above all maintaining complete equilibrium of the nervous system. There is perhaps another element of great importance especially to the man who uses the weapon in service, which is that if a man has little confidence in the qualities of a weapon he is not likely to strain himself to bring about its maximum efficiency in his hands. In a word, if you do not have confidence in and respect for the accuracy and efficiency of a weapon it is never of much value to you. It is one of the purposes of this paper to touch upon some of the more commendable features of the late Mr. Browning's Colt-manufactured .45 automatic pistol. No attempt is made to support the proposition that an effective and accurate hand-gun is an extremely valuable and necessary piece of armament. It is obvious that the military branches of the United States government are somewhat imbued with that idea. However, the writer cannot pass on without telling one little Marine Corps story about a certain officer who used the service pistol "as she should be shot." This story came from a prominent field officer and the writer, to use a legal phrase, will seek to hide behind the "skirts of his immunity."

It seems that a patrol was attacked in an old farm house. A certain officer who happened to be very proficient with the service pistol found himself confronted by a hostile individual who thrust a revolver into the officer's ear, snapping the hammer most fortunately on an empty cylinder. Some time after the smoke of battle had cleared away and the assailant of the officer duly interred, the latter was heard to make the following comment, in effect: "I was kind of upset when that chap shoved that gun in my face. You know I was so excited that I shot him twice." It is hardly possible to suggest that this officer expended government munitions unduly.

It has been suggested in connection with other types

of ordnance that ammunition is a most important factor. That is especially true of the service pistol. The automatic pistol cartridge has received much attention in the past dozen years, especially with regard to potential accuracy. Range and muzzle velocity remain comparatively unchanged. Several years ago, in fact in 1925, Frankford Arsenal turned out 50-yd. groups from machine-rest which could be easily covered by a silver quarter. Average group diameters have been in the vicinity of 1.5 to 1.75 inches at 50 yards. One authority on this subject states that at present .45 automatic ammunition from Frankford is, on the average, as accurate as any made. Since this is not a dissertation on hand guns, examination of the .38 special revolver cartridge will not be made. It may be reasonably accepted that our service pistol ammunition is at present far more accurate than the hand of the average pistol expert is capable of indicating. Digressing for the moment on the subject of barrels it may be asserted that the service barrel is most accurately bored; that its length of 5 inches is quite sufficient in so far as its inherent accuracy is concerned, especially because the powder used is of a fast-burning type which is highly efficient in that barrel for which it was particularly developed. The matter of "burning-time" and "barrel-length," though rather technical, is extremely interesting but will not be covered here, except to say that the Ordnance Department as usual knows just what it is about, the only reason for extra barrel length lying in the possible advantages which may be obtained by a longer sighting radius.

Returning now to another phase of the ammunition question one must bear in mind as one inevitably does in so very many connections the mission of the service pistol and its relation to other arms. It is inevitable that the first of the nine principles of war, objective or mission, should be our starting point. And thus we come to a proposition which, from the writer's experience, belongs to that category of information which practically everyone in the service knows by heart. The writer has never heard an informal discussion of our present service pistol which did not include a resumé of shooting "hard-boiled" people with smaller calibered weapons just after the Spanish War. Those who were in combat discovered that a .38 would not put the enemy down. Therefore the .45. In a word the service pistol is primarily, in fact almost exclusively, a short-range weapon. In a well-balanced armament it is inevitably so. There is a tool for every trade and in the field of small arms only the rifle is satisfactory for range. Nor should we forget the obvious fact that the hand of man is so limited that for orthodox pistol work extreme accuracy at longer ranges would be rather valueless. But on the other hand, when the opposition is close at hand the knock-down feature becomes of paramount importance. It is doubtful that the bullet of the .45 is of a shape which would lend itself readily to long-range development. It may be noticed that pistol bullets which are capable of greater range in front of a proper propellant are generally of greater length in proportion to their sectional density or calibre. In fact, it may be said that sectional density is the secret of the stopping power of the .45 automatic. However, it has been demonstrated that a lead bullet of the same size and of practically the same shape is capable of even greater stopping power. Before considering that we may dispose here of the proposition that if that is so we ought to use lead bullets in the automatic chiefly because the softer lead

bullet, as distinguished from the metal-jacketed type, becomes quickly deformed in the function of operation of the self-loading weapon. Going one step further we may dispose here of the argument that the revolver rather than the automatic should be our side-arm. Aside from other factors automatics make for fire power and in view of the very purpose or mission for which our military side-arm has been developed, fire power is most essential. It is not the writer's object here to weigh all the advantages of revolvers and automatics as military weapons for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that in the last analysis the automatic is superior, although the automatic certainly has many disadvantages; not the least of which is that many persons have a preconceived idea that you cannot hit anything with "the things."

If the reader will pardon the peculiar chronological treatment employed let us return to the question of bullets once more. It is submitted that very often it is easier to state a result which has been indubitably demonstrated, than to adduce a logical chain of reasons why a certain thing is so. Those readers who are hostile to the legal profession may perhaps sympathize though they do not approve of the fashion which has flourished in legal circles of producing various complicated reasons in the support of a result which, as the layman sees it, is the only possible result to be reached. Or as Admiral Farragut put it—"Well, we all know what he said." It has been clearly demonstrated that a soft lead bullet of about .45 calibre, having a flat point, is capable of producing more stopping power than a bullet of the same weight in size which is covered with a metal jacket. It is also demonstrated that in the realm of pistols calibre and bullet weight are more effective than velocity, which can only be obtained in a smaller calibre weapon, bearing in mind inherent limitations on the hand gun. Tests were made once in a stock-yard using almost every type of weapon available. The fire was directed at the non-vital parts of steers. The report comments on the fact that such weapons as the Luger and Mauser pistols made very little impression. On the other hand the subjects could not take more than a couple of rounds of .45 calibre lead bullets, though perhaps could stand a bit more from the .45 automatic using the conventional jacketed bullet. In favor of the jacketed bullet, it may be said that it is less susceptible to deviation upon impact. Since expanding bullets are illegal in warfare, it is sufficient to say that for military purposes, if not for hunting, the stopping power of the heavy blunt nose projectile is more efficient than what may be called the "shocking power" of the high speed expanding pistol bullet, although this question is by no means a settled one.

So far the writer has attempted merely to touch upon several of these points without going into a detailed discussion of any of them. The ultimate proposition is that the service pistol as a particular weapon, if not as part of the class of hand-guns generally, is colloquially "not as bad as it is cracked up to be." The writer was very much interested at one time to observe a successful series of assaults upon the lives and safety of the rather diminutive red squirrel. These squirrels were shot at from all possible angles, often partially unconcealed, in rather poor light, from ranges up to perhaps 30 yards. In fact, as a sporting proposition there is as much to be said for red-squirrel hunting with the .45. One shot in the body proper is invariably sufficient. Still you have to make reasonable contacts.

Although not called upon to do so, the writer submits

that an enlarged Partridge front sight with the square notched rear sight is much more practical for all types of pistol shooting. The Marine Corps type of front sight used on the rifle illustrates this principle. In rapid fire shooting it is much easier to realign the sights; they are much more effective in poor light; blur is to some extent eliminated. It is submitted respectfully that under the present system pistol novices tend to be permanently ruined as marksmen from the very moment they receive a loaded magazine on the firing line. The very principle of using the .22 for rifle instruction is quite ignored with the pistol. In view of the factor of expense the writer submits that there is at present on the market a "toy" pistol of surprising accuracy which uses No. 6 shot propelled by rubber bands. All of the fundamentals can be demonstrated by the use of some such weapon at extremely slight expense. This pistol is equipped with adjustable partridge sights, costs only a few dollars, and the shot can be used over and over. The reader is assured that no commercial interest is being furthered here.

The writer once witnessed a case of a man who literally could not hit an egg crate at 15 yards. The shooter realized that he was flinching, yanking the trigger, and so on. His anecdote was rather simple and most successful. He had another man load the gun for each shot in such manner that the shooter could not possibly know whether the piece was prepared to fire. The result was that after some embarrassing contortions with an empty gun that just went click, the shooter became utterly indifferent whether it went off or not and simply concentrated on those things which are necessary for the proper handling of the weapon. The writer was much impressed by this procedure because that shooter hung up an average of better than 93 per cent on the standard "long" service qualification course, on several occasions getting up to 97 per cent during the period of informal summer firings. This method of instruction has been used on other students with equal success and is submitted, not as an original proposition, for what it is worth. At least it works pretty well and that in itself is a pretty good recommendation.

In conclusion it is submitted that the service pistol, especially the new model with its improved grip, is a weapon not to be ignored; that it is accurate and extremely effective within the ranges for which it is designed to be used, that beyond such ranges the efficiency of hand guns diminishes sharply; that our present system of pistol instruction tends to be harmful rather than helpful; that those who are equipped with this arm should be encouraged to develop it as a weapon to be used as such rather than as a club; that its limitations are physical and psychological, rather than mechanical defects in the weapon itself.

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PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

DIPLOMATIC SPURS

(Continued from page 25)

surrender their firearms. This decision made the enforcement of the disarming order a purely military activity, and at the same time charged the Occupation with the duty of gathering all evidence for the conviction of persons found in possession of arms, ammunition and explosives in contravention of the disarming order of November 29, 1916.

It is not contemplated to give an account of the manner in which the invading forces secured and collected arms from the date of entrance into the Republic to the date of the Proclamation of the Military Government, other than to state that considerable quantities of firearms were taken by compelling the leaders of the Dominican military forces to lay down their weapons in token of surrender, assisted by a search of suspected areas, where arms were reported to be secreted. As an incentive to the Dominican leaders, and to prevent the indiscriminate scattering of arms throughout the Republic with the increased difficulty of securing them later, it was recommended by the military authorities that money be furnished by the Dominican Government for the purchase of arms voluntarily surrendered.

In order to keep a complete record of the arms acquired by the Military Government, the district commanders were directed shortly after the beginning of the Occupation to submit monthly reports of all arms and ammunitions collected within their respective districts. A compilation of these reports indicated that by July, 1922, the Brigade had collected in round numbers about 53,000 firearms of all descriptions, approximately 200,000 rounds of ammunition and some 14,000 cutting weapons. The greater portion of these collected articles were procured during the early years of the Occupation.

The firearms consisted of revolvers, rifles, shotguns and "pata de mulas" (sawed off rifles or shotguns), and in the order named the percentages were roughly 66, 26, 5, and 3. The larger part were of an obsolete pattern and in such poor condition as to render them of little or no practical value. Huge quantities were destroyed either by burning or dumping at sea. The better types were retained by the forces of Occupation or issued to Dominican officials, and in some instances to deserving individuals on firearm permits. A few found their way into the hands of the inevitable souvenir hunters.

It may be interesting to know that on a basis of a population of 800,000 Dominican inhabitants, the figures for firearms as already presented show that one firearm was confiscated or turned in for every fifteen inhabitants, including men, women, and children. Counting one male inhabitant to each six inhabitants, which is believed to be a conservative estimate for Santo Domingo, this meant approximately two firearms for every five adult men. With this in mind, together with the knowledge that the Military Government was unable to gain possession of all firearms in the Republic, as large quantities were reported to be buried there appears substantial evidence that the male population of Santo Domingo went about armed.

The collection and confiscation of firearms, ammunition, and other deadly weapons by the Brigade did not terminate until the Provisional Government had been inaugurated. The showing made by the Brigade in this capacity was remarkable and was highly commendatory to those officers and men who were directly engaged in the collection of the prohibited articles as defined in the disarming order of November 29, 1916.

CONTROL OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES

The fact that the population had to all intents and purposes been effectually disarmed was not in itself conclusive evidence that many of the inhabitants would not again hasten to arm themselves, provided energetic means were not taken to discourage any tendency in this direction. Some plan had to be evolved without delay by means of which it would be impracticable and dangerous to procure firearms either from within or from without the Republic; if the Occupation was to reap the full benefits of the Brigade's successes in disarming the population. Careful thought had to be given to those methods the Military Government resolved to adopt, in order that it might prevent the derelict condition of authority that existed under the Dominican regime, which imposed no restraint whatsoever on the unlawful ownership and the promiscuous use of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Not until the Military Government had satisfactorily assured itself, that the inhabitants had been disarmed to the point where they no longer menaced the public safety, was the Occupation prepared to dictate the terms of prohibition by which it proposed to govern the use of firearms and explosives. When the Military Government was disposed to reflect upon this measure of restriction, two courses of action were open: one, the absolute refusal to the possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and the other, the permission to possess and use these articles subject to regulation.

Had the Military Occupation decided upon the former course of action, its decision could hardly have been interpreted as an abuse of authority, but nevertheless such use of prerogative would have been looked upon by Dominican and sojourner alike as unjust and high-handed. Considering the numerical strength of the armed forces and the inadequacy of local police protection in their relation to the great extent of Dominican territory, it is extremely doubtful whether ample police refuge could have been furnished to all parts of the Dominican Republic. Should such a condition have arisen, aggravated by a deplorable lack of quick communication and means of rapid transportation for the purpose of summoning aid, the denial to possess and use firearms would have been viewed rightfully as an unreasonable imposition. Then again, for example, there were numerous outlawed parties, such as the bandit groups and remnants of old revolutionary bands, which the Occupation could not hope to disarm except after months or probably years of strenuous campaigning. As a consequence of this situation, had the Occupation persistently denied the use of firearms, and unequal balance would have been created, extremely prejudicial to the law abiding elements. The knowledge that commercial and industrial establishments and well to do citizens were without armed protection would have greatly encouraged the lawless factions to broaden their scope of operations.

In a like manner, it did not seem possible or reasonable that the Military Government could overlook the value and need of explosives within the Republic. As revealed later there was a considerable demand for explosives both for constructional purposes and engineering projects. To have declared prohibitory restrictions against their use would have materially arrested the development and improvement of industrial and commercial enterprise.

If the Occupation was desirous of achieving a reputation for liberal policies in matters of equity, it seemed

that the above causes were ostensibly of sufficient importance to impel the Military Government to authorize the use of firearms and explosives, even if conditioned on the retention of certain reservations. So it was prompted to act as evidenced by the closing paragraphs of the disarming order.

This order, it is to be remembered, enjoined the inhabitants to voluntarily surrender their weapons and as an additional precaution specified that the carrying or possession of these articles would be liable to punishment by the Military Government. It further stated that after the above orders had been complied with, the following would apply to the legalized use of firearms and explosives:

"After these regulations have been put into effect, explosives needed for peaceful public or civil purposes may be released by competent authority of the Military Government in the necessary quantities for immediate use, provided that the intending users are responsible persons and that they accept responsibility for the proper custody and use of the released explosives to insure that they will not be employed for any purpose inimical to public order.

"Under exceptional circumstances, of whose existence and duration the Military Government will be the judge, responsible parties in exposed locations may be permitted to keep a limited supply of arms and ammunition by competent officers of the Military Government; conditioned upon the acceptance of responsibility by the recipients that the arms and ammunition do not fall into improper hands, and that they will be used only for self-preservation, and not for any purpose inimical to public order."

It was an estimable decision that prevented the people from availing themselves of the above privileges until the population as a whole had been disarmed, or otherwise the military authorities would have had great difficulty in maintaining a rigid check over the use of firearms and ammunition. In working out the details of the Military Governor's order, the military authorities had to consider first, the conditions that would govern the legalized use of firearms and explosives, and second, the extent and character of supervision that would be requisite to control the sources of supply of these same articles. Once these points had been solved, and given shape in the form of instructions to the command, they were incorporated in Brigade General Orders. As will be noted the provost marshals were to play the principal role in the execution of all orders relative to firearm permits.

The Brigade Orders at one time or other empowered the following officials or commanders to issue firearm permits: provost marshals, district commanders, and the provost marshal general. The provost marshals were authorized to grant permits to carry arms within their own jurisdiction in certain excepted cases only. These cases referred to civil officials, such as provincial governors, judges, procuradores generales, procuradores fiscales, alcaldes, alcaldes pedaneos and other officials exercising police functions. Originally, no other permits were issued without first having the express approval of the Brigade Commander. This procedure was later altered and district commanders were authorized to issue permits without reference to higher authority, but which were valid only within their respective districts. The provost marshal general was authorized with the approval of Brigade Headquarters to issue

general permits to government officials, which were valid in two or more districts. When general permits were granted the district commanders were notified accordingly, in order that they might be previously informed of the identity of the holder.

Before any permit was issued, the person who desired to possess a weapon had to make application to the nearest provost marshal in the district in which he desired to carry the firearm, and at the same time had to establish his identity beyond every reasonable doubt. In all cases where the provost marshals were not authorized to issue permits, these officers in the forwarding endorsement of the applicant's request had to state or verify the nationality, character, affiliations (political, commercial, etc.), occupation, and address of the applicant, and, furthermore, the necessity for granting the permit, including the actual danger to be guarded against. This information was mandatory before a standard permit could be completed and issued. In this connection, provost marshals and district commanders were cautioned to exercise the greatest care to the end that permits be issued only where real necessity existed, and that any application which had the appearance of enhancing the prestige of the applicant should be promptly refused.

Permits were issued on a standard form with a description of the person to whom issued, together with the character and serial numbers of the firearm, and the purpose for which it was to be used and the locality in which it could be carried. These permits were non-transferable and had to be renewed each year or otherwise they were concealed and the firearm turned in to the provost marshal. As a warning to holders of permits, they were impressed with the fact, that the unauthorized use of their firearms would lead to their trial by military court and the immediate confiscation of the firearm.

Permits were granted for the possession of revolvers, pistols and shotguns only. No other firearms could be legally possessed by any person within the Dominican Republic, other than a member of the armed forces of the Occupation. The privilege of possessing rifles was refused consistently because of the injury that might result through their falling into the hands of enemies of the Military Government. As a matter of fact, it was exceedingly difficult to secure a permit for any kind of weapon. This was particularly true in the early days of the Occupation, although later a more liberal view was taken in authorizing their possession. At no time did the number of weapons held by the inhabitants under permits exceed 2,200. Firearms that were retained under permits were obtained from the confiscated weapons held by the military authorities or through importation.

In order to maintain a strict and close count of all firearms granted on permits, the provost marshals were directed to keep a record of all permits issued by them, a copy of which was forwarded to the district commander. The district provost marshals in turn submitted to Brigade Headquarters annually a list in duplicate of all permits issued within their respective districts. In addition to this yearly report they also rendered a monthly change sheet in duplicate, containing a list of permits issued and cancelled during the month.

As the Marine forces were not armed with the various type of firearms held by owners of firearm permits, the ammunition for these weapons had to be secured from

other sources than within the Brigade. The greatest portion of ammunition, in fact all of the revolver ammunition for sale to persons authorized to have firearms was purchased by the provost marshal general from the Intendant General, Policia Nacional Dominicana. This ammunition was turned over to the district commanders, who distributed it to their provost marshals for sale. Certain merchants were also authorized to sell shot gun shells to persons possessing shot guns under fire-arm permits.

There were no facilities within the Dominican Republic for the manufacture of firearms, explosives and ammunition, other than a few hand loading devices for the making of cartridges. Therefore as these articles had to be obtained from sources outside of the Republic, it permitted the Military Government to control their introduction into the country through the medium of importation. As the Brigade Commander was charged with the regulation and use of firearms, ammunition and explosives within the Republic, it was only proper that he should exercise some similar supervision over the sources of supply. Accordingly, he was granted sufficient latitude and authority to decide upon the great majority of all applications for the importation of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

Any person, or representative of a business, commercial or industrial firm desiring to import these articles was obliged to make written application for permission for each separate shipment of arms, ammunition or explosives in which had to appear in detail the quantity and character of the stores to be imported, together with the name of the firm from which the stores were to be purchased, and the port from which they would be exported. All applications were forwarded through the local provost marshal, who endorsed the request with such information or recommendation as would establish the character and identity of the applicant.

In the event the application was approved certain formalities had to be undergone before the articles could be shipped to the consignee. For example, with few exceptions all firearms, ammunitions and explosives were procured from United States, but as the President had issued a proclamation in 1905, prohibiting the export of arms and munitions of war from any port in United States or Puerto Rico to any port in the Dominican Republic, it was necessary to obtain an exemption or exoneration for each shipment. The Brigade Commander forwarded a notice of the applicant's approved requests to the Secretary of Foreign Relations, in order that the proper notification might be sent to the Dominican diplomatic representative in the United States. This official in behalf of his constituent made representation to the the United States Department requesting the usual declaration of exemption, and when this authorization had been secured the exporting firm was allowed to make shipment.

Immediately upon the arrival of the arms, ammunition or explosives at a Dominican port of entry, the customs officials notified the local provost marshal of the receipt of these articles. They were then deposited in the provost store room or in such place as the provost marshal might designate. The imported articles could then be drawn by the consignee in such quantities or under such conditions as the provost marshal might indicate. Usually these particular imports involved small quantities of stores, unless it was an un-

usually large shipment of explosives for engineering or constructional purposes.

The disarming of the population, the breaking up and the surrender of the bandit groups, together with the strict enforcement of the permit regulations destroyed the last vestige of any illegal traffic in firearms or munitions of war. This policy was heartily approved by many Dominicans, and even the most prejudiced who had been bitterly inimical towards the Occupation, later proclaimed it the one outstanding and redeeming feature of the Military Government, which has proved beneficial to the welfare of the people.

POWERS OF ARREST

When the United States had determined upon the formal occupation of Santo Domingo, the Brigade became the moving factor in the enforcement of the Executive Orders, and the Proclamation of Intervention, the maintenance of order throughout the Republic, the prevention and suppression of banditry, unlawful assemblies and uprisings, and the repression of crime, breaches of peace and other violations of the laws. This assignment of tasks virtually made the members of the Brigade or such portions of them as were specifically charged with the performance of the above duties, peace or police officers. They were automatically vested with the authority to make arrests and were empowered to apprehend all individuals or groups of individuals suspected or detected in the act of committing offenses against the Military Government, or offenses against the civil laws as remained in force under the sanction of the Occupation.

The offenses under which arrests were most commonly made, comprised banditry, insurrection, illegal possession of firearms, smuggling of contraband, violation of censorship rules and immigration laws, criminal acts of a serious nature, disturbance of the peace, malfeasance of civil officials, falsely posing as officials of the Military Government, destruction and theft of government property or personal property of members of the Occupation, defamation of character, and physical assaults upon members of the Military Government.

In the absence of a well defined policy governing the actions of the armed forces in the opening phases of the Occupation, it would be exceedingly hard to state definitely where the Brigade's powers to make arrests actually began and ended. Generally speaking, the armed forces were primarily and initially interested in the enforcement of the orders of the Military Government, and yet the added responsibility of preserving peace and order and repressing crime obliged the Brigade to act both as a civil and constabulary police force. From the viewpoint of international law, the forces of the Brigade had unlimited authority to make arrests regardless of the offender or offense committed. However, if such jurisdiction were exercised at any time it was only for a short duration at the beginning of the Occupation, when chaotic conditions prevented the ordinary employment of the civil institutions in the enforcement of law. Aside from the practicability of reserving the exclusive right to make arrests, such action would have been incompatible with the spirit of the Proclamation of Intervention, which specifically stipulated that the Dominican statutes would remain in effect in so far as they did not conflict with the objects of the Occupation, and would continue in the hands of duly authorized Dominican officials under the super-

vision of the Military Government. Here was the clear intention of trying civil offenders by the Dominican Courts, and the apprehension of such offenders by civil officials was but a natural assumption.

With this conciliatory stipulation in mind, it is not surprising to find two other agencies actively engaged in making arrests, the civil police and Policia Nacional Dominicana. In these instances the authority to make arrests was derived from or delegated by the supreme governing power, the Military Government. However, the degree or sphere of authority wielded by these two police forces was not equivalent to the powers of the Brigade serving in a similar capacity.

The civil police, municipal and rural, operated under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of Interior and Police, and their authority as police officers embraced infractions of the civil law and municipal ordinances, and even then the authority was restricted to local boundaries. No cognizance was taken of the Executive Orders of the Military Government, except inasmuch as they related to the execution of purely civil affairs. The retention of the civil police in spite of many cases of inefficiency possessed certain commendable features. Principally did it compel an observance of the local laws, the violation of which the forces of Occupation could have had no concern and, furthermore, which would have been difficult to prevent, because of the reticence of the inhabitants to give evidence or divulge the identification of the violators to the Occupying forces. Moreover, had the forces of the Brigade been called upon to enforce the local laws and ordinances it would have been a great drain on their already overtaxed efforts.

The powers of the Policia to make arrest was projected both ways, that is, it possessed jurisdiction to make arrests for infractions against the civil laws and also against the orders of the Military Government. Notwithstanding, this dual authority did not eclipse all offenses either under the civil law or orders of the Military Government. Civil officials were jealous of sharing their prerogatives and reluctantly acquiesced to any appreciable indulgence on the part of the Policia to make arrests for misdemeanors triable by the local courts. In other words the Policia ordinarily was not authorized to arrest persons for violations of municipal ordinances. This was rather vividly illustrated by Policia orders which directed that the organization would restrict its operations within municipal limits to assisting local authorities when the latter were unable to cope with a given situation, and to guard against any interference in strictly municipal or communal affairs. They were, however, required to execute lawful warrants or orders of arrests issued by any judge of the Court of First Instance or any other official authorized by law to serve a warrant, and in this connection were frequently referred to as judicial police. It was their duty, when not in direct opposition to the civil authorities, to make arrests in cases of crime by violence, such as homicide, highway robbery, and burglary. They did arrest a large number of fugitives from justice, who had seized the opportunity to escape from the prisons during the general state of lawlessness that existed just prior to and immediately after the Proclamation of Intervention.

When the Policia was employed to enforce the orders of the Military Government, the authorities did not fail to overlook the fact that the Policia was primarily a

constabulary force belonging to the Dominican Government, even though that Government had been temporarily deprived of its sovereignty. It would have been manifestly unfair and improper had the Military Government insisted that members of the Policia make arrests for the violations of all executive orders. For instance, had the Policia forces been directed to enforce the censorship rules for attacks upon the Military Government and the United States, and ordered to make arrests for verbal insults or assaults against the members of the Occupation, the Policia would never have acquired prestige or popularity in the eyes of Dominicans. Such employment of the Policia would have given rise to strong prejudices which the organization would never have surmounted.

This triple police system was not without its complexities, and because of its complex nature there was frequently a lack of coordination, understanding, and a partial defectiveness in the combined system that was not always conducive to an effective enforcement of the civil and municipal laws. It was not unusual, especially in the early days of the Occupation, for the Brigade to assist the civil police and Policia in the normal performance of their duties. Again in exceptional cases, the forces of the Brigade were impelled to usurp the prerogatives of one or both of these agencies in making arrests, in order that offenders be summarily and vigorously punished. But as stated before, there was a strong and growing tendency during the succeeding years of the Occupation to inhibit the armed forces from participating in the administration of civil matters.

In discussing the subject of arrests, it might be proper to mention here the causes that led to the Brigade's decline in civil affairs. The perturbation that arose from the political crisis that immediately preceded the invasion of the American forces, along with the disorganization of the civil institutions occurrent with the Proclamation of Occupation, precluded the rigid enforcement of the local laws and ordinances by their former servers; civil officials were either incapable or unwilling to preserve peace and maintain justice under the civil law. The resultant effect of this situation made it mandatory to utilize the armed forces to act as civil functionaries. It followed then, that the Brigade's authority in making arrests had to include violations of the civil laws, and particularly a close scrutiny of criminal cases, serious disturbances, and such other acts as jeopardized the public safety. But as the Occupation was undertaken with no ulterior motive of permanent conquest, but with the idea of returning Santo Domingo to its former possessors as soon as the object of the Occupation had been accomplished, every effort was made to restore the administration of civil affairs to the Dominican officials. The tension which had developed between the time of the invasion of Dominican territory and the formal declaration of the Intervention gradually let down under the administration of the Military Government, and conditions improved until the civil officials were encouraged to resume their former official tasks, at the same time feeling assured of the support of the Military Government. With this gain in adjustment and stabilization, civil officials were entrusted more and more with the conduct of civil affairs, and the Brigade receded from its former position as a civil instrument. Arrests for violations of the civil law finally devolved wholly upon the civil police and Policia.

(Continued in the August issue)

RECRUITING DOCTRINE

Methods of securing men for the Marine Corps based upon current needs

COLONEL JAMES J. MEADE
U. S. Marine Corps

■ One problem will constantly confront the Recruiting Service as long as the volunteer system of recruiting remains in vogue, and that is how to get the right material to fill our ranks with a minimum of effort and expense.

The problem is as old as the military service. In the past it was solved with almost as many ingenious ideas as could be conceived. These ideas ranged all the way from grants of land as an award for periods of service, to the "press gangs," which flourished in Lord Nelson's time and forced into the service the fit and unfit.

Even the so-called selective draft of the World War was not new, as so many persons suppose, but was approved in this country as long ago as the Revolution, when both Massachusetts and Virginia passed conscription laws. Washington himself advocated the draft principle as the only system of enlistment that would prove satisfactory in times when large numbers of men were required for war service.

That there is nothing new under the sun applies to recruiting as to other things. The poster, for example, is as old as the Revolutionary War, and officers sought publicity as a first aid to recruiting shortly after the Marine Corps was permanently organized in 1798.

The roll of drums along Philadelphia's streets brought the first recruits into the Corps in 1775, and in the early days it was a common practice to "make frolick," as it was called, and induce recruits to enlist with the aid of military displays and demonstrations.

Newspaper ads are old, too. The *Chicago Tribune* ran advertisements telling about the attractiveness of Marine Corps life as long ago as 1866. Rarely in the old days were there any permanent recruiting locations, it being the custom for officers to recruit their own men before going aboard ship.

All of us know that the life of the old-time Marine was as different from that of his prototype today, as the primitive life of our colonial ancestors differs from that of the modern American. Steady advances in living and educational standards have wrought their change in all the services.

It is only natural that these readjustments brought about a more standardized method of recruiting, with established recruiting centers, set quotas, and more businesslike methods in the enlistment and training of men.

Oddly enough, some of the practices for securing recruits have survived through the years, namely the poster and the newspaper article or advertisement. They have survived because they are still worthwhile and are still approved by up-to-date mercantile concerns who have advanced as far in their own particular field as has the Recruiting Service.

Methods of telling our "customers" what we have to sell have also advanced with the times aided by the movies, radio, pictures and pamphlets. Year by year there has been a tendency to lift the veil of secrecy that formerly surrounded the service. Military matters which would

have been strictly censored a few years ago are now often broadcast as subjects of current interest.

No exact parallel can be drawn between old-time and present-day recruiting methods. Today we invite the prospect to spend four years in a service that has vastly improved in living conditions; that has introduced many new departments, such as radio and aviation; that offers a free education; and that requires a somewhat higher type of recruit.

It must be remembered that the applicant of today is a more discerning type of individual. He is better educated. And he is more likely to weigh the net results of his four years of service than would his brother of a previous era. Nation-wide educational standards are vastly higher than they were ten or fifteen years ago.

Depression times have led scores of men to look with more favor upon the security and economic safety that can be found only in a permanent organization, rather than to seek greater financial rewards in any one of the other occupations, subject to the changing conditions of the times.

There are many young men throughout the country who desire service in the Marine Corps because they have read or heard about the opportunities offered by the Corps for travel and adventure which they feel will aid them in the development of their character, their welfare and their ambitions.

The task of the recruiting personnel is to gain contact with great numbers of these young men, find out what qualifications they possess and select for enlistment those who have the necessary qualifications—mental, moral and physical—to perform well the varied and important duties of a Marine.

Successful selection of recruits demands careful judgment on the part of the recruiting officer and his assistants so as to meet the requirements for enlistment laid down by the Major General Commandant.

In order to attain a high percentage of recruits who will serve with honor and distinction throughout their enlistment, it is advisable that the prospective recruit or applicant be furnished with accurate information of what will be required of him during his service, and that he have some time to consider the proposition after he has been furnished with this information. It is also advisable that the District recruiting personnel have accurate information of the character and qualifications of the applicants whom they are going to select for enlistment.

In the past, the Recruiting Service has employed various methods to gain contact with young men interested in service with the Marine Corps. From experience, it has been found that one of the most economical and efficient methods of approach is by means of short articles of interest, furnished by the Recruiting District to the weekly and daily papers published throughout its territory, in which the address of the district office is given and a note embodied in the article stating that applications by mail will be given careful consideration.

When the inquiry is received the contact has been made, but the development of this contact requires considerable time and energy. A means of the development of this contact with the inquiring applicant is to mail him an application blank to be filled out by himself, a preliminary physical examination blank to be filled out by some reputable physician, and an addressed envelope in which to return these blanks, together with pamphlets and literature which give him detailed information regarding the duties and opportunities of a Marine.

If the applicant is still interested and returns the above mentioned blanks properly filled out, they are carefully

studied by the recruiting personnel and a decision is made by the recruiting officer whether to notify the applicant that he cannot fulfill the present requirements or to request further information from him.

The next step with the applicant who apparently has the necessary qualifications is to furnish him with a parents' consent blank, if he is under twenty-one years of age, and request that he have this blank filled out by his parents and attested by a notary.

With the return of this blank, he is asked to forward information regarding his educational qualifications, and two letters of character recommendation, covering several years of his life, from established business or professional men in his local community.

When the applicant has satisfactorily complied with the above requirements his name is placed on the waiting list of applicants in the chronological order in which he completes those requirements. When a quota is received by a district headquarters which has an ample number of applicants on the waiting list, the work of filling the quota is a pleasant diversion from the more arduous work that has previously been performed, and it requires but a small portion of time to become personally acquainted with the prospective Marine with whom the district personnel have already become well acquainted through correspondence.

After the recruit has been transferred to the Recruit Depot, a personal article forwarded to his home town paper not only increases the morale of the recruit while he is undergoing training at the Recruit Depot but it pleases his parents and friends and is usually productive of inquiries from some of his friends or acquaintances.

When the man has been in the service for six months to a year, a letter to him requesting information as to his progress in his new profession and interesting experiences he has had, followed up by a letter to his parents expressing continued interest in his welfare is a fruitful source of material for general or local stories for publication.

A recapitulation of the stations at which these men are serving at the time gives an amazing picture of the wide distribution and manifold opportunities that are available to the young man of ability and ambition. Pertinent facts regarding promotion, transfer, commendation, etc., will be furnished the recruiting service from time to time and should be the subject of newspaper articles in home town papers.

Other successful means of establishing contact with applicants are: "A" signs properly placed; letters to high school principals, postmasters, reserve officers, etc. Many recruiting officers have had unusual success in radio broadcasts which they arrange for free of cost. Others have been successful in making arrangements with announcers to put in short notices between broadcasts to the effect that the Marine Corps has a number of vacancies for desirable applicants, giving a short statement of the requirements.

A district, after securing its current monthly quota, should have on the waiting list by the fifteenth of any month sufficient applicants to fill the maximum quota that it may be called upon to enlist during the following calendar month.

The stress of high-pressure recruiting and the making of quick appraisals regarding the merits of an applicant are greatly relieved by our present plan. It works well both ways. The applicant himself has a better chance to carefully weigh his decision before enlisting.

In this regard, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the telling of the whole truth in regard to the service. Service in the Marine Corps, fairly estimated, certainly can hold its own in comparison with almost any sort of a

civilian occupation nowadays.

Flexibility in recruiting methods must also be considered. The use of advertising matter, greater display of posters, the liberal broadcasting of recruiting literature, more radio addresses, even the opening up of more recruiting stations should be visualized as "possibilities" of the future. Recruiting officers should at all time be prepared for any sort of change brought about by new or unexpected demands upon the Recruiting Service.

The strength of the various services is not standardized, and perhaps never will be. Neither are recruiting methods. Our present method of getting recruits by what might be called the "appraisal" plan, is very effective. The Recruiting Service, however, must be on the alert to adapt itself quickly to any unforeseen demands it may be required to meet in the future.

Editor's Note—July 1, 1931—there were nineteen (19) officers and one hundred fifty-seven (157) enlisted men on recruiting duty; the rental of offices cost \$1,532.86 monthly. July 1, 1932—there were fifteen (15) officers and one hundred nine (109) enlisted men on recruiting duty; the rental of offices cost \$284.50 monthly. July 1, 1935—there were sixteen (16) officers and fifty-seven (57) enlisted men on recruiting duty; the rental of offices cost \$72.50 monthly. During this period the procurement cost of recruits, including all overhead, transportation to the recruit depots, etc., has been cut from approximately seventy-five (\$75.00) dollars to about \$25.00 each. The above clearly sets forth the substantial saving, amounting to approximately a quarter of a million dollars annually, to the government brought about by the adoption of present-day recruiting methods.

THE OLD BEAR OF THE NORTH

(Continued from page 48)

ammunition was at hand. It would be hard to conceive that tragedy lay ahead of them. True the expedition was one attended by dangers and one in which the elements would have every opportunity for attack. However, with a thorough knowledge of the Arctic, with fair breaks, the expedition would have been a success. Plans were for a chartered vessel to pick them up the following summer. Unfortunately, ice was unusually heavy during the summer of 1922. Captain Joe Bernard, of the auxiliary schooner *Teddy Bear*, made every effort to reach Wrangell Island that season; the price of his charter was to be doubled in the event of success. Heavy ice kept him from approaching anywhere near the island. Records left by the ill-fated party on the island also verified that the ice conditions were so bad they did not expect any ship that summer.

A HARD WINTER

All went reasonably well with the party until the winter of 1922 set in. Whereas tentative plans had long been made to attempt the trip across the ice to Siberia, which they hoped to make with the same ease as Captain Bartlett in 1914, doubtless the fact that Knight felt the first symptoms of scurvy, made the party less than ever willing to chance remaining on the island until the following summer. Of course there was no guarantee that ice conditions would even then permit their rescue by steamer. It seemed to be advisable to leave one man on the island to protect Ada Blackjack from solitude and act in the capacity of hunter. Eskimo women are trained only to sew and cook. Maurer was accordingly left on the island. Early in January, 1923, Knight, Crawford and Galle set out on the ice. In a week or so Knight found his scorbutic condition would never permit him to reach the Siberian shore. For this reason the men returned to Wrangell Island.

(To be continued)

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CAPTAIN HEALY'S REINDEER

(Continued from page 29)

When at long last the dancing ceased, the partially cremated bodies of the reindeer were taken from the fire and the natives fell upon them and with their knives proceeded to hack them to pieces and gorge themselves as though they never expected to see food again. Some of the women rescued some of the tidbits and offered them shyly to the white men; but with this exception no ceremony was observed and in an incredibly short space of time every ounce of the feast had been devoured. The natives now lighted their pipes and sat down in readiness to hear what Captain Healy had to propose. Through an interpreter he then told them that the Eskimos, with whom they had traded for so long a time that their grandfathers could not remember, were slowly dying of starvation, because the whales, walrus and seals were being destroyed by the whalers and there was nothing left for them to eat. If they all died there would be no more trade and the deer-men would also suffer. Therefore, the Great White Chief of the Americans had told Healy to ask the deer-men if they would not allow him to take a few live reindeer on his ship to Alaska, to see if they could not be raised there and so give the Eskimos something to eat. If this could be done the Eskimos would soon grow strong again and be able to trap the foxes, minks, otters and sables which were found in their land, and to send their pelts to the deer-men for exchange for the skins of their reindeer. If they would consent to this plan, Healy's heart would be glad, and he would know that the deer-men spoke the truth when they were his friends. "I have spoken," he concluded, "Now let me hear your answer."

HARD TO ANSWER

For a long minute absolute silence fell upon the throng of listening natives and then one of their headmen, a magnificent specimen of savage manhood, with the feral grace of one accustomed to the hardships of life in the open, stepped forward and said that all that the Umalik (Chief) Healy had said was known to be true by the deer-men and that they were sorry in their hearts for the Eskimos. They knew that the whalers were killing all the whales and walrus and that Nanuk (polar bear) grew fat on the carcasses of the walrus left to rot on the ice floes, for all the whalers wanted was their tusks. Why

did the Great White Chief permit the whale men to do these things? Why did he not tell Umalik Healy to send them away and let the Eskimos have their food again?

This was hard to answer and Healy was silent.

The native continued, "My people are willing to let Healy have all the deermeat he can carry on his ship and give it to the Eskimos. They can pay us for it when they are strong and can hunt again. But our wise men have spoken to the Spirits and they have said it is not good for us to sell live reindeer to the white men and we are afraid for if we shut our ears and do not listen to what our Spirits say, evil will come upon us and we will surely die." Amidst a murmur of approval from his fellow tribesmen, he ceased to speak.

HEADMAN SPEAKS

It was apparent that an impasse had been reached, and Captain Healy realized that nothing he could say would overcome the superstitious fears of the deer-men and that the project was faced with defeat.

At this juncture, Koharra, the local headman, who had been quietly seated beside Healy, rose from the ground and began to address the assembled natives. "You all know me," he said, "I am Koharra and you all know that I am your friend. Umalik Healy is also my friend and there is a bond between us that cannot be broken. I do not want to see him go away with sorrow in his heart. So I ask you to sell me the reindeer that he wants and if the Spirits are angry if I give them to him, you will not be blamed. It will be only Koharra who will suffer. I have spoken! What is your answer?"

For a moment there was dead silence and then as the full import of Koharra's words dawned upon them, a shout of approval showed that they were more than willing to agree to this settlement. Then Koharra turned to Healy and said: "It is settled. Let us lose no time in getting the reindeer into your boats. Follow me." Together they proceeded to where the reindeer were grazing and five animals, three females and two males, were quickly selected by Koharra, cut out from the herd and driven down to the beach. Here they were hobbled and placed in the waiting boats and from thence they were carried to the *Corwin* for transportation to Port Clarence, at which place there was a native school in charge of Mr. Minor W. Bruce, under whose care it had been decided to leave the animals during the coming winter. Arriving at this point, the reindeer were safely landed and soon were peacefully grazing on the moss-covered plain a short distance from the native settlement.

After leaving directions with Mr. Bruce as to the proper care of the reindeer the *Corwin* resumed her usual cruising duties, and nothing more was heard of the project until the arrival of the *Corwin* at Port Clarence on her next annual summer cruise in these waters. It was then found that the little herd of reindeer were in excellent condition and that the original number of five animals had been increased to eight by the birth of three fawns.



AUTHOR INSPECTS DOG TEAM

ALL DOUBT REMOVED

All doubts of the success of the experiment were now removed. It only remained to carry out the project to its legitimate ends to insure in the future an ample and never-failing source of food supply for the Eskimos, if they could be induced to give up their former means of subsistence to a certain extent, and to adopt the life of a pastoral people instead of one which depended for its existence on fishing and hunting. Dr. Jackson at once began the work of securing this result by the purchase of an additional number of reindeer from the Siberian deer-men and their distribution, with the cooperation of Captain Healy, to other native schools situated on the coast of Alaska. This was made comparatively easy since, at the next visit of the *Corwin* at St. Lawrence Bay, Koharra, who had taken upon himself the responsibility of allowing the first herd to be taken alive out of the country, was found to be in excellent health and as he had apparently suffered no ill fortune as the result of his disregard of the warnings given by the Siberian shamans, the deer-men were found to be not only willing but anxious to sell to the white men any number of reindeer which might be wanted. The additional number of animals procured during the summer of 1887 was distributed to other native schools in Alaska with the same instructions as to their care as had been given to Mr. Bruce at Port Clarence and in addition to these directions, Dr. Jackson inaugurated a plan of operation of the several herds which was not only ingenious but proved to be, as we shall see, eminently successful. At each of the schools the native pupils were given the opportunity of acquiring by actual experience the proper method of taking care of the reindeer herds and at the end of a period of two years, those who had proved themselves capable of doing this were to be considered as "graduates" in the course of reindeer culture and entitled to the loan of as many reindeer as might be avail-



TYPICAL ESKIMO WOMEN

able at the time for the formation of a separate herd, the increase of which would be for their own use and benefit. Under the operation of this plan, during the succeeding ten years, thousands of reindeer came into the possession of the natives, and the increase of the original stock was so great that in some cases a single family owned more than one hundred animals.

These happy results, however, were not achieved except after several years of strenuous work on the part of Dr. Jackson and a small but enthusiastic coterie of humane people who had been induced largely by the personal appeals made by him to lend their aid to the project. By extensive writing in the public press and by



REINDEER AT PORT CLARENCE, ALASKA, WITH NATIVE HERDER AT LEFT
PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

speeches made before the Presbyterian Board of Missions, the Chatauquan Institution and indeed, wherever he was given an opportunity of explaining to the public the necessity for the further extension of the project, Dr. Jackson's following gradually increased in numbers until during the next cruise of the *Corwin* in the summer of 1888, he had been supplied with a sum of money large enough to purchase the third consignment of reindeer from the Siberians and to have them distributed as heretofore among the native schools in Alaska.

SUCCESSFUL VENTURE

The initial steps in this vast undertaking had been successful beyond the hopes of its most sanguine promoters. But in order that its ultimate objective should be reached some means of importing the reindeer in larger quantities must be found. In consequence of this fact Dr. Jackson next appealed to the national government for aid and finally during the winter of 1888-9 a Bill was passed by the Congress granting an appropriation of \$35,000 for the purpose of purchasing the required number of animals to complete the project, and to have them transported to Alaska in a commercial vessel which was to be chartered for that purpose.

In order to accomplish this object, Lieutenant E. P. Bertholf, a young officer of the U. S. Coast Guard, was directed by the Treasury Department to proceed to Russia and to make contact with the deermen to be found "somewhere" on the vast tundra plains of Siberia, and to arrange with them for the purchase of the reindeer and for their delivery on the coast of Bering Sea at some point most convenient for their shipment to Alaska on the vessel which was planned to be on hand at the place selected for the embarkation of the herd.

The story of Bertholf's journey almost half around the globe to carry out his orders, of the difficulties he overcame and the suffering from exposure and lack of proper food he endured, while on this trek across the blizzard-swept plains of Siberia, is one of the most gripping tales of duty well performed in the annals of the Coast Guard, and that is the highest prize that can be bestowed on any man. But it is too long to be included in this article. Suffice it to say that his orders were accomplished without a hitch and the new herd was landed in Alaska, with the loss of only a very few of the animals by injuries received en route and by straying from the herd while being driven across over a thousand miles of unknown country.

FROM FINLAND

This was the last importation of domesticated reindeer from Siberia and with the exception of a small herd which was imported from Finland, it comprises all the animals from which the present vast herds which now graze on the moss-covered plains of Arctic Alaska have grown. From the last census made of the animals it is estimated that the total number at present owned by the natives and white men, who have entered into the business of raising them on a commercial basis, is in the neighborhood of half a million head.

The problem of a new food supply for the starving Eskimos has been solved, and a new industry created that will, in the future, be more valuable than all the gold that has been salvaged from the sands of our once despoised but incredibly wealthy Arctic Province.

YUKON vs. MAUNA LOA

(Continued from page 18)

well fortified. It would cost Japan valuable men and equipment to seize them and, after she did that to hold her advantage. In this supposed war, neither side could afford to sacrifice any weapons.

Japan, it is maintained, would not be so foolish as to risk undertaking an expedition to Alaska, thus dividing her forces and opening herself to a body blow. There would be long lines of communication and supply to maintain and our Navy would be on her back from Hawaii.

SEIZURE OF ALASKA WOULD BE FOOLISH MOVE

But, let us suppose for a minute that Japan did attack and seize the beautiful harbor of Seward. What would she have, once she got it? Control of the coastal terminal of the Alaskan railroad, Mr. Brownell points out. But it is very doubtful if that would do her much good.

She would be unable, say the experts, to do the United States much harm by such control. We are not dependent, in time of war, on anything which Alaska produces.

Modern naval vessels no longer use coal and the oil in Alaska is almost negligible. So far as supplies are concerned, there are over a million reindeer in the northern part of the country. But Alaska is absolutely dependent on the United States for her food supply. She imports annually several million dollars worth. The invading Japs would have a very difficult time feeding themselves, to say nothing about the rest of the population. She would have to keep long lines of communication and supply open at great expense and risk.

Mayor Brownell believes that the enemy would use Alaska as a base for air attacks on the Pacific Coast cities. The present cruising range of bombers, it is pointed out by his opponents, does not make this scheme feasible. But, if it did, her base of operations would be subject to attack from this country. The Army would be able to bring into action aeroplanes which would, in all probability, make the defense of Alaska by any invader almost an impossibility.

There is one more point. The mayor quotes a California Congressman who said that, with the Navy in the Atlantic, the Pacific Coast cities will be left defenseless, "protected only by old forts with several mortars and naval type rifles."

While it is probably true that the defense of these cities is not the most perfect possible, the Army is faced with a practical problem. Every coast city from Miami to Seattle brings political pressure on Capitol Hill to spend money fortifying its property. The coast line is long and there is a definite limit to the available funds. Also, there are other weapons besides mortars and rifles, such as powerful antiaircraft guns.

THE RESERVISTS AND THE NEXT WAR

(Continued from page 14)

tion. They know the value of cover from airplane observation; the proper method of communication, and the value of aerial support in an attack, and the absolute necessity of synchronizing their attack with the movements of the air force.

Furthermore, as a gesture of comradely feeling, we have undertaken the training and instruction of the en-

listed personnel of the Reserve air unit with which we maneuver, in infantry drill and general infantry instruction. Officers and men alike of the air unit have stated unequivocally that they have gained a greater knowledge of their own part in battle from this land-soldier instruction. We feel, with justifiable pride, that we have, through these methods of unorthodox Reserve training, paved the way to a better and more efficient understanding of the respective duties and values of these organizations.

Before the present year is out, our Battalion plans a voluntary land-sea-air maneuver which will startle many military and naval men by virtue of an element which we plan to inject which will point out the value of keeping the civilian population apprised of our activities of training. We hope to show that as England made effective use of her commercial fishing fleet in the North Sea during the last war, so American civilians can be shown where they too can be of value in the scheme of a united national defense. Details of this plan, now being carefully worked out, must of necessity be withheld at this time for obvious reasons. But it will give our infantry-trained unit the additional sea training they will need in the matter of landing shore parties to defend or retake any of our insular possessions which might fall into enemy hands in a future conflict.

This treatise should in no way be misinterpreted as any criticism of the present training schedule or its planners. It is merely the expression of opinion and suggestion of one who earnestly feels the necessity of preparing our Reserve troops *in advance* for unusual and ultra-modern methods of warfare which we are certain to face in the next World War. Personally I should like to see a general discussion eventuate from the publication of this article (if it is published) and from such a compendium of ideas and suggestions could come the very type of "super-advanced" Reserve training as is needed.

What of the "tricks of the trade," known by the old-timer of the Islands or the Cuban or Haitian campaigns? Would the average reservist know how to properly forage in a strange tropical land—or construct the proper shelter for his small patrol in the tropical hills? Couldn't some of this material be well included in the curriculum of the Reserve school of instruction? Such subjects likewise would serve to break the monotony of the existing training schedule. Grading men into various classes in a unit is not sufficient to keep their interest nor to give them the utmost in necessary combat training.

And what of the much-discussed "specialist system" of training? Granted that any Marine—regular or reserve—must be first thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals, and be experienced and trained in all phases of routine work, it is, to my humble mind, a mistake not to classify, *right now*, those specialists in Reserve units who, in addition to the regulation training, can be encouraged in duties of a special nature which they are fitted for by virtue of professional experience in civilian life, or by educational qualifications.

I realize that this is a sore spot with many military men—a hotly debated point—yet the very nature of the Corps and its duties makes such a system almost imperative. It is not new to have an unofficial substitute in training to take over, in event of casualty or discharge from the Reserve, the duties of some authorized specialist. Thus in our unit we have a system of "assistants" in everything from instruction to administrative work. The company clerk has an assistant who is working with

him on his office work, an extra-duty training which he volunteers for, with the hope of a quicker promotion in an emergency or in the event of the clerk being discharged. Thus, when an unavoidable absence from drill keeps our company clerk from his duties, his assistant steps right in and the work suffers no delay. This policy is carried out in the matter of technical instruction. The officers of the command are supervising instructors—the sergeants the instructors, and each has a corporal as an assistant instructor. Each must be thoroughly prepared to lecture on the specific subjects announced in advance on the armory training schedule. Thus any absence does not delay the schedule, and the burden is more evenly divided. In addition it trains the junior non-commissioned officer in the work of company instruction, and makes him more efficient.

We are fortunate in this particular company in having many specialists in various branches of engineering, administration and other subjects related closely to military science. We give them fairly free rein, under supervision, in the practise of the subjects in which they are most interested or professionally equipped and experienced. This encouragement has done much toward keeping an extremely high morale and enthusiasm in the entire command, and encourages other men, less skilled, to select subjects in which they may become proficient. This, I believe, is an effective argument in favor of the specialist-soldier. In our case it most certainly has proved its value in the results obtained and the high efficiency of the unit.

In conclusion, therefore, it is my humble suggestion that careful attention be given, particularly in the Reserve, to those important elements of advanced training which ultimately will prove their absolute worth in the saving of lives of trained men who otherwise would become casualties in the war of the future, and a better understanding of the potential problems to be faced in the next conflict—against which we pray and prepare, but for which we must be ready and equipped.

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

(Continued from page 36)

whose willingness to help you has been definitely established is much to be preferred.

Once there was such a man employed in a key position in a telegraph office in a certain foreign port. Our intelligence officer had made his acquaintance and had done him a very marked favor in connection with his family. This particular man had a marvelously trained memory, in that he could read a file of despatches and remember almost verbatim the important ones. Thus he was never observed in any more than the usual perusal of the message files at his office, but later, when off duty, he would transmit such items as were of any importance to the intelligence officer by word of mouth. The latter would then copy them down. No writing or record could ever connect the employee with the leak, if any had been discovered. This resulted in several important messages being intercepted by the intelligence system which otherwise had ever remained a secret. This is only cited as one case, and no two cases will ever be alike. The thing to remember is that this is a valuable source, and that it must be tapped with delicacy and discretion.

Some of the most direct and simple expedients are likely to turn out to be the best means of securing the information desired. Thus we shall see how profitable

it was in one case to watch the transportation routes. Steamers, busses, trucks, and railroads, as well as airplane lines are simple everyday things which it may be very important to watch. In this case there had been a revolutionary upheaval and troops from the capital were being sent into the interior. It was necessary to know where they were going and in what numbers. Ordinarily the best way to find out would have been to ask the general commanding the army. However, as this particular general had proved recalcitrant, the next best thing to do was to watch the exits. The roads had to be watched for truck transport or marching columns. The railroads we knew had to embark troops and material at stations or sidings, and airplanes had to leave from air ports. Steamers left from the docks. All these would have to be covered. But the idea was put forth that it might not hurt to ask the station agent beforehand. Much to the relief of the intelligence unit in question, the agent at the railway station had no orders to the contrary and readily divulged the fact that the troop movement was to take place by rail from a certain station. All there was to do after that piece of luck was to check the troops out by stationing an agent inconspicuously at the station.

Once in a while there comes a very difficult assignment which appears hopeless at first. A case in point was one where the intelligence officer of a ship was handed a despatch from a naval station stating that an airplane with no military markings, but of distinctive color, had flown over the reservation in violation of international law. It had flown away before any effort could be made to repel or pursue it. The commandant expressed the belief that the plane might have flown towards the foreign port in which the ship addressed was visiting. Problem was to find the airplane in question, and it looked pretty hopeless from the meagre data available. It was not known whether it was a sea or land plane; hence both airport and sea plane landing had to be covered. Everything was based upon guess-work. The estimated time over the probable course at the most likely speed had to be roughly figured. Then there was the possibility of stops for refueling and stops beyond or before reaching our locality. Due to a delay in transmitting the despatch, it was thus calculated that the plane, if travelling over the usual course and at a probable speed towards this particular port, had already arrived and most likely had left. So it was with little enthusiasm that the intelligence officer called up an acquaintance of his who was an official at the airport. Much to his surprise he learned that his wild and disconnected calculations were approximately correct, for the agent reported that such a plane had just checked in and out the day before. A visit to the airport and a perusal of the usual report of arrivals and departures convinced the intelligence officer that luck had again favored him. The numbers and markings on the plane, the names of the pilot and the passengers, the destination given, all served to identify the airplane. Later the intelligence officer had the satisfaction of hearing that his work was well-done and worth while. It proved to be a foreign airplane and the violation of our rights at international law was duly protested via the usual channels.

Chance very often plays an important part in the gathering of information. This is illustrated by the case of a certain island of no great commercial importance, hence not in the usual sea lanes. It was desired to ascertain certain information as to its harbor, its defenses, and its topography in general. The assignment came to a

certain unit that was engaged in an operation in another area, far removed from the island in question. Yet no other force was any nearer, nor was it expedient to despatch a force there for this mission at this time. In the course of time the intelligence officer met the skipper of a Norwegian tramp steamer which had recently called at that island. Cultivating his acquaintance over a few congenial cups it was possible to elicit quite a few of the items desired from the skipper, without the latter becoming aware that he was being pumped of valuable information. Thus by mere chance he was enabled to submit a report which he had never really thought was going to be possible, in view of the circumstances under which the assignment had to be worked out.

Personal contacts are a very valuable source of information for the volunteer intelligence agent. If upon arrival at a place the personnel of a unit stick to themselves in a close corporation and fail to meet and mingle with local people, both foreign and native, they are wasting a good chance to learn things which cannot be learned any other way. Incidentally they can be of but little use to the intelligence system. People love to talk, and the more you gain their confidence by social contact the less are they apt to hold back. Sometimes to keep his hand on the pulse of the local situation all an intelligence officer needs is to have a half dozen or so volunteer helpers who are willing to contact the various groups and classes of persons who go to make up the community. The labor is not arduous, for all you have to do is keep your wits about you, and the results are sometimes remarkable from the standpoint of information. You would be surprised at the different way of looking at things that different social and racial groups have. As a liberal education, this sort of work has college lashed to the mast. And, because we are human too, we form our own opinions and character, widen our horizon, acquire a more cosmopolitan outlook. As we grow older, and depend more and more upon our intellects for the zest of living, we shall have no reason to regret any wasted opportunities to improve our erudition in a practical and delightful way. We shall have shed many a useless prejudice, and we shall have attained that modicum of discernment and human understanding which is essential to achieve mental poise.

But aside from the philosophical aspects of human contacts, we have the practical value of a discreet gregariousness. This is illustrated by the case of a certain politician of distinctly leftist tendencies whose activities concerned us vicariously, but very deeply. The local chieftain in power at the time was likewise suspected of this tendency, but was clever enough to lambast the Reds in public, and to make frequent disavowals of any liaison with the leftist politician, who was definitely connected with the Third International. A volunteer intelligence worker was gradually and inconspicuously worked into the social circle of the chieftain under observation. The frequency with which the Red politico was present at the places where the chieftain had his social life, coupled with a shrewd questioning of the other persons found thereabouts elicited the fact that these two were working together and that the disavowals and other public acts of the big chief were simply drawing a herring across the trail. Thus the mere presence of our volunteer agent in the circles in which the chief moved enabled us to become correctly informed about him, and resulted in this particular case in materially affecting our policy towards him.

But the average case will be less glamorous. It will

be that of the volunteer agents, commissioned and enlisted, who mix with the ordinary, average people representing all shades of opinion. Lest any should discount the tremendous value of this type of work, we should consider what it means to have a true cross-section of the reactions of all the people in a place to their political, economic, and military situation. It may well be the most important part of intelligence work, as the temper of a people may well be the deciding factor in forming our policy towards them. One need look no further than pre-war Germany to establish the momentous value of this factor in political and military decisions. The miscalculation of the reaction of the people of the United States to ruthless warfare was perhaps one of the greatest mistakes of the age. The Imperial German First Line of Defense was largely to blame for the error. Let us so build ours that we may not some day regret its failure to inform us correctly. There is no manual of instructions that can possibly tell us how to go about this. Human ingenuity will work the thing out for each individual and for each particular case. Suffice it to point out that this is one of the most important tasks of the military man, to form a part of the great intelligence net which has its center in Washington, and local foci in whatever intelligence agency there may exist in any part of the world. Thus shall we quietly, devotedly, without glory and without reward, form a First Line of Defense behind which our diplomatic and military strategists can form up, drop their packs, take on extra handoleers, and shoot it out to the best advantage.

"BLOCKING THE BELGIAN BASES"

(Continued from page 12)

the mole extension was unable to report their presence and intention to the shore batteries.

From his elevated position Captain Carpenter could see the funnels of the block ships moving into the harbor. Convinced that the diversion afforded by the *Vindictive's* attack on the mole had made this possible, he went below to see the wounded and give the news to the crews below deck. The fire on the *Vindictive* was still heavy and casualties were occurring constantly. He wrote:

Every available space on the mess deck was occupied by casualties. Those who could do so were sitting on mess stools awaiting their turn for medical attention. Many were stretched out at full length on the deck, the majority being severely wounded ---. Somehow amidst all the smashing and crashing on deck, one had not realized the sacrifice that was taking place ---. I shouted something about everything going splendidly, the mole being stormed, the viaduct being blown up and the block ships having passed in. The cheer that went up will live long in my memory.

(CARPENTER, *The Blocking of Zeebrugge*, 196-197.)

As the *Thetis* leading the van of the block ships approached the harbor she ran into barrage fire which the Germans appeared to be firing aimlessly. As she cleared the smoke screens she came in for heavy shelling by the mole battery. Hampered by this fire and by poor visibility, the *Thetis* ran into the net boom, broke through, but was brought to a stop by a badly fouled propellor. By arrangement the other ships which had suffered but slightly in their approach to the harbor now steered past the *Thetis* and safely made the channel. They entered the canal and took up their positions almost unmolested. The *Intrepid* collided with a dredger and with the

Iphigenia, but Lieutenant Billyard-Leake managed in the "sulphorus darkness" to sink his ship in the position he judged to be most favorable.

At 12:50 A. M. the signal for the return of the landing parties was made on the *Daffodil's* siren, both of the *Vindictive's* sirens having been damaged by shell fire. After a quarter of an hour wait for stragglers, the cable was unslipped and the *Vindictive* prepared to move off. When the Germans became aware that the ships at the mole were making off, their vexation was naturally very great. Heavy shell fire was concentrated upon them, and the *Iris* suffered terrible punishment. Commander Gibbs was mortally wounded, and Major C. E. Eagles commanding the storming party was killed outright. In the reserved language of the official history, "when the *Iris* got out of the gunfire half her bridge was blown away, and she was blazing. The main deck was simply choked with dying and wounded." It was about this time that the German batteries also ranged the destroyer *North Star* and sank her with gunfire. The smoke arrangements amply covered the retirement of the *Daffodil* and *Vindictive*, although the Germans continued to fire blindly into the smoke.

The spirit of the British sailors throughout the engagement was beyond praise. As the end of the battle approached they seemed to sense the victory. Motor launch No. 282 under Lieutenant P. T. Dean carried 101 survivors of the block ships out of the harbor under heavy fire. The heavily-laden boat was hit repeatedly: the living, dead, and wounded were mixed in utter confusion.

But those who were alive and conscious had seen the block ships sunk in the entrance channel, and were swept by the wild emotions that seize men in the hour of victory. As the motor boat staggered towards the *Warwick* the men in her saw that she was flying an immense silk flag which had been given to Admiral Keyes when he commanded the *Centurion*. They rose to their feet and rent the air with their cheering. Their shout of triumph was amongst the last sounds of battle, for the swarm of ships that had appeared off the coast about two hours before was now fast disappearing in the darkness.

(NEWBOLT, *Naval Operations*, V. 264.)

As each ship of the scattered armada made its way to Dover it was greeted with a tremendous ovation.

Almost immediately a controversy arose over the effectiveness of the blocking operations. The British reported the harbor completely blocked and fortified their contention with aerial photographs showing the position of the block ships. In view of the generally conservative character of British Admiralty reports this view was widely accepted. The German marine commander who first inspected the block ships reported that the "channel was not completely blocked." On April 24th, Admiral Schroder reported that units of the 2nd "T" half flotilla (vessels of low draught) had used the passage on the west side of the block ships. He expressed an opinion that the blocking operations would not hinder the submarine warfare. On April 25th the German submarine *U. B. 16* used the passage, and "after April 28th the average number of sailings and arrivals was maintained." Engineers hurriedly dredged a channel on the west side of the block ships and removed two small jetties in order to get more room. No content with the use of the port, the Germans apparently circulated faked photographs in the homeland and neutral world in order to convince the world of the British failure. Captain Carpenter's book *The Blocking of Zeebrugge* written in 1921 shows that

he was unduly optimistic about the effectiveness of the blocking operation. He cites the number of submarines and torpedo craft "bottled up" at Bruges and says:

I believe that no torpedo craft or submarine could use the channel for a considerable time, and that about five months elapsed before they could enter or leave the canal at any other period than the top of high tide. He takes comfort in the fact that it was not until January, 1921, three years after Zeebrugge had been occupied by the allies, that the obstructions were finally removed.

It seems impossible, however, to assert that the blocking operation seriously interfered with German naval plans. Sir Henry Newbolt shows that the average number of sailings from Zeebrugge was maintained until June, 1918. An effective bombardment by monitors in that month caused considerable damage to the lock gate. He writes:

It is clear that the number of submarines working from the Belgian ports fell off during the summer of 1918, and that the decline may have been considerable enough to reduce the intensity of submarine warfare in the Channel and North Sea. But as this decline only began five weeks after the expedition against Zeebrugge was over, it cannot be attributed to the blocking operations and must be related to another cause.

(NEWBOLT, *Naval Operations*, V, 275.)

He believes that the reason for the decline in the volume of submarine activity was the lighting of the minefields at night and effectiveness of the new patrol dispositions in the Channel area. Before the attack on Zeebrugge the Germans had always countered such measures by destroyer raids, but since Zeebrugge could not be freely used as a port of stealthy exit and hasty return, this mode of attack was no longer practical.

In order to complete the Zeebrugge operation, an effort was made to block Ostend on May 10 with the *Vindictive* and *Sappho*. The latter vessel broke down and Commander Godsall made a desperate attempt to carry on with the *Vindictive* alone. Ill luck attended the venture; Godsall was killed at the crisis of the encounter, and the *Vindictive* was sunk in a position occupying about one-third of the fairway. The Admiralty, however, announced to the press that "the operation designed to close the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend was successfully completed when the obsolete cruiser *Vindictive* was sunk between the piers and across the entrance to Ostend harbor." Admiral Keyes made an effort to have this report corrected and planned to carry out another operation. This program was not carried out. The impression that Ostend harbor was successfully blocked is still widely held, as a glance at the latest edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* will show.

Captain Carpenter and others are careful to point out that the operation was not simply a "morale raiser," although it did exert that effect. The operation came at a time when the British army was facing a crisis in France. It silenced for a moment the question often raised in England as to what the navy was doing. In a war in which the naval power of Britain was employed in exerting "silent pressure," this bold stroke showed that the Royal Navy still had the dash and brilliance of the days of Drake and Hawkins.

The effect on the public spirit at home and abroad was undeniable. According to the official historian of the naval war:

The feeling aroused was not merely British pride in a British triumph—it spread like fire from country to country, from continent to continent; it raised the captive Belgians from their dark oppression; it excited fierce joy in the most distant America training camp. But above all it brought about that prevision of victory which often in great conflicts appears to be the deciding force—a prevision which is not confined to the combatants, but comes suddenly to the whole attendant world as a revelation of the inevitable end. After more than three years of deadlocked and alternating war, our force for both attack and defense seemed to have been enfeebled to the last point of exhaustion, when beyond all expectation the great Service which had already borne and accomplished so much for the Allies was seen to rise like a giant among the wounded and the dying and to deliver a blow which resounded with power and significance—the blow of a people whose heart was still unbroken.

(NEWBOLT, *Naval Operations*, V, 277.)

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


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